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My dissertation considers narratives of Indian captivity and antebellum slavery 
in relation to erotic novels that depict fantasies of willing enslavement.  While 
carefully evaluating the historical context of each narrative, I focus on the psychic 
dimensions of domination and submission in order to identify desire and agency and 
then to question when and if desire determines agency.  The psychoanalytic model of 
the seduction fantasy proposes that the eroticization of and the desire for submission 
may be linked to a structural foundation of human subjectivity.  By acknowledging the 
possibility of a subject’s masochistic relationship to the Other, I interrogate the 
psychic foundation of the desire for submission; such a desire raises an uncomfortable 
but necessary questioning of both the extent to which and the ways in which a captive 
is complicit in her servitude.  I offer an innovative approach to captivity literature 
through the development of a transhistorical account of the psychical conditions of 
servitude by showing that the captive’s ability to act as an agent of her own will is 
subject to both external and internal constraints: the orders of her captors, various 
historical and material conditions, and her unconscious fantasies, especially her 
relationship to the psychical Other.   
My first two chapters examine Mary Rowlandson’s The Sovereignty and 
Goodness of God and Catharine Sedgwick’s Hope Leslie, respectively.  I argue that 
the captives’ expressions of masochistic desire are linked to colonial political agendas 
concerning  racial hierarchies and territorial expansion.  Next I turn to Harriet Jacobs’s 
Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl in which Jacobs endures masochistic suffering to 
 move toward a political goal of freedom.  Chapter four focuses on Margaret Atwood’s 
The Handmaid’s Tale; like Jacobs, Atwood demonstrates the perils of being 
objectified in servitude.  Atwood also explores the constraints of a social and symbolic 
order that tends to limit expressions of a woman’s desire to fantasies envisioned by the 
male subject.  The final chapter considers Pauline Réage’s Story of O; it presents the 
most dramatic and definite example of a consenting captive, allowing me to untangle 
the complicated relationship between femininity and masochism in psychoanalytic 
theory.
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Seduction and servitude, two main topics of women’s captivity literature, 
highlight the entanglement of desire and agency that play out in the female captive’s 
account of her captivity experience.  Contemporary captivity literature, like the 
autobiographical accounts from earlier centuries, reveals that power relations between 
master and slave, captor and captive, are unstable and subject to contestation through 
inversions of authority and through the psychic relations between the two parties.  In 
my study of captivity literature, I examine a wide range of captivity narratives in order 
to study seduction as a mode of amorous discourse, a strategy of subversion, and an 
unconscious fantasy.  I consider autobiographical narratives that describe being held 
hostage in a foreign culture in relation to erotic novels that depict fantasies of willing 
enslavement.   
From a historical and generic standpoint, Mary Rowlandson’s The Sovereignty 
and Goodness of God is the foundational narrative of women’s captivity literature; it 
introduces the dynamic of domination and submission that recurs in later captivity 
texts by Catharine Sedgwick, Harriet Jacobs, Pauline Réage, and Margaret Atwood.  
Various theories of seduction stress the uncertain distribution of power between 
seducer and seduced, and the following terms associated with seduction demonstrate 
the ambiguity but also the richness of the concept: fantasy and reality, consent and 
coercion, and lastly, allurement and rape.  The terms fluctuate between seemingly 
contradictory poles, but it is in the very oscillation between these poles that an 
opportunity arises to locate both the female captive’s exercise of agency and the 
expression of her desire. 
Through the use of seductive ploys, I show how captive female figures 
challenge patriarchal familial arrangements and racist social structures as they trouble, 
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or possibly even overturn, these oppressive systems.  Thus, seduction presents itself as 
a possible mode of resistance for those who are slaves and captives.  Contemporary 
captivity literature by writers like Pauline Réage and Margaret Atwood engages in a 
critique of the symbolic order understood as language and as the social rules 
governing co-existence.  Through hyper-attention to linguistics and to destabilizing 
narrative strategies, Réage and Atwood self-consciously explore and test the 
boundaries of the representational ability of language, and they both suggest that the 
protagonists in each of their texts are captives of language as much as they are of 
various other social structures.  The psychoanalytic model of seduction, which posits 
the positions of object and Other, links transhistorical captivity narratives by stressing 
the psychic dimension of subjectivity that transcends any particular historical period.  
The focus on a Lacanian model of feminine subjectivity raises questions about the 
potential of the feminine subject to expose the inadequacy of the symbolic order, and 
it leads to an exploration of other possibilities of signification outside of the present 
symbolic order.  My comparatist approach highlights issues concerning feminine 
agency and desire, which are often obscured in historical and cultural studies of 
captivity literature.   
As far as the captive’s desire is concerned, she is often required to subordinate 
her desire to the desire of a male authority figure; on the official level, her expressed 
desire is meant to coincide with male desire.  However, a subversive model of 
feminine desire manifests itself in many of the narratives because the female captives 
often act or speak against various father figures.  Sometimes inadvertently and 
sometimes purposefully, female captives assert their agency in ways that contradict 
patriarchal ideology, including domestic, political, and religious ideologies, and this 
often occurs in the form of daughters or wives confronting and challenging the 
authority of various father figures.  In many cases, the agency of the female captive 
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has the potential to be a subversive force in society, one that reshapes the social sphere 
in ways that are more progressive in regard to the rights of women and people of 
color.  Many of the captivity narratives that I consider feature imperiled heroines who 
struggle to maintain their very lives, frequently in times of colonial or national crisis, 
and who challenge the norms of patriarchal society.  The captivity genre paradoxically 
stages the possibilities and limitations of women’s agency because the extremity and 
urgency of the situation suspends the necessity of conforming to conventional gender 
roles, even though the captive female figure is clearly enduring restrictions on her 
autonomy.   
Psychoanalytic theory proposes a crucial model of desire for both masculine 
and feminine subjects in which the subject responds to the desire of the Other; that is, 
a subject forms his or her ego as an object of desire for the Other, as in the account 
offered by Lacan’s mirror stage.  The psychoanalytic model of the seduction fantasy 
proposes that the eroticization of and the desire for submission may be linked to a 
structural foundation of human subjectivity; this model is formulated in Freud’s “A 
Child is Being Beaten: A Contribution to the Study of the Origin of Sexual 
Perversions,” an essay in which literature, history, and psychoanalysis converge.  
Many of the normal or typical children whom Freud analyzed reported that their 
masturbatory fantasies derived from Harriet Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin.  
Although by no means eliding the violent and degrading objectification suffered by 
victims of the historical institution of slavery, the children’s fixation on the 
exploitation and humiliation described in Stowe’s text highlights the possibility of a 
fundamental erotic fantasy in which the subject is in an unconscious position of 
masochism.   
The children’s beating fantasies also suggest that historical and literary 
accounts of servitude shape how people imagine and experience sexuality.  Moreover, 
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the beating fantasies reveal that involuntary servitude is not only a harsh historical 
reality suffered by unwilling, objectified victims but also a prevalent and fundamental 
erotic fantasy staging the subject’s relation to a psychical Other.  The convergence of 
eroticism and violence is exemplified in the fantasy’s fundamental wish: “I am being 
beaten by my father”; this wish indicates a primordial masochism at the root of the 
subject’s psychic position.  In light of this discovery, Freud theorizes the seduction 
fantasy, proposing that the subject’s ego is formed as an object of love or hate for the 
Other.  Lacan develops this theory in his account of the mirror stage in which the child 
constructs his or her ego as an object of the Other’s desire in order to repress the 
fragmented body of the drives, the site of primary masochism.  Thus, an eroticized 
desire for submission is an expression of the unconscious seduction fantasy, which 
suggests that even unwilling captives may find an element of satisfaction in the 
experience of servitude.  The captive’s complicity—at least in certain aspects of her 
captivity—raises complex questions about the psychic and political significance of 
masochistic desire, the instability of cultural boundaries, and the emergence of a 
feminine subject of desire.   
While my own study of captivity literature is not tied to a historical period or a 
historical model of investigation, historical studies of captivity literature are 
nevertheless important foundations for my analysis of captivity literature.  In her work 
on women’s experiences in frontier settings, Annette Kolodny argues that captivity 
narratives have the distinction of being “the single narrative form indigenous to the 
New World [which] is the victim’s recounting of unwilling captivity and that, in 
English, the history of this genre begins with a Puritan woman” (6).  Nancy Armstrong 
and Leonard Tennenhouse go one step further than Kolodny by arguing that “[o]ne has 
to go to America, in other words, to understand where English novels come from” 
(388).  Armstrong and Tennenhouse compare the plight of Mary Rowlandson among 
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her Indian captors to that of Pamela in the aristocratic house of the libertine Mr.B.  
Their comparison aims to show that an audience for novels depicting a non-
aristocratic woman striving to preserve her virtue and her ties to her home, whether of 
a larger community or of an individual family, originates with the tremendously 
popular narrative of Indian captivity written by Mary Rowlandson (391).   
As Armstrong and Tennenhouse point out, Samuel Richardson’s Pamela, 
which appeared in 1740, is “generally considered the first domestic novel” (388).  
Along with Kolodny, Armstrong and Tennenhouse raise key questions about historical 
events and developments in literary genre, and Elizabeth Barnes’s States of Sympathy: 
Seduction and Democracy in the American Novel similarly participates in this line of 
inquiry by showing how much of post-revolutionary American fiction “stage[s] 
political issues as personal dramas” (16).  Although Barnes does not discuss captivity 
literature in her study, I use her insights about the political workings of seduction 
novels to discuss Sedgwick’s Hope Leslie, a historical romance novel that abounds in 
multiple captivity scenarios.  Armstrong and Tennenhouse’s argument about the 
origins of the English novel identifies the centrality of the threat, or conversely of the 
welcome possibility, of seduction—whether sexual in the case of Pamela or cultural in 
the case of Rowlandson—as the main drama accompanying the woman’s captivity 
experience.  In one of the most recent studies of captivity literature to appear, Teresa 
Toulouse focuses on “the literal and methaphorical meanings of the possible seduction 
of the captive woman” in her work (18), The Captive’s Position: Female Narrative, 
Male Identity, and Royal Authority in Colonial New England, published in 2007.  
Christopher Castiglia considers the “the captives’ cultural crossings” in relation to 
ideologies about essential versus constructed identities (4), and Rebecca Faery 
analyzes the politics of cultural crossing in relation to the nationalist agenda of 
expansion.  Like Castiglia and Faery, Toulouse considers the implications of cultural 
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crossing in captivity narratives, but she frames the cultural border crossing in terms of 
seduction, as it was understood by the Puritans (161).  Across historical periods and 
across genres, seduction is a constant preoccupation of captivity literature, and as 
various critics suggest, seduction brings to the fore issues concerning sexuality and 
politics.      
Commenting on the blurred lines between fathers and lovers in seduction 
fiction, Barnes offers perceptive claims about the performative function of this 
literature in relation to its content: “Seduction thus denotes not only what the story is 
about but also what it does: it breaks down distinctions between parent and lover, 
moral guide and criminal influence, and translates ‘female education’ into another 
form of seduction” (9).1  Barnes also provides the etymology of the word seduction: 
“The root of both words is the Latin for ‘to lead’: dūcere.  Sedūcere is ‘to lead aside, 
or mislead’; ēdūcere is ‘to lead in the way of life, or to rear (a child),” and she notes 
that “the linguistic root of the words suggests that the difference between to lead and 
to mislead is not definitive but relative” (51).  Barnes cites the example of the Marquis 
de Sade’s Crimes of Love in relation to her discussion of seduction and education, and 
one might also consider Sade’s Philosophy in the Bedroom, a classic libertine text that 
rather spectacularly brings the two terms together.  There are two varying epigraphs to 
Philosophy in the Bedroom, one from the 1795 edition and the other from the 1805 
edition: “Mothers will make this volume mandatory reading for their daughters” and 
“Mothers will forbid their daughters to read it” (179, 180).  The two versions of the 
epigraph may result from a typographical error that substitutes “préscrira” (179) and 
“proscrira” (180), but either version is intriguing and provocative.  The first epigraph 
alludes to the instructive goal of the text, and the second version evokes the temptation 
associated with forbidden knowledge.  Eugénie de Mistival is a captive of sorts in the 
                                                 
1 See also p. 3 of Barnes’s work for a discussion of this topic. 
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home of Madame de Saint-Ange, a great devotee of libertinage, and she eagerly 
plunges into the lewd education that she receives from Madame.  In particular, 
Réage’s Story of O refers to the libertine world of sexual excess and indulgence 
envisioned by Sade, but all of the texts examined here likewise depict seduction, in 
terms of exposure to erotic temptation or to sexual abuse, as an integral element of the 
captivity experience. 
Sigmund Freud’s case histories and his other writings on hysteria, neuroses, 
and the drives lay the groundwork for psychoanalytic accounts of seduction and 
provide a key theoretical framework for my study of the importance of seduction and 
servitude in captivity literature.  Freud’s thinking on seduction goes through a number 
of complicated stages, but one of the important points lies in the oscillation between 
the positions of victim and agent in the seduction scenarios, that is one is either 
seduced or one attempts to seduce.  “Further Remarks on the Neuro-Psychoses of 
Defence” (1896), one of Freud’s early essays on seduction, stresses that seduction is 
an actual event in a person’s early childhood, which usually involves sexual contact 
between an adult and a child.  In the same essay, Freud proposes that hysteria arises 
from “sexual passivity during the pre-sexual period” (163); in contrast, obsessional 
neurosis arises from “acts of aggression carried out with pleasure and of pleasurable 
participation in sexual acts—that is to say, of sexual activity” (168).  Freud, however, 
is quick to point out “that precocious sexual activity always implies a previous 
experience of being seduced” (169), citing the example of a sister seduced by a brother 
who was in turn seduced by an older cousin—the cycle originating with a governess 
who had seduced the cousin (165).   
Freud’s investigation of the origin of neuroses in “The Aetiology of Hysteria” 
(1896) leads to further elaboration of the nature of seduction and of hysterical 
symptoms; he argues for the necessary foundation of a real experience of sexual 
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trauma, as well as the significance of the memory of the trauma.  In “Further 
Remarks” and in “The Aetiology of Hysteria,” Freud uses the term seduction to cover 
a range of sexual encounters, from “attempted rape” to a young man’s act of touching 
the hand of a young woman (“Aetiology” 200).  In the early stages of his work on 
seduction, Freud’s use of the word “seduction” generally refers to an incident that 
would be called sexual molestation or abuse in today’s terms.  Freud is direct in his 
condemnation of those who seduce young children:  
The childhood traumas which analysis uncovered in these severe cases 
had all to be classed as grave sexual injuries; some of them were 
positively revolting.  Foremost among those guilty of abuses like these, 
with their momentous consequences, are nursemaids, governesses and 
domestic servants, to whose care children are only too thoughtlessly 
entrusted; teachers, moreover, figure with regrettable frequency.  
(“Further” 164) 
The frequently cited 21 September 1897 letter to Wilhelm Fliess, friend and colleague, 
specifically mentions fathers as seducers, and this is the letter in which Freud declares 
“I no longer believe in my neurotica [theory of the neuroses]” (264).  Freud cites his 
failure to successfully bring an analysis “to a real conclusion” and “the surprise that in 
all cases, the father, not excluding my own, had to be accused of being perverse” 
(264).  Freud’s reluctance to name the father as seducer has generated a storm of 
controversy,2 and it certainly suggests a problematic desire to protect the father from 
the same criticism leveled at the caretakers named above.  However, it is important to 
                                                 
2 Various critics have rebuked Freud for his so-called abandonment of the seduction theory; Masson’s 
The Assault on Truth: Freud’s Suppression of the Seduction Theory is one of the most sensational 
examples of this.  See also Evans’s “Hysteria and the Seduction of Theory” for a discussion of Freud’s 
seduction theory in relation to his clinical practice.  See Cummings for a balanced treatment of the 
controversy over Freud’s seduction theory and for a development of his theory, especially the 
introduction and chapter one.   
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note that Freud never denied that sexual abuse of children by adults, including fathers, 
occurred; even after his theory on seduction undergoes substantial revision, Freud still 
considers seduction, understood as a traumatic sexual encounter in childhood, as one 
of the precipitating causes of psychical disturbances in adults.3
 The abandonment of the “neurotica” leads Freud to the next stage of his theory 
of seduction (Fliess letter 264); in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905), he 
argues for the existence of infantile sexuality, which leads him to underscore the 
pivotal role of fantasy in sexuality, especially through the myth of the Oedipus 
complex.  Freud downplays the role of seduction as an actual sexual event; instead, he 
focuses on “the factors of sexual constitution and development” (56).4  Yet, the 
interplay of reality and fantasy remains a vital concern in Freud’s work, and in Dora: 
An Analysis of a Case of Hysteria, he remarks “upon unconscious love relations” 
between parents and children, insisting that desire is operative in both parties: “at … 
an early age sexual attraction makes itself felt between parents and children, and I 
have explained that the myth of Oedipus is probably to be regarded as a poetical 
rendering of what is typical in these relations” (49).  Seduction is no longer 
exclusively theorized as an actual physical act involving genital contact between two 
parties; rather, it is a phenomenon involving the psyche.  Yet, the actual fact of a 
sexual trauma and the importance of fantasy in the unconscious is an irresolvable 
debate in Freud’s seduction theory.  Later essays by Freud such as, “Female 
Sexuality” (1931) and “Femininity” (1933), again stress the material reality of the 
body, claiming that the mother’s hygienic care for the child awakens the child’s 
                                                 
3 See Freud’s note added in 1924 to his essay on “Further Remarks on the Neuro-Psychoses of 
Defence,” p. 168. 
4 Freud’s essay on “Female Sexuality” also discusses the girl’s fantasy of seduction by the father as a 
manifestation of the Oedipus complex, see pp 191, 197; his essay on “Femininity” offers a similar 
theorization, see pp. 149-150. 
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sexuality.5  Positing the mother as the original seducer of the child, Freud discloses 
the uncertainties in his own theory of seduction, as well as the uncertain lines dividing 
fantasy from reality and seducer from seduced.  The roles of seducer and seduced are 
shifting and unstable throughout his theorizations of seduction, but the ambiguous 
nature of the event and Freud’s revisions to and developments of his theory suggest 
the complexity of agency and desire at play in the encounter of seduction. 
Analysis of the beating fantasies in young children leads Freud to further 
discoveries about the force of unconscious desire and the phenomenon of seduction.  
Freud’s “A Child is Being Beaten” sets forth three stages of the beating fantasy that 
offer important theorizations about unconscious processes such as repression and that 
show different vicissitudes of the drive.  Freud provides the following summary of the 
three phases of the beating fantasy in girls: 
The little girl’s beating-phantasy goes through three phases, of which 
the first and third are consciously remembered, the middle one 
remaining unconscious.  The two conscious phases appear to be 
sadistic, whereas the middle and unconscious one is undoubtedly of a 
masochistic nature; its content consists in being beaten by the father, 
and it carries with it the libidinal cathexis and the sense of guilt.  In the 
first and third phantasies the child who is being beaten is always 
someone else; in the middle phase it is only the child itself; in the third 
phase it is almost invariably only boys who are being beaten.  The 
person beating is from the first the father, but is later on a substitute 
taken from the class of fathers.  The unconscious phantasy of the 
middle phase had primarily a genital significance and developed by 
                                                 
5 See Freud’s “Female Sexuality” pp. 192, 197, 201, and “Femininity” pp. 149-150. 
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means of repression and regression out of an incestuous wish to be 
loved by the father.  (114) 
Freud stresses that the second phase is the most important (113); the second phase 
testifies to the power of the child’s love for the father to live on in the unconscious.  If 
being beaten by the father is indeed a subterfuge for the wish to be loved by the father, 
then the beating fantasy can also be read as a seduction fantasy because its aim is to 
secure the father’s love.  While the beating fantasy does convey the child’s desire to 
be the object of the father’s love, the question of agency is fraught with complications 
because the fantasy is unconscious.  The father’s role, or the role of whoever may be 
filling in the function of disciplinarian and standing in the place of the Other, in all of 
these fantasies is also ambiguous because he or she may be provoking the fantasy; that 
is, the fantasy may be a response to a perceived desire emanating from the Other.6
Jacques Lacan’s formulation of the mirror stage offers a theoretical model of 
seduction that moves beyond Freud’s original emphasis on the actual fact of a sexual 
encounter between a child and an adult (or even between a child and another child), 
but it nonetheless maintains a point of reference with Freud’s theory of seduction by 
emphasizing that the ego is formed as the object of the Other’s desire, as Freud 
suggests that it is in his analysis of the beating fantasy.7  As Tracy McNulty writes: 
“Lacan identifies the structural underpinnings of seduction in the mirror stage, where 
the ego comes into being as an object for the Other” (179).  While seduction is a 
                                                 
6 See Laplanche’s “Seduction, Persecution, Revelation” for a discussion of the transmission of a 
message as the heart of seduction.  Laplanche argues that “the other scenarios [primal scene, castration] 
invoked as primal have seduction as their nucleus, to the extent that they too convey messages from the 
other, always at first in the direction from adult to child” (170).  Laplanche’s “Masochism and the 
General Theory of Seduction” offers an extended treatment of the connections between seduction and 
masochism; the gist of his argument is encapsulated in the following statement: “The theory of 
seduction affirms the priority of the other in the constitution of the human being and of its sexuality.  
Not the Lacanian Other, but the concrete other: the adult facing the child.  A perverse adult?  Yes, one 
must say; but intrinsically perverse because his messages are ‘compromised’ by his own unconscious” 
(212). 
7  See Lacan’s “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic 
Experience.”   
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phenomenon that affects both male and female subjects, Willy Apollon suggests a way 
in which a further interrogation of the woman’s complaint of seduction by her father 
may open up questions about the psychic structure of femininity.  Apollon examines 
woman’s relationship to the signifier; he writes that “the signifier determines the 
unconscious relation of the subject to enjoyment (jouissance)” (101).  The signifier is 
a crucial key to the subject’s unconscious and a unique way in which the subject seeks 
to identify himself or herself as a subject.   In regard to the seduction fantasy, Apollon 
poses the following query in an attempt to account for Freud’s problems in theorizing 
seduction:  
Could all the little girls – the women in analysis – have been seduced 
by their father, or is it that the seduction fantasy is already formulated 
by what will become the phenomenology of the complaint or the 
memory of paternal love?  In other terms, shouldn’t we see, in the 
fantasy of the little girl’s seduction by the father, the very structure of 
the search for the signifier as pure offering of love?  (104) 
Apollon identifies the feminine response to castration, understood as alienation or lack 
in language, as a contesting of the signifier, a distrust of the signifier (104).  The girl 
seeks the father’s word of love to provide her with a unique and unmediated identity 
(that is, one which is not established through a relation to the mother); the failure of 
the father’s word of love to provide this unique signifier of love is related to the 
feminine subject’s distrust of the signifier, especially in relation to its failure to 
circumscribe and provide a limit for the experience of the Other jouissance.  The 
inadequacy of the signifier and of language is tied to seduction because the desire of 
the Other is a central concern in each of these concepts and phenomena, as Apollon 
explains, “The certainty required of the signifier in this questioning plays out the 
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fundamental inadequacy of language, the arbitrariness of the signifier, against the 
relation of the lover’s discourse to the desire of the Other” (105).   
The circumstances of captivity foreground many of the same issues that are 
highlighted in scenarios of seduction: coercion and consent, fantasy and reality, and 
temptation and violation.  Using theories of seduction, I bring the psychoanalytic 
model of seduction into dialogue with the captivity literature that I consider to 
examine the significance of sexual, psychic, and political aspects of captivity 
literature.  The captive female figure often uses strategies of seduction to contest 
discursive, gender, and political systems of power, and I engage with seduction as a 
strategy of resistance in which the female captive manages to loosen the bonds of her 
male captor.  In addition, I examine seduction as an unconscious fantasy in which the 
subject’s ego depends on the psychical Other to consider the stakes of the feminine 
subject’s contesting of the signifier and of language itself.  The ambivalent nature of 
seduction and the unstable relationship between victim and agent in the positions of 
seducer and seduced provide an opportunity to evaluate the convergence of sexuality 
and politics in captivity literature.  The depiction of each captive’s involuntary—or in 
some cases, voluntary—servitude also poses the following questions about desire: 
How do you know your own desire?  Do you fulfill your own desire by submitting to 
someone else’s desire; that is, is the fulfillment of the Other’s desire an instrument 
through which you achieve your own desire?  What happens to desire when the 
subject acknowledges the failure of the seduction fantasy?   
 “Seduction and Subversive Desire in Rowlandson’s The Sovereignty and 
Goodness of God,” the first chapter of my dissertation, analyzes the various modes of 
seduction raised in this early American captivity narrative.  Rowlandson violates a 
number of bans on traditional conduct for Puritan women, not the least of which 
concerns the public circulation of her text.  Before its contents are even considered, 
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the fact of the public dissemination of a woman’s text constituted a scandal in and of 
itself for the Puritan community, initiating the pioneering and radical tradition of 
captivity literature.  Rowlandson’s text also portrays a core element of Indian captivity 
narratives, an encounter with difference across racial, sexual, and cultural boundaries.  
In Rowlandson’s case, she forms surprisingly close relationships with various Indian 
captors, and, as in other texts of this kind, the possibility of interracial desire surfaces 
in this narrative.  Instances of genuine affection, sometimes even leading to marriage, 
between captive and captor disrupt the accepted view of coercive master/slave 
relations.   
Chapter two, “Desire and Duty: The Exercise of Feminine Agency in 
Sedgwick’s Hope Leslie,” considers Sedgwick’s nineteenth-century novel, which 
describes conflicts between Puritan colonials and American Indians.  Sedgwick’s 
novel features multiple captivity scenarios, involving imperiled yet rebellious female 
captives.  Hope Leslie presents radical revisions of typical gender roles; for example, 
Sedgwick’s female characters defy typical norms of feminine behavior by flagrantly 
disobeying male authority figures and by violating prohibitions on interracial 
romances.  Yet, on the narrative level of Sedgwick’s novel, strategies of seduction 
function more conservatively to confuse questions of coercion and consent in regard to 
displacement of American Indians. 
In chapter three, “Designs of Her Own: A Perilous Journey from Slave Girl to 
Free Woman,” I consider Harriet Jacobs’s Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, a vivid 
narrative of resistance and eventual liberation from captivity in the slaveholding 
South.  Jacobs critiques yet nevertheless utilizes romance conventions to reveal the 
limits of seduction in a racist culture.  More so than in the historical or fictional Indian 
captivity narratives, Jacobs represents herself as deliberately manipulating the desire 
of her master in order to gain small freedoms for herself.  My emphasis on evaluating 
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the degree to which Jacobs represents herself as complicit in various scenarios of 
seduction clarifies the questions that arise in relation to certain silences surrounding 
sexuality and to her prolonged captivity.  In Jacobs’s text, there is a discrepancy 
between her frequent portrayal of her master as a suitor for her affections, as if he 
were in a position of weakness, and the historical reality of the brutal inequality of 
master/slave relations.  Jacobs describes herself as participating in the narrative of 
seduction for strategic reasons: whereas a slave cannot easily rebuff her master, at the 
level of narrative representation the beloved can reject her suitor.  Without her 
submission to his will, his dominion over her cannot be confirmed, implying a psychic 
dimension to the struggle between master and slave.  I also investigate the generic 
classification of captivity literature with respect to the motifs of seduction in 
sentimental and domestic novels; in this chapter, seduction is analyzed primarily as a 
mode of amorous pursuit, and Jacobs stresses that seduction as such is inextricably 
related to power relations, revealing an aggressive underside to erotic relations. 
Chapter four, “What Does a Woman Want: Desire and Seduction in Atwood’s 
The Handmaid’s Tale,” also takes up the provocative issues of sexuality and consent, 
and it can be read as staging the problem of seduction through the depiction of the 
complicity of the narrator, Offred, in her servitude as a handmaid.  Through her 
exposure of the falsity and emptiness of scripted roles of seduction, Atwood addresses 
the question of how to express desire; she suggests that creating better ways of 
expressing desire both in new symbolic forms and through different gender 
expectations would offer a means of stepping out of a purely passive position of 
compliance.  While the situations of women in Atwood’s and Jacobs’s texts are by no 
means equivalent, various structures of oppression are operating in similar ways in 
each of the societies depicted; women are subjected to sexual exploitation, spatial 
confinement, rigorous surveillance, and dehumanizing treatment as objects, or more 
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precisely, as the property of their masters.  The historical and the imagined captivity 
scenarios depicted by Jacobs and Atwood respectively revolve around the 
phenomenon of seduction, and they reveal the entanglement of desire and agency.  
Both texts deploy seduction to argue for the liberation of women’s agency and desire 
through a challenge to oppressive structures of authority and, at least in the case of 
Atwood’s novel, even to the symbolic order.  Atwood engages with the seduction 
fantasy through the depiction of Offred’s obedience to authority figures, which allows 
her to avoid taking any responsibility for her own desire by simply submitting to their 
commands; Offred attempts to make the Other responsible both for the jouissance, or 
the unanchored drive, at work within her and for placing a limit on this jouissance.   
The final chapter, “The Dissolution of the Dynamic of Domination and 
Submission in Réage’s Story of O: The Writing of Jouissance on O’s Body,” is also 
concerned with rituals of seduction and with the manipulation of the master’s desire, 
but the novel’s heroine, O, like Offred, willingly submits to enslavement, raising 
questions about the motives lying behind her submission.  In contrast to the political 
circumstances of historical servitude, O submits to her enslavement through a 
masochistic contract with her masters, and this text presents the most dramatic and 
definite example of a consenting captive, allowing me to untangle the complicated 
relationship between femininity and masochism in psychoanalytic theory.  As in The 
Handmaid’s Tale, the portrayals of voluntary servitude, especially the scenes of sexual 
submission, are depicted in explicitly erotic and pornographic terms, which allows me 
to further my interrogation of the forms and expressions of feminine desire and 
speech.  Réage presents the feminine position as one of passivity to question feminine 
subjectivity and its problematic relationship to agency and to the symbolic order, 
especially with respect to language.  Just as Atwood does, Réage responds to the 
challenge of representing a woman’s desire and speech in language by exposing the 
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limitations of the signifying abilities of language and by moving toward ways of 
expressing feminine desire that are not trapped in the mode of assuming the status of 
object for the Other.  Réage is interested in circumventing the symbolic order and in 
exploring other modes of signification that do not necessarily alienate the subject by 
placing him or her in the discourse of the Other.  In Story of O, we see that O is a 
captive of language, as well as a  slave to her masters, and similar to the way that a 
bodily symptom speaks in the hysteric’s discourse, O’s body functions as a means of 
signification.  The seduction scenarios and explicit sexual scenes raise questions about 
femininity and masochism, calling for a revisiting of psychoanalytic theories of 
femininity, especially with respect to Freud’s theories on the associations among 
femininity, passivity, and masochism.  Analysis of this text affirms my argument that 
the captive’s ability to act as an agent of her own will is subject to both external and 
internal constraints: the orders of her captors, various historical and material 
conditions, and her unconscious fantasies, especially her relationship to the psychical 
Other.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Seduction and Subversive Desire in Rowlandson’s The Sovereignty and Goodness of 
God 
 
It was a strange and amazing dispensation, that the Lord should so afflict his 
precious Servant, and Hand maid.  It was a strange, if not more, that he should 
so bear up the spirits of his Servant under such bereavements and of his 
handmaid under such captivity, travels and hardships (much too hard for flesh 
and blood) as he did, and at length deliver and restore. 
From “The Preface to the Reader” of The Sovereignty and Goodness of God 
 
Heb. 12.6.  For whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth, and scourgeth every Son 
whom he receiveth. 
From “The Twentieth Remove” of The Sovereignty and Goodness of God 
 
 
The epigraphs above advance a religious interpretation of the captivity 
experience of Mary Rowlandson, which she recounted in The Sovereignty and 
Goodness of God (1682).  The epigraph from “The Preface to the Reader” was most 
likely authored by the Puritan minister, Increase Mather, and it reflects an orthodox 
Puritan understanding of God as the sole source not only of affliction and trial but also 
of redemption and salvation.8  The excerpt from the preface abrogates agency from 
Rowlandson and attributes it exclusively to God the Father; as God’s handmaid, 
                                                 
8 Many scholars speculate that Mather wrote the preface; see, for instance, Faery pp. 41-43, Salisbury 
pp. 44-45, and Toulouse pp. 5, 9. 
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Rowlandson passively submits to “travels and hardships (much too hard for flesh and 
blood),” as the preface puts it.  According to the orthodox view espoused in the 
preface readers should interpret the fact of Rowlandson’s survival as evidence of 
God’s power and mercy toward her, a lesson that she and other readers of her text 
should be ever mindful of.  The preface goes to great lengths to assure the reader that 
Rowlandson is indeed a faithful handmaiden of the Lord, and it instructs the reader on 
how to interpret her captivity and redemption.  The second epigraph from Letter to the 
Hebrews points to the possibility of masochistic desire and pleasure in Rowlandson’s 
text; the Lord’s punishment is a sign of his love, which eroticizes the victim’s 
suffering.  The possibility of masochistic desire and pleasure is hardly one that would 
have been openly acknowledged by the Puritan community, but it is nonetheless a 
strong thread in Rowlandson’s text. 
In her poem, “Captivity,” Louise Erdrich creatively responds to Rowlandson’s 
narrative, and she invents a line that could have appeared in Rowlandson’s text, which 
she uses as an epigraph to her poem:   
He (my captor) gave me a bisquit, which I put in my pocket, and not daring to 
eat it, buried it under a log, fearing he had put something in it to make me love 
him. 
―from the narrative of the captivity of Mrs. Mary Rowlandson, who was 
taken prisoner by the Wampanoag when Lancaster, Massachusetts, was 
destroyed, in the year 1676  (epigraph to Erdrich’s poem, “Captivity”) 
Although Erdrich’s poem is a creative response to Rowlandson’s text, she taps into 
very real anxieties expressed by various members of the Puritan community about the 
possible seduction of Rowlandson by her Indian captors.  As Erdrich’s epigraph and 
the rest of her poem suggest, Rowlandson’s actions during her captivity and her 
reflections on it in her narrative stray from the posture of strict obedience and 
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submission to God’s will.  The fictional Rowlandson imagined in the epigraph of 
Erdrich’s poem may have been right to bury her master’s biscuit for fear of love 
potions in it; that is, she may well have been seducible.  One cannot literally find the 
line that Erdrich uses as an epigraph for her poem in Rowlandson’s text, but Erdrich is 
responding creatively to the real temptation of seduction that permeates Rowlandson’s 
narrative. 
Rowlandson’s Indian captivity narrative and Catharine Maria Sedgwick’s 
historical romance novel, Hope Leslie; or, Early Times in the Massachusetts, which 
will be discussed in the next chapter, both stage multiple seduction scenarios, at the 
levels of narrative, plot, and thematics, in which issues concerning sexuality and 
politics converge in the figure of the female captive.  Although Sedgwick’s Hope 
Leslie was published in 1827, it is set in the early 1630s to the 1640s, which is about 
forty years earlier than Rowlandson’s narrative.  While Rowlandson’s narrative arises 
out of Metacom’s War of 1675-1676, Sedgwick’s novel offers a revisionist account of 
the Pequot War of 1637, the first large-scale conflict between settlers and Indians.  
Hope Leslie presents multiple captivity scenarios, including native and non-native 
captivities, and, like Rowlandson, Sedgwick is anxiously preoccupied with the ability 
of both native and non-native characters to cross cultural boundaries as a result of 
captivity.  To varying degrees, Rowlandson’s and Sedgwick’s texts struggle with the 
task of representing the relations between Anglo-American settlers and American 
Indians, but both of them, though not always convincingly or consistently, offer an 
argument in support of a racially homogenous community, in which one can only love 
those who resemble oneself.    
In The Captive’s Position: Female Narrative, Male Identity, and Royal 
Authority in Colonial New England, Teresa Toulouse explains that Puritan ministers 
were simultaneously attracted to and repulsed by “the border crossings they have 
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expended so much energy in condemning as seduction” (161).  Along with border 
crossing, sexual seduction is featured as a dangerous possibility in Rowlandson’s and 
Sedgwick’s texts, and seduction especially brings into focus a confrontation between a 
woman’s desire and a figure of patriarchal authority.  In various stages of Freud’s 
theory of seduction, we see that the roles of seducer and seduced are unstable and 
shifting, as his theory oscillates between the poles of material and psychic reality.  The 
tension and oscillation in the roles of seducer and seduced create a limited space for 
the exercise of feminine agency and the emergence of feminine desire; thus, the 
dynamics of domination and submission within seduction structurally provide an 
opportunity for locating feminine agency and desire even within the oppressive 
confines of the social and religious hierarchy of the Puritan community.  Although 
women were assigned to subordinate and submissive positions, the exigencies of the 
captivity situation allow for women to call into question (even if inadvertently) aspects 
of the social structure, including assumptions about race and about women’s passivity 
in the face of the desire of various father figures.  The reaction of male authorities in 
each of the women’s texts examined in chapters one and two reveals considerable 
anxieties about women in the public sphere.  The trial of Anne Hutchinson in 1637 
and the Salem witch trials of 1692 revolve around the construction of woman as 
dangerous seductress, a figure who must be cast out of the public sphere; in the case of 
both Rowlandson’s narrative and Sedgwick’s text, we see that male figures are 
similarly vexed by the problem of women’s public roles.  Male authorities attempt to 
guide the reception of Rowlandson’s text and to control the actions of female 
characters in Sedgwick’s novel, respectively, but especially in regard to Rowlandson’s 
text, the ruptures in her narrative disrupt orthodox religious and cultural ideologies and 
offer an subversive model of feminine agency and desire. 
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 If one definition of seduction is to lead one from the path of righteousness, 
then Rowlandson cannot be said to have been seduced away from her home and her 
privileged role as wife of the Puritan minister, Joseph Rowlandson, of Lancaster, 
Massachusetts.  Instead, she is dragged from her burning home in a chaotic and violent 
siege conducted by Nipmuc, Narragansett, and Wampanoag Indians on February 20, 
1676.  She spent the next three months moving throughout the harsh and desolate 
winter landscape in the conflict known as Metacom’s, or King Philip’s War, of 1675-
1676.  Her narrative is organized into a series of twenty “removes,” and it recounts the 
physical, mental, and spiritual anguish that she experienced while moving from one 
encampment to another during her captivity. 
The removal from the Rowlandson garrison occurs under conditions of duress: 
“But out we must go, the fire increasing, and coming along behind us, roaring, and the 
Indians gaping before us with their Guns, Spears and Hatchets to devour us” (69).  
Rowlandson relates that only one of the thirty-seven people at the garrison escaped 
death or captivity, and Rowlandson was wounded by a bullet that both goes through 
her side and fatally wounds her youngest daughter, Sarah, whom she is carrying in her 
arms.  Rowlandson recounts “some wallowing in their blood” (69) and a particularly 
gruesome case of someone “chopt into the head with a Hatchet, and stripped naked, 
and yet was crawling up and down” (70).  The text records Rowlandson’s many 
moments of horror and astonishment; not only in regard to her own actions and 
emotions, but also in regard to the behavior of her Indian captors toward her.  Having 
just witnessed the slaughter of various friends and family members, Rowlandson 
expresses surprise at her own desire to live, as she remarks: “I had often before this 
said, that if the Indians should come, I should chuse rather to be killed by them than be 
taken alive, but when it came to the tryal my mind changed; their glittering weapons 
so daunted my spirit, that I chose rather to go along with those (as I may say) ravenous 
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Beasts, than that moment to end my dayes …” (70).   Faced with the reality of this 
traumatic event, Rowlandson realizes that her “mind changed” (70), as she now 
prefers life to death.   
 Rowlandson was eventually ransomed, or “redeemed,” as she might say, and 
she reiterates her belief in the superiority of her own culture and religion throughout 
her text.  Yet, her professions of loyalty to her culture are undermined, at least to some 
extent, by her actual experiences during her captivity and by her interactions with her 
captors.  Rowlandson attempts to interpret her captivity in terms of providential 
Puritan theology, but it is evident that she often finds it difficult to match her 
experience to a religious explanation even though she may not explicitly say so.9  
Many critics have discussed these textual ruptures which are communicated through 
the irrepressible and even rebellious female voice that often comes through in an 
uncensored fashion despite the strong influence of her Puritan faith and of Puritan 
ministers who attempted to guide the contemporary audience’s reception of her text.10  
In addition to the preface, a sermon preached by her husband in 1678, “The Possibility 
of God’s Forsaking a People, That have been visibly near and dear to Him,” was 
appended to her captivity narrative, and the book-ending of her text by the texts of two 
ministers both bestowed an air of authority on her narrative and at the same time 
revealed male anxieties about granting a woman authority to appear in public, even if 
only metonymically through her text.   
                                                 
9 Numerous scholars comment on Rowlandson’s desire to see her captivity through the lens of Puritan 
theology, and its ultimate failure to explain her unsettling experience.  For a sampling of this, see Faery 
p. 31 and Burnham p. 15-18. 
10 See Faery’s discussion of the two voices in Rowlandson’s text pp. 30-31, 41. 
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 Scholars speculate that Rowlandson composed her narrative well-before it was 
published in 1682,11 and the author of the preface informs the reader that the narrative 
circulated privately before its publication: 
 This narrative was penned by the Gentlewoman her self, to be 
to her a memorandum of Gods dealing with her, that she might never 
forget, but remember the same, and the severall circumstances thereof, 
all the dayes of her life.  A pious scope which deserves both 
commendation and imitation: Some friends having obtained a sight of 
it, could not but be so much affected with the many passages of 
working providence discovered therein as to judge it worthy of publick 
view, and altogether unmeet that such works of God should be hid from 
present and future Generations: And therefore though this 
Gentlewomans modesty would not thrust it into the Press, yet her 
gratitude unto God made her not hardly perswadable to let it pass, that 
God might have his due glory and others benefit by it as well as herself.  
I hope by this time none will cast any reflection upon this 
Gentlewoman, on the score of this publication of her affliction and 
deliverance.  (65-66) 
Neither is glory to accrue to Rowlandson and nor is blame to be cast upon her for 
publishing the narrative because she is not publicly relating her narrative for her own 
aggrandizement but for the Lord’s.  The issue of her text circulating publicly was 
especially controversial because woman’s speech, whether verbal or written, was 
highly regulated in Puritan New England; the most famous example of a female orator 
in New England is Anne Hutchinson.  In 1637 Hutchinson was banished from the 
                                                 
11 See Salisbury for an overview of the debate surrounding the date of the narrative’s composition, pp. 
40-41. 
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Massachusetts Bay Colony after being tried for the heresy of antinomianism; she 
claimed that she experienced direct divine revelation from God concerning her 
salvation, denying the role of the clergy and of the church to mediate between an 
individual and God.  Prior to her banishment, Hutchinson was a popular preacher of 
sorts.  Neal Salisbury reports that “most churches had ceased allowing women to 
speak publicly in any capacity” after Hutchinson’s trial and exile from the colony (9).  
In her study of women’s roles in Puritan New England, Lonna Malmsheimer exposes 
the extreme subordination of women to men; her comments about women’s roles in 
public and religious life are especially pertinent to this discussion: “the principle of 
subjection dictated that women should not participate in public affairs.  … Although 
allowed [church] membership, they were not permitted to speak in meeting because 
they were prone to doctrinal error and to seducing others into error” (486).  The 
woman’s voice is potentially threatening in its seductive power, and the publication of 
Rowlandson’s text was risky because, despite the claims of the Puritan ministers and 
many of Rowlandson’s own statements, her text significantly contradicts orthodox 
Puritan doctrine and their beliefs in Indian savagery.  Rowlandson’s narrative was 
tremendously popular in New England, as well as in England, quickly selling out and 
going through numerous editions;12 thus, according to the logic of woman as 
seductress, it had far-reaching potential to seduce many readers. 
 A dominant religious myth condemned women for their supposed role as 
seductress; a view based on the Biblical story of Eve seducing Adam in the Garden of 
Eden.  Of course, even then Eve’s seduction of Adam is secondary to her original 
seduction by the devil in the guise of the snake.  Women were seen as more 
                                                 
12 See Salisbury pp. 48-49 for a summary of the text’s publication history.  Toulouse also a useful 
account of political and historical factors influencing the printing and publication of the text; see pp. 22-
25 and p. 34.  For a consideration of gender issues in relation to the narrative’s publication, see Faery p. 
43, and Burnham p. 25.  Aside from Anne Bradstreet’s poetry, Puritan woman did not publish texts. 
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susceptible to others’ desires, and yet somehow also more responsible for seducing 
others.  Building on the work of Carol Karlsen, Teresa Toulouse explains the use and 
deployment of the term seduction in colonial New England:  
As a number of historians have demonstrated, a concern with physical 
seduction, also termed fornication, permeates New English culture and 
law from the 1640s on, coming to a head during the 1690s, the period 
not only of the Salem witch trials, but also of almost continuous border 
warfare and captivity.  In her study of New England witchcraft, Carol 
Karlsen notes that while laws existed that argued for the equal 
punishment of men and women in cases of seduction, over time these 
laws had become increasingly and more severely applied to female than 
to male offenders.  (142) 
In addition, Karlsen reports that throughout the 1690s women were more frequently 
executed for infanticide arising from instances of fornication (qtd. in Toulouse 8), and 
the witchcraft trials were one sign of the settlers’ fear of the possibility of sexual 
seduction.   
 As has already been discussed, the preface assures the reader of Rowlandson’s 
“modesty” (65), and Rowlandson explicitly addresses the issue of her chastity on 
numerous occasions in her narrative.  It is likely that Rowlandson was responding to 
stories concerning her sexual experiences during her captivity, as Salisbury explains: 
“Shortly after her capture, Nathaniel Saltonstall, a prolific chronicler of the war, took 
pains in one of his reports to dispel a rumor that Rowlandson had been forced to marry 
Monoco, the Nashaway Nipmuc known to the English as One-eyed John” (43).  
Attributing the preservation of her chastity to God, Rowlandson nevertheless admits 
that she felt her position to be precarious: “And I cannot but admire at the wonderfull 
power and goodness of God to me, in that, though I was gone from home, and met 
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with all sorts of Indians, and those I had no knowledge of, and there being no 
Christian soul near me; yet no one of them offered the least imaginable miscarriage to 
me” (84).13  In the twentieth and final remove of her text, Rowlandson again stresses 
that she suffered no sexual violation during her captivity: “I have been in the midst of 
those roaring Lyons, and Salvage Bears, that feared neither God, nor Man, nor the 
Devil, by night and day, alone and in company: sleeping all sorts together, and yet not 
one of them ever offered me the least abuse of unchastity to me, in word or action” 
(107).  Even though much of her narrative breaks down a civilized versus savage 
dichotomy, Rowlandson deploys negative stereotypical imagery of Indians toward the 
end of her narrative, perhaps to distance herself from her captors now that she has 
rejoined the Puritan community.   
At earlier moments in her narrative, Rowlandson recounts various nights when 
she goes about from wigwam to wigwam, seeking shelter for the night; she writes of 
the “comfortable lodging” (87) she finds in the wigwam of an old Indian and “such 
kindness shewed me” (97), when an Indian woman gives her a mat and rug to sleep 
on.  A few days before her release her master, Quinnapin, a Narragansett sachem, gets 
drunk, but, in Rowlandson’s words, “he drank to me, shewing no incivility” (104).  
Although colonists feared that captives would be raped by Indian captors, the 
historical record proves that this was not the case, and it was certainly not the case 
with respect to Rowlandson.14   
 While there is no evidence and no reason to believe that Rowlandson was 
raped during her captivity, traces of possible seduction manifest themselves in 
Rowlandson’s generous portraits of her Indian master, Quinnapin, and of Metacom, 
                                                 
13 Unless otherwise noted, the emphasis is Rowlandson’s own.  In general, italicized words and 
sentences indicate dialogue, Indian words, or Biblical quotations. 
14 Salisbury notes that “there is no record of any sexual violation of captive women by Native 
Americans anywhere in eastern North America” (107).  See also Toulouse p. 66. 
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the Wampanoag leader whom the settlers called King Philip.  Rowlandson refers to 
Quinnapin as “the best friend that I had of an Indian” (86), and she consistently 
portrays her relations with him as amicable.  Rowlandson assumes a number of 
different roles while she is a captive; she is a commodity as her freedom will be 
brought for a fixed price, she is a servant of sort’s to Quinnapin’s wife, Weetamoo, a 
powerful Wamponoag leader in her own right, and, simultaneously even if a bit 
contradictorily, she is an independent trader within the Indian community as she knits 
items in exchange for money and food.  Having received some food in exchange for 
knitting stockings, Rowlandson prepares a meal and “invited [her] master and mistriss 
[sic] to dinner” (83), and she happily gives her master a knife that she earned through 
her knitting skills.  Despite her many protestations that God alone bears her up during 
her captivity, it is clear that she is highly adaptable and resourceful, finding shelter for 
herself, bartering her domestic skills for food, and forming a friendship of sorts with 
her master. 
 Upon Rowlandson’s first meeting with Metacom, he invites her into his 
wigwam and offers her tobacco, a gesture of hospitality, and he later shows her other 
kindnesses that, at least, psychologically ease her burdens.  Physically exhausted from 
the ceaseless marching that the Indians and their captives have been doing to elude the 
colonial forces, Rowlandson writes that she nearly collapsed while crossing through a 
swamp “up to the knees, in mud and water” (96).  In a seamless transition, 
Rowlandson moves from quoting Scripture to narrating a surprisingly intimate 
encounter with Metacom:  
Being almost spent, I thought I should have sunk down at last, and 
never gat out; but I may, as in Psal. 94.18.  When my foot slipped, thy 
mercy, O Lord, held me up.  Going along, having indeed my life, but 
little spirit, Philip [Metacom], who was in the Company, came up and 
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took me by the hand, and said, Two weeks more and you shal be 
Mistress again.  I asked him, if he spake true?  He answered, Yes, and 
quickly you shall come to your master again [Quinnapin]; who had 
been gone from us three weeks.  (96) 
Surely, Rowlandson does not intend to publicly commit blasphemy by suggesting that 
Metacom takes the place of the Lord.  But, it is indeed Metacom, who, in the flesh, 
provides her with bodily support.  The movement from one sentence to the next, along 
with the paired gestures of “held me up” and “took me by the hand” implicitly place 
Metacom in the Lord’s role.  The action of taking her hand to console her suggests a 
familiarity and fondness that is quite surprising given the expected situation of 
coercion inherent to captivity.  If Rowlandson is meant to be nothing more than a 
cipher for the Lord’s will during her captivity, then blasphemy is lurking just below 
the surface of the official interpretation and endorsement of her text as an example of 
God the Father’s dealings with his handmaid.   
The way in which Rowlandson relates Metacom’s news of her impending 
reunion with Quinnapin implies that her reunion with her master provides her with 
comfort, and her candid expression of her pleasure of being reunited with him is 
extraordinary given the fact of her Puritan upbringing and of the likely Puritan 
audience of her text.  Immediately after the long passage quoted above, Rowland 
writes: 
After many weary steps we came to Wachuset, where he [Quinnapin] 
was: and glad I was to see him.  He asked me, When I washt me? I told 
him not this month, then he fetcht me some water himself, and bid me 
wash, and gave me the Glass to see how I lookt; and bid his Squaw give 
me something to eat: so she gave me a mess of Beans and meat, and a 
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little Groundnut Cake.  I was wonderfully revived with this favour 
shewed me.  (96) 
Quinnapin’s solicitude for Rowlandson is another sign of their friendship, and his 
personal involvement in fetching the water and bringing a mirror to her shows his 
concern for her.  The ambiguity of the phrase, “this favour shewed me” (96), suggests 
that it is as much Quinnapin’s attentions toward her as it is the actual material goods 
that lift her spirits.  
Metacom and Quinnapin each demonstrate considerable sympathy for 
Rowlandson’s plight as a captive, and her good-natured relationships with these 
powerful political leaders is subversive on many levels.  First of all, the act of 
befriending a man other than her husband would have constituted a scandal in itself 
among the Puritan community, and the racial difference would have made their 
relationship even more transgressive.  While Rowlandson is eager to receive word of 
her husband, Metacom and Quinnapin figure far more prominently in the narrative 
than her own husband.  In fact, Rowlandson’s most significant reference to her 
husband emphasizes her emotional and mental distance from him:  
Hearing that my Son was come to this place, I went to see him, and told 
him his Father was well, but very melancholy: he told me he was as 
much grieved for his Father as for himself; I wondered at his speech, 
for I thought I had enough upon my spirit in reference to my self, to 
make me mindless of my Husband and every one else: they being safe 
among their Friends.  (89) 
Rowlandson endures conditions of near starvation, extreme cold, physical exhaustion, 
and emotional and spiritual distress, and she is definitely justified in focusing on her 
own tribulations.  Her son, Joseph Jr., is also a captive, suffering from illness, cold, 
and hunger just as his mother is, and it seems implausible that he could really be “as 
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much grieved for his Father as for himself” (89).  Rowlandson strikes the 
contemporary reader as being much more sensible and matter-of-fact in her view of 
the situation; however, given the strict gender hierarchies which regulated Puritan 
familial and social life, it is highly unusual for a Puritan wife to admit to being 
“mindless of my Husband” (89).  Toulouse comments on the Puritan belief in a 
“divinely mandated” social and gender system which “not only ordered that woman be 
subservient to man within the marriage covenant; it also dictated that the marriage 
covenant itself be used as the basis for explaining and justifying all other social 
covenants” (7).  Thus, Rowlandson’s formation of close relationships with her male 
captors and her confession of remoteness from her husband indicate that she 
experienced a loosening of the bonds of Puritan patriarchal ideology while a captive.  
Because the entire edifice of the social structure rests on the marriage covenant, 
Rowlandson’s troubling of the Puritan hierarchy poses a significant threat to the social 
order as a whole.  
From a political standpoint, Rowlandson’s obvious attachment to her male 
captors is controversial because they were the declared enemies of the settlers.  After 
the war ended, both Metacom and Quinnapin were killed by the Anglo-Americans or 
by their allies, and the corpses were subject to ignominy and abuse, including the 
decapitation and dismemberment of Metacom and the public hanging of Quinnapin 
(Salisbury 35-37).  Metacom’s head was exhibited for a number of years in Boston, 
and Quinnapin and other Indian leaders “were publicly hanged with great fanfare” 
(Salisbury 37).  Rowlandson’s humane portrayal of the high profile American Indian 
opposition leaders is astonishing given the cruel treatment inflicted on them by the 
colonial authorities.  Although her narrative is not traitorous, it is strange that a 
woman who has seemingly reintegrated herself into Puritan society to express such 
warmth for the foes of her home community.  The sanctioning of her text by Puritan 
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ministers and Rowlandson’s frequent citations of Scripture anxiously proclaim her 
loyalty to both the Puritan God and to the fathers of New England, but throughout the 
text, there are numerous passages that point to possibilities other than her blind 
obedience to male religious authorities.  At a relatively early stage in her captivity, 
Rowlandson expresses her empathy with Lot’s wife, the Old Testament figure who 
was turned into a pillar of salt as punishment for her disobedience of God: “I went 
along that day mourning and lamenting, leaving farther my own Country, and 
traveling into the vast and howling Wilderness, and I understood something of Lot’s 
Wife’s Temptation, when she looked back” (80).  The selection of Lot’s wife as the 
sole female Biblical figure referred to in her text, suggests that Rowlandson choose it 
because she recognized, on some level, her own transgressions.  Just as Lot’s wife 
paid a severe penalty for her offense, Rowlandson might fear punishment for the 
violation of gender, religious, and cultural codes that are evident throughout her 
narrative.  
 In Bound and Determined: Captivity, Culture-Crossing, and White 
Womanhood from Mary Rowlandson to Patty Hearst, Christopher Castiglia examines 
a wide range of captivity narratives through the centuries, and he considers the 
phenomenon of captives who “go native” or adopt the ideals of their captives, arguing 
that women authors of such narratives often revise accepted views on identity and 
culture (6-7).  Rowlandson, of course, did not “go native” as did other captives who 
will be discussed in the next section of this chapter.  But, as the example of her 
friendship with her Indian captors illustrates, she diverges from Puritan orthodoxy, and 
other examples reveal that she diverges in more ways than one.  For instance, 
Rowlandson does not outright criticize Puritan practices or institutions, but she does 
offer an implicit critique of the English army: 
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And here I cannot but take notice of the strange providence of God in 
preserving the heathen: They were many hundreds, old and young, 
some sick, and some lame, many had Papooses at their backs, the 
greatest number at this time with us, were Squaws, and they travelled 
with all they had, bag and baggage, and yet they got over this River 
aforesaid; and on Munday they set their Wigwams on fire, and away 
they went: on that very day came the English Army after them to this 
River, and saw the smoak of their Wigwams, and yet this River put a 
stop to them.  God did not give them courage or activity to go over 
after us; we were not ready for so great a mercy as victory and 
deliverance; if we had been, God would have found out a way for the 
English to have passed this River, as well as for the Indians with their 
Squaws and Children, and all their Luggage: Oh, that my People had 
hearkened to me, and Israel had walked in my ways, I should soon have 
subdued  their Enemies, and turned my hand against their Adversaries, 
Psal. 81. 13-14.  (79-80) 
The superimposition of a Biblical interpretation for the English army’s failure to cross 
the river rings hollow, and, even in accordance with Rowlandson’s interpretation, the 
army is still lacking “courage and activity to go over” (80).  Rowlandson needs to 
interpret the army’s failure to cross as an act of divine providence, but one suspects 
that she has a hard time convincing herself of this.  Increase Mather used 
Rowlandson’s narrative to call for a reform of what he saw as a decrease in spiritual 
rigor among second-generation Puritans; the Puritans were likened to the Israelites 
who disregarded the Father’s will and who were punished for doing so.15  Yet, one 
must have a fanatical level of faith not to see the logical inconsistencies in the 
                                                 
15 See Salisbury p. 45. 
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application of a Biblical interpretation to Rowlandson’s captivity experience.  Even if 
Rowlandson did not voice objections to the orthodox view of her captivity, her 
emphasis on the feeble condition of many of the Indians who did manage to cross the 
river insinuates that she felt the inconsistencies of this interpretation on some level.   
At the end of her text, she revisits this scene of the river crossing, and it is 
tempting to hear irony in her statement that “[The Indians] could go in great numbers 
over, but the English must stop: God had an over-ruling hand in all those things” 
(105).  Rowlandson comments on the Indians’ scorn of “the slowness, and dullness” 
of the English army, and she records their sarcasm when they ask her about the army:  
“they asked me when I thought the English Army would come after them?  I told them 
I could not tell: It may be they will come in May, said they” (105).   
 Scholars have frequently noted that captivity narratives raise questions about 
the construction and stability of cultural identities because the circumstances of 
captivity call into question assumptions about supposedly innate differences between 
various groups of people.  Rowlandson’s narrative also poses challenges to Puritan 
notions of identity in this respect in addition to its other subversive elements, such as 
her friendship with her male captors and her criticism of the army.  Toulouse discusses 
the way in which seduction can be seen as a form of cultural-border crossing in 
reference to children of European settlers who have been captured by Indians and 
subsequently assumed Indian identities: “What the representations of Indianized 
children indicate is the literal fact as well as the cultural fear that colonials themselves 
are not just seducible, but seducible to cultural identities other than those offered by 
Europe” (149).  Moreover, Rowlandson reserves her greatest scorn for Praying 
Indians, those who have converted to Christianity; she accuses them of deception and 
hypocrisy, suggesting her unease with the crossing of cultural boundaries.  The extent 
to which Rowlandson is seducible to non-European identities is questionable, but there 
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are certainly examples of a disintegration of a strict line between native and non-native 
identities in her text. 
In regard to her own conduct, Rowlandson does not assume Indian dress or an 
Indian identity, but she does sprinkle Indian words throughout her text, one sign of her 
knowledge of their culture.  She also integrates into their community by using her 
sewing and knitting skills to participate in the barter economy of the Indian 
community.  Yet, the most striking example of the destabilization of her identity lies 
in her portrayal of the leveling effects of starvation on both the captors and their 
captives.  When Rowlandson and her family members are first taken by the Indians, 
she figuratively speaks of their capture as “a company of Sheep torn by Wolves” (70), 
thus placing the Indians in the role of ravenous and fierce animals.  Interestingly 
enough, Rowlandson later applies the same lupine imagery to herself when she 
considers how starvation has affected her: “I cannot but think what a Wolvish appetite 
persons have in a starving condition: for many times when they gave me that which 
was hot, I was so greedy, that I shou’d burn my mouth, that it would trouble me hours 
after, and yet I should quickly do the same again” (93).   Rowlandson narrates an even 
more unflattering occasion when she describes how she snatched a boiled horse’s foot 
from a starving English child, reporting that “savoury it was to my taste” (96).  If the 
pathetic image of the child “sucking, gnawing, chewing and slobbering of it in the 
mouth and hand” evokes any compassion on her part, she makes no mention of it (96).   
Once she has been reunited with her family and friends, Rowlandson makes a 
number of concluding remarks about her captivity, one of which is of special 
relevance to this discussion: “Though many times they would eat that, that a Hog or a 
Dog would hardly touch; yet by that God strengthened them to be a scourge to His 
People” (105).  When she is no longer living among her captors, Rowlandson 
rhetorically separates herself from them by using the pronoun “they” instead of “we,” 
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as if the Indians were the only ones who had to eat repulsive food in order to survive.  
Previously, Rowlandson relates that some of her captors were surprised by her ability 
to eat bear and horse liver; one such occasion is both humorous and gruesome:  
What, sayes he can you eat Horse-liver? I told him, I would try, if he 
would give a piece, which he did, and I laid it on the coals to roast; but 
before it was half ready they got half of it away from me, so that I was 
fain to take the rest and eat it as it was, with the blood about my mouth, 
and yet a savory bit it was to me …” (81) 
It is odd that Rowlandson lets these contradictions stand unremarked as she concludes 
her narrative, but they might be read as evidence of her insecurities about her own so-
called savage behavior. 
 As the above passage illustrates, some of the most graphic and unfavorable 
portraits of Rowlandson concern images of consumption, and the fact of physical 
degradation is one of the issues that comes through most clearly in her narrative.  In 
her poem, “Captivity,” Erdrich draws on the images of consumption depicted in 
Rowlandson’s narrative to pursue the idea of Rowlandson’s seduction by her Indian 
captors.  Like the apple in the Garden of Eden, the “bisquit” mentioned in the poem’s 
epigraph is infused with a love potion that will precipitate Rowlandson’s fall.  In the 
poem, Rowlandson’s resistance to the food offered by her captors lessens, and she 
eventually accepts food from her master, as seen in the third stanza: 
I told myself that I would starve 
before I took food from his hands 
but I did not starve. 
One night 
he killed a deer with a young one in her 
and gave me to eat of the fawn. 
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It was so tender,  
the bones like the stems of flowers, 
that I followed where he took me. 
The night was thick.  He cut the cord 
that bound me to the tree. (lines 20-30) 
During the fourteenth remove, Rowlandson describes eating a fawn: “that one might 
eat the bones as well as the flesh, and yet I thought it very good” (93), but the poem 
departs from Rowlandson’s account with the description of the nighttime setting and 
the image of bondage and release associated with the tree.  In the poem, the food 
offered to her does exert seductive powers.  Her master feeds her the “tender” fawn 
(26), and “[she] followed where he took [her]” (28).  We see the blurry line between 
coercion and consent typical of seduction in this passage; she willingly follows but 
only because of the food’s lulling influence.  Under cover of darkness, the conditions 
are more conducive for seduction, and, although the imagery is elliptical, in the 
following stanza Erdrich hints at sexual encounter between the two: “He [her master] 
did not notice God’s wrath. / God blasted fire from half-buried stumps. / I hid my face 
in my dress, fearing He would burn us all / but this, too, passed” (35-38).  As if she 
were guilty of a sin, she imagines God raining down fire, but she inexplicably escapes 
unscathed.   
The sexual imagery depicting the relationship between Rowlandson and her 
master is contrasted with the impotence of her husband: “My husband drives a thick 
wedge / through the earth, still it shuts / to him year after year” (40-42).  In the same 
stanza, Rowlandson is described lying in bed and recalling herself alone in the midst 
of her Indian captors; she is lying “on a Holland-laced pillowbeer” (45).  As the only 
European manufactured item mentioned in the poem, the pillowbeer stands out among 
the poem’s natural imagery.  Yet, the detail of the pillowbeer connects Rowlandson to 
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her master in the actual narrative: “When my master [Quinnapin] came home, he came 
to me and bide me make shirt for his Papoos, of a holland-laced Pillowbeer” (101).  
While the European cloth is evidence of the exchange of material goods among 
natives and Euro-American settlers, its significance for this discussion lies in the 
crucial connection that it establishes between Rowlandson and her master.  In the final 
two stanzas of “Captivity,” Erdrich alludes to one of the most frequently discussed 
passages which appears at the conclusion of Rowlandson’s narrative: 
 I can remember the time, when I used to sleep quietly without 
workings in my thoughts, whole nights together, but now it is other 
wayes with me.  When all are fast about me, and no eye open, but his 
who ever waketh, my thoughts are upon things past, upon the awfull 
dispensation of the Lord towards us; upon his wonderful power and 
might, in carrying of us through so many difficulties, in returning us in 
safety, and suffering none to hurt us.  I remember in the night season, 
how the other day I was in the midst of thousands of enemies, & 
nothing but death before me: It is then hard work to perswade myself, 
that ever I should be satisfied with bread again.  But now we are fed 
with the finest of the Wheat, and, as I may say, with honey out of the 
rock16” (111).   
As a result of her captivity, Rowlandson experiences a persistent unease, and one 
symptom of this is her insomnia.  By evoking the privacy of the nighttime bedroom 
setting in which Rowlandson makes her confession, Erdrich once more taps into the 
sexual undertones of the narrative in her rewriting of Rowlandson’s experience.  
Rowlandson’s concluding confession contains elements of both poetry and pathos, and 
                                                 
16 Psalm 81:16. 
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it suggests that her transition from captivity back to her home culture was not entirely 
smooth, and perhaps not ever complete.   
The themes of obedience and disobedience to the Father’s will are raised by 
the allusion to Psalm 81:16, which recounts the Israelites’ failure to submit to God’s 
will and their subsequent misery because of their lack of obedience.  According to this 
Psalm, an individual’s suffering is entirely his or her own fault, and an end to the 
suffering can be achieved simply by heeding God’s commands.  The Israelites are 
promised the “finest of wheat” and “honey of the rock” if they submit to God’s 
commands (Psalm 81.16), but the poem subverts the logic of the Psalm by taking the 
role of provider away from God.  In the poem, Rowlandson is depicted beating “the 
earth” (54) and then “begging it to open / to admit me / as he was / and feed me honey 
from the rock” (55-58).  The phrase “as he was” is ambiguous, but the lower-case “he” 
suggests that Rowlandson is referring to her Indian master, not God.  It is her master 
who earlier feeds her the fawn, and, turning to her master for the impossible but 
desired honey, Rowlandson defies God’s will.  The text, perhaps unconsciously, 
records Rowlandson’s struggle to submit her desires to God’s desire and to forgo 
agency for the sake of God’s sovereignty.  Toulouse offers a similar argument in 
regard to John Williams’s sermon, God in the Camp (1707): “[God’s] power and 
legitimacy seem not only to demand but also to be grounded in His ‘sons’’ giving up 
of their desires in order to share in and complete His desire.  The Father cannot 
continue sovereign without their abrogation of their desire” (160).  The paradox is, of 
course, that the Father is not sovereign if his power rests on the necessary surrender of 
his children’s autonomy and desire.   
As a devout Puritan woman, Rowlandson is not supposed to have desires of 
her own, other than to desire what God desires, though it is important to note that both 
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Puritan women and men were meant to inhabit a subordinate position before God.17  
In her study of Puritan sermons, Toulouse explains another way in which seduction 
and desire were understood within the Puritan community: “the preacher must also 
drive home the divine punishments in store for all those who are drawn to seduction or 
even now committing the secret and addictive sin of desiring anything other than the 
‘Father’s’ desires” (145).  However, God’s desire is often inscrutable and arbitrary, 
and the many references to Job in Rowlandson’s text vividly make this point.  Job can 
discern no apparent causality for the afflictions that God sends; together with her son, 
Rowlandson likens their situation to that of Job: “now we may say, as Job, Naked 
came I out of my Mothers Womb, and naked shall I return: The Lord gave, and the 
Lord hath taken away, Blessed be the Name of the Lord18” (81-82).    
In “Seduction, Persecution, Revelation,” Jean Laplanche argues “that the 
concept of seduction is evident, and indeed almost omnipresent, in the Bible” (190), 
citing the temptation story in Genesis and Job’s suffering among others: “As far as 
enigmatic messages and seduction stories are concerned, Job provides us with a fine 
example” (191).  Laplanche’s analysis of Job in relation to seduction introduces the 
element of address into this discussion of seduction; he emphasizes the message and 
the enigma that accompany the address (193, 196).  Starting with the model of an adult 
and a child, Laplanche posits that the major elements of seduction are “the reality of 
the message and the irreducibility of the fact of communication,” a straightforward 
assessment which he quickly complicates by adding that “[the message] is opaque to 
its recipient and its transmitter alike” (169).  To illustrate the complexity of the 
message and its transmission and reception, Laplanche recalls Freud’s discussion of 
the Wolf Man and the moment when the Wolf Man’s father takes his son on a walk to 
                                                 
17 I am drawing on Toulouse’s analysis of Puritan social and religious hierarchies; see p. 7. 
18 Job 1:21. 
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see the animals copulating (170).  Laplanche wonders if the father’s motive could only 
be “an innocent stroll” (170).   Rowlandson opens the door to questions about her 
unconscious with her confession of her sleeplessness, and if Laplanche’s analysis of 
seduction in terms of the message and the enigma are applied to Rowlandson’s 
situation, then we see that she confronts the challenge of decoding God’s message that 
he communicates to her through her captivity experience.    
Yet, the allusions to Job insinuate that one cannot decipher God’s motives; one 
must simply accept them.  The most readily available response to the unknowability of 
God’s desire—the desire of the Other to situate the problem in psychoanalytic terms—
is to assume a passive posture, to empty oneself of desire, to reduce oneself to the 
position of object.  It is possible to read Rowlandson’s assumption of the object 
position as evincing masochistic desire; on various occasions, she interprets her 
suffering as a means to a sought-after end—her salvation.  The third epigraph quoted 
at the beginning of this chapter—Heb. 12.6  For whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth, 
and scourgeth every Son whom he receiveth—appears at the end of Rowlandson’s 
narrative.19  The Lord’s love and His chastening are grammatically equivalent in the 
passage from the Letter to the Hebrews, and the punishment serves as a prerequisite to 
receiving salvation.  According to Freud’s “The Economic Problem of Masochism,” 
masochistic fantasies can arise from guilty feelings, in which “the subject assumes that 
he has committed some crime (the nature of which is left indefinite) which is to be 
expiated by all these painful and tormenting procedures” (162).  The equation of 
beating with love is also explored by Freud in his essay, “A Child is Being Beaten,” in 
which the second and unconscious stage of the beating fantasy in girls is explained by 
Freud as a manifestation of the girl’s sense of guilt that is related to her incestuous 
desire for her father: “This being beaten is now a meeting-place between the sense of 
                                                 
19 See Rowlandson p. 112. 
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guilt and sexual love.  It is not only the punishment for the forbidden genital relation, 
but also the regressive substitute for it…” (108).  The point is not to diagnose 
Rowlandson as suffering from repressed sexuality but to show the way in which an 
unconscious fantasy of seduction is at play in her narrative.  By understanding her 
affliction as a sign of God’s wrath, a wrath that is actually supported by his love for 
her, Rowlandson maintains her ego as an object of God’s love.  
In reference to Rowlandson’s narrative, Marianne Noble argues that Puritan 
religious doctrine was a likely influence on women’s expressions of longing for 
punishment: “Receptivity to masochism is linked to spiritual transcendence.  The 
Protestant doctrine underlying this belief system is the notion of providence, according 
to which affliction is a manifestation of God’s love, sent to force individuals to turn 
away from earthly comforts and toward heavenly support” (28).  Noble focuses her 
study on both the eroticization of domination exercised through men’s violent acts and 
its effects on women’s fantasies about beatings and suffering, but, in the case of 
Rowlandson and the larger Puritan community, the desire for God’s punishment as a 
coded sign for his love is not specific to women.  In her discussion of social versus 
spiritual hierarchies, Toulouse points out that “the spiritual realm allowed for an 
equality based on men’s inhabiting the passive, obedient, and humbled position before 
God that they ideally assigned to women before them in the secular realm” (7).  Thus, 
in the context of Rowlandson’s text and the religious framework of her community, 
there is no equation between masochistic desire and a feminine subject position, 
although the social role of the passive and submissive woman most likely facilitated 
men’s identification with the captive woman in terms of a theological interpretation of 
captivity.  
Confessing a sense of guilt, Rowlandson blames herself for her former lack of 
spiritual vigilance, and she claims that she understands the ordeals of her captivity as 
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penance for her sins.  Observing the “tryals and afflictions” of others, Rowlandson 
writes “I should sometimes be jealous least [sic] I should have my portion in this life 
…” (112), and then, after her captivity, she says, “Affliction I wanted, and affliction I 
had, full measure (I thought) pressed down and running over …” (112).  Perhaps the 
tone is a bit rueful, considering all she has endured, but she can at least claim her trials 
as a sign of God’s love.  To read Rowlandson’s desire as masochistic is to uphold an 
orthodox interpretation of her captivity, one that is in line with the interpretation of her 
text offered by Puritan ministers because it bolsters their pleas for members of their 
congregations to practice stricter obedience to the Church.  A more radical reading of 
Rowlandson’s narrative focuses on the chinks in the official interpretation of her text. 
As we have seen, the preface and her husband’s sermon, which introduce and 
conclude her narrative respectively, reveal the desire of male authorities to control the 
reception and the message promulgated by Rowlandson’s narrative.  Lest her text 
seduce others to blasphemous desires or erroneous doctrines, the ministers insist that 
Rowlanson’s desire must coincide with the father’s (both the minister’s and God’s).  
Yet, the dangerous possibility of Rowlandson’s seduction is never far below the 
surface; she acts independently in the Indian community during her captivity, she 
forms close relationships with two of her male captors, and her text discloses a number 
of ruptures in Puritan orthodoxy, all of which testify to the disruptive power of 
feminine desire unleashed on the traditional social and religious order.  As Erdrich’s 
poetic response, “Captivity,” to Rowlandson’s narrative makes clear, the erotically 
charged moments between Rowlandson and her male captors, those that speak to the 
desire to be touched, to be seduced, suggest a more subversive model of feminine 
desire and agency that are present in her recounting of her captivity experience. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Desire and Duty: The Exercise of Feminine Agency in Sedgwick’s Hope Leslie 
 
“‘Liberty, what is it!  Daughter of disloyalty and mother of all misrule—who, 
from the hour that she tempted our first parents to forfeit paradise, hath ever 
worked mischief to our race.’”  
   Sir William Fletcher (Hope Leslie, 6) 
 
 
In a letter to his brother, Sir William Fletcher pens the above epigraph; Sir 
William instructs his brother to be vigilant about guarding his son also named, 
William, from the influence of the Puritans.  The epigraph’s allusion to the story of the 
temptation and fall in the Garden of Eden myth introduces the novel’s preoccupation 
with seduction, and Sir William fears that his free-thinking nephew might be seduced 
by the Puritans.  Sir William wants to ensure the smooth transition of his considerable 
estate by seeing his daughter, Alice, marry his nephew, William, but this marriage is 
contingent upon William’s adherence to the Anglican religion.  The theme of 
disobedience to parental, or to be more specific paternal, authority is established with 
the story of William and Alice.  The struggle between romantic love versus religious 
and political duties recurs throughout the novel, and, as it does in the case of William 
and Alice, religious and political commitments typically win out.  Even though he is 
deeply in love with Alice, William is unwilling to compromise his religious principles 
in order to win his uncle’s permission to marry Alice, and he resolves to “exile himself 
for ever from England” (11).  Although Hope Leslie opens in England with a tale of 
thwarted love between these two young cousins, the setting quickly shifts to the 
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 Puritan settlements in New England when the young William Fletcher sets sail in 1630 
abroad the Arabella along with Governor Winthrop, a character based on the historical 
figure of the same name.   
In the first instance of a long series of female characters disobeying their 
fathers, Alice attempts to join William on his voyage to England, but her father’s 
guards seize her on the wharf just before she makes her escape.  While obviously 
rewriting it in significant ways, this scene alludes to Susanna Rowson’s Charlotte 
Temple (1794), a classic eighteenth-century novel that tells of the seduction and 
abandonment of a naïve young woman, Charlotte, by a worldly and shrewd seducer.  
Unlike Alice, Charlotte is not carried from the wharf by her parents, and, after bearing 
an out-of-wedlock child, she dies a penitent death in New York.  As a cautionary tale 
about the dangers of seduction, Charlotte Temple exemplifies how seduction novels 
strive to educate readers through the negative example of Charlotte’s fate.  Judith 
Fetterley argues that “Sedgwick defines Charlotte Temple, one of the most popular 
stories in America, even in 1827, as essentially un-American, a story of the old 
country, for whether dragged off by a seducer or dragged home by a father, women in 
stories like Charlotte Temple are subject to patriarchal control” (81).  Certainly, it is 
true that many of the female characters in Hope Leslie resist overt forms of patriarchal 
control, but whether or not they actually escape from it is less clear.   
Following upon her failed quest to follow William to the English colonies, 
Alice is coerced into marrying a man of her father’s choosing “in the imbecility of 
utter despair” (12), but, after her husband’s death, she leaves England for New 
England, along with her two daughters, Alice and Mary, later renamed Hope and 
Faith, respectively.  In the meantime, William has been prevailed upon to marry 
Martha, a faithful and obedient Puritan woman whom he respects but never loves in 
the same way as he does Alice.  Describing his love for Alice, William informs his 
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 wife, Martha: “‘It inspired every hope—modified every project—such was the love I 
bore to Alice—love immortal as the soul!—’” (19).  During the same conversation, he 
expresses his feelings for Martha in markedly less passionate terms: “‘And think you 
not that principle has preserved me faithful in my friendship to you?  Think you not 
that your obedience—; your careful conformity to my wishes; your steady love … can 
be lightly estimated?’” (19).  Not long after this frank conversation between husband 
and wife, Martha writes a letter in which she again references her lesser status in her 
husband’s heart: “I have ever known that mine was Leah’s portion—that I was not the 
chosen and the loved one …” (35).  Sedgwick represents William and Martha’s 
marriage as a counter-example to the true love marriage, and she sets up their marriage 
as a foil to that of a marriage between their son, Everell, and Hope.  In Sedgwick’s 
text, representations of marriage tend to privilege fondness that closely resembles 
sibling affection and that is based on a model of barely disguised incestuous unions.  
The fear of seduction as border crossing is evident in Sedgwick’s text as it is in 
Rowlandson’s text, and Sedgwick’s novel forcefully engages in an argument for 
constructing a U.S. national identity based on a white racial identity through her 
portrayal of various romances and marriages. 
At the novel’s conclusion, Hope marries Everell Fletcher, and thus their 
parents’ ill-fated romance is finally realized in a quasi-incestuous union of their 
children.  As her name suggests, Hope is confident and optimistic, and Sedgwick 
optimistically but not unproblematically represents New England as a place where the 
daughter can challenge, though not altogether dismantle, patriarchal authority.  Unlike 
Charlotte Temple or her mother, Alice, Hope marries Everell of her own free will, but 
her will coincides perfectly with the desire of her stepfather, William Fletcher, that she 
marry his son.  Hope Leslie utilizes and revises the typical eighteenth-century 
seduction plot of a young innocent woman seduced by the cunning and verbal 
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 eloquence of a male seducer to suggest the problem with women’s subordination to 
male authority, whether benevolent or malevolent.  Sedgwick’s novel seemingly offers 
a radical critique of the limitations of women’s restricted roles in the social sphere and 
of the barriers standing in the way of women’s personal and romantic desires, but the 
seductive designs of the novel ultimately consign feminine desire to a fulfillment of 
paternal desire, insisting that woman’s desire can only coincide with a sanctioned 
desire of the father. 
In her study of the motifs of seduction and incest in eighteenth and nineteenth-
century American fiction, Elizabeth Barnes argues that the blurry line between fathers 
and lovers served to “perfect the conflation of familial, erotic, and social ties, at once 
legitimizing incestuous bonding and extending the parameters of patriarchal 
influence” (16).  The central argument of Teresa Toulouse’s analysis of captivity 
narratives is that anxieties about the seduction of captives by the Indians or French are 
interconnected with complex negotiations of Puritan leaders’ authority in relation to 
the political and religious situations in the colonies as well as those in England and 
Europe.  Shirley Samuels shows that the seduction narrative plays a key role in the 
mythology of the American Revolution: “While contemporary cartoons portray 
America [often in the figure of an Indian woman] as seduced from her mother Britain 
by the designing French, such iconographic seductions associate violence with not 
only the sexual but also the racial attributes of women who appear as metaphors for 
national identity” (9).  In Hope Leslie, the seductive relations between fathers and 
daughters manifest themselves on a personal level in the fulfillment of the romantic 
aspirations of the parents through the marital union of the children.  Just as Toulouse 
and Samuels make connections between politics and seduction with respect to earlier 
historical periods, so too does seduction operate in the political, as well as the 
personal, realm in Hope Leslie.   In Sedgwick’s novel, seductive scenarios are 
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 inextricably tied to political situations, especially to the question of Indian Removal 
that dominated U.S. politics in the 1820s and 1830s.   
From a feminist perspective, there is certainly much to admire in Sedgwick’s 
creation of the spirited, independent, and often defiant characters of Hope Leslie and 
Magawisca, an eloquent defender of the Pequot nation.  In their discussions of Hope 
Leslie, many critics applaud Sedgwick’s portrayal of Hope and Magawisca because 
these characters challenge gender roles that prescribe passive and obedient feminine 
behavior through their confrontations with various father figures.  For the English 
settlers, the colonies—at least according to Sedgwick’s representation of them—offer 
tremendous opportunities to rebel against religious and political oppression, and, for 
the female settlers, they provide considerable opportunities to cast off gender 
oppression.  Yet, the English settlers only enjoy this chance to rebel against the 
tyranny of the crown at the expense of the indigenous population; consequently, the 
racial politics of Hope Leslie are very conflicted.  Despite the fact that Sedgwick goes 
far in her attempts to undermine a stereotypical binary between civilized Anglo-
Americans and savage Indians, her text cannot envision racial equality within the 
boundaries of the historical Puritan community mainly because it is swayed by the 
crisis fomenting over Indian removal in the early-nineteenth century.20  The 
controversy surrounding Indian removal was spurred on by the Cherokee case in 
Georgia, which ultimately led to the passage of the Indian Removal Act in 1830.  
Passage of the act in both houses of Congress was fiercely contested, predominantly 
along partisan lines,21 and it is also notable that the 1832 Worcester v. Georgia 
decision, authored by Chief Justice John Marshall, upheld Cherokee sovereignty.  
                                                 
20 According to Karcher, “Sedgwick never translated the sympathy for Indians expressed in her novel 
into political activism on their behalf” (“Introduction” to Hope Leslie  xxxvii, xxxviii).  However, 
Fetterley suggests that Sedgwick “may well have protested the Indian Removal Act of 1830” (93).  
21  See Perdue and Green’s thorough summary of the debates over Removal in both houses (114-115). 
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 Therefore, it is important to bear in mind the degree to which Indian removal was 
contested, and various historical documents, including Ralph Waldo Emerson’s 1836 
letter protesting removal to President Martin Van Buren and Mary Jemison’s captivity 
narrative, are more progressive in their calls for racial equality and justice than much 
of the fiction of the same period.22  
Although Sedgwick offers a complicated account of Indian-white relations, 
especially in her willingness to indict Anglo-Americans for their treacherous conduct 
toward Indians, her fiction exhibits a tendency common to many dominant nineteenth-
century texts in which Indians are depicted as a dying race.23  Rebecca Blevins Faery 
makes an important argument in regard to many nineteenth-century frontier novels’ 
representations of Indian removal by stressing the effects created by the distant 
colonial setting of these novels: “The remote past was a convenient stand-in for a 
remote place in these texts, all of which support in varying ways the popular idea of 
displacing Indians to make more room for white settlement” (192).  Cooper’s The Last 
of the Mohicans (1826) is set during The Seven Years’ War, which spanned the years 
1756 to 1763, and Sedgwick’s Hope Leslie is set a century earlier, ranging from the 
early 1630s to the 1640s.  Faery insightfully argues that the cultural work of such texts 
is to create the illusion that conflicts between settlers and Indians have already been 
resolved, which, in turn, absolves the contemporary reading audience from culpability 
in current government policies directed against American Indians (192). 
                                                 
22  In contrast to Emerson’s letter and Seaver’s A Narrative of the Life of Mrs. Mary Jemison, fiction by 
Cooper, Child, and Sedgwick, to name a few examples, subtly or not-so-subtly supports Indian removal 
in the interests of U.S. expansionist goals.    
23 With respect to the myth of a “Vanishing Race,” various critics compare Cooper’s works to 
Sedgwick’s; for particularly useful comparisons, see Zagarell pp. 52-53, 55-60; Karcher pp. xx-xxi, 
xxvi of her “Introduction” to Hope Leslie; and Faery pp. 183-185.  Romero also discusses the “‘cult of 
the Vanishing American’” in relation to Cooper’s works: “The elegiac mode here performs the 
historical sleight of hand crucial to the topos of the doomed aboriginal: it represents the disappearance 
of the native not just as natural but as having already happened” (115). 
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 In her preface, Sedgwick stakes out her position on race and aligns herself with 
Enlightenment racial philosophies, which emphasize the role of culture over nature: 
The liberal philanthropist will not be offended by a representation 
which supposes that the elements of virtue and intellect are not 
withheld from any branch of the human family; and the enlightened and 
accurate observer of human nature, will admit that the difference of 
character among the various races of the earth, arises mainly from 
difference of condition.  (4) 24
Privileging her stance as that of “the enlightened and accurate observer” (4), Sedgwick 
makes a case for the humanity of American Indians, and she concedes—perhaps in an 
attempt to preempt criticism—that not all of her readers will share her beliefs, which 
are those of the “liberal philanthropist” (4).  Sedgwick’s assertion (even with its 
qualification—“mainly”) that variations among races result “mainly from difference of 
condition” is a bold declaration (4), although positions such as hers invariably had a 
Eurocentric bias because the desirability of indoctrinating natives in Western culture 
was taken for granted.  Nevertheless, in her Preface, Sedgwick espouses progressive 
views on race for her day, but are these views actually upheld within the text, or are 
they misleading claims? 
In many ways, Sedgwick’s portrayal of Magawisca supports her claim for 
racial equality; Magawisca embodies “the elements of virtue and intellect” praised by 
Sedgwick in her preface (4).  Many critics focus on the similarities between Hope and 
Magawisca, frequently describing their relationship as one of sisters.25  Reflecting on 
                                                 
24 I am drawing on Horsman’s discussion of racial philosophies and politics in the years from 1815-
1850 in my characterization of Sedgwick’s position as belonging to the Enlightenment tradition; see 
Horsman p. 190.  Kelley offers further background information about nineteenth-century racial debates 
with respect to Sedgwick’s Preface; see p. xxix. 
25 In one of the most frequently cited instances of this, Zagarell dubs them “metaphorical sisters,” and 
she lists a number of connections between the two, concluding with the observation that “they are literal 
sisters-in-law, Hope’s sister Faith marrying Oneco” (56).  In addition, I am drawing on Karcher’s 
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 her clandestine meeting with Magawisca in the churchyard, Hope makes the following 
comment: “‘Mysteriously,’ she said, as her eye followed the noble figure of 
Magawisca, till it was lost in the surrounding darkness, ‘mysteriously have our 
destinies been interwoven.  Our mothers brought from a far distance to rest together 
here—their children connected in indissoluble bonds!’” (201).  Commenting on 
Sedgwick’s representation of Magawisca, Fetterley writes: “Magawisca is consistently 
described by images that suggest the ‘evening’ of life—something fading, 
disappearing” (93).  Sedgwick repeatedly employs imagery of darkness to naturalize 
the disappearance of Indians from lands that are rapidly being appropriated by Anglo-
Americans, and, in this scene, she bestows the power of the gaze upon Hope, who 
enjoys a position of mastery as she watches the erasure of the native presence.  
Although Hope and Magawisca develop a close friendship and exhibit similar 
behaviors, their different racial backgrounds eventually result in their permanent 
separation, and a comparison of their “‘interwoven’” yet divergent destinies reveals 
how racial hierarchies and colonial New England expansionist projects (201), as well 
as the contemporary removal crisis that was unfolding as Sedgwick was writing her 
novel, force the exclusion of Magawisca and other American Indians from white 
settlements.   
Magawisca is the daughter of the once powerful Pequot chief, Mononotto, who 
previously has formed alliances with the English but now seeks vengeance after the 
bloody massacre of his people by the English in the conflict known as the Pequot War 
of 1637.  Governor Winthrop makes a special pledge to Monoca, Magawisca and 
Oneco’s mother, to protect her children out of consideration for the fact that “[many] 
instances of [Monoca’s] kindness to the white traders are recorded …” (21).  
                                                                                                                                            
characterization of Hope and Magawisca as “twinned heroines” (“Introduction” to Hope Leslie, xxi), 
Fetterley’s argument that Magawisca is the “‘real’ sister” (95), and Kelley’s proposal that they “serve as 
doubles, as sisters of the soul” (xxii).   
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 Moreover, Magawisca informs Everell of the hospitality and friendship her father 
previously offers to the English: “‘[Mononotto] had been the friend of the English; he 
had counselled peace and alliance with them; he had protected their traders; delivered 
the captives taken from them, and restored them to their people …’” (51-52).  
Sedgwick thus shows that peaceful relations once prevailed between Indians and 
settlers, but, in return for the Indians’ generosity, Governor Winthrop sends 
Magawisca and her brother, Oneco, to the Fletcher household at Bethel to assume the 
position of servants.  They are fortunate in comparison to other Indians who were 
captured after the war and “‘sent into slavery in the West Indies’” (21), as William 
informs Martha.  Part of Magawisca’s nobility derives from her resistance to a role of 
servitude, as Martha says, “‘I have, in vain, attempted to subdue her to the drudgery of 
domestic service …’” (32).  After Mononotto redeems his children from captivity, he 
instructs his son to change his clothing: “Mononotto tore from Oneco his English 
dress, and casting it from him—‘Thus perish, he said, ‘every mark of the captivity of 
my children’” (67).  The treacherous treatment of the Pequot by the English brings 
about Mononotto’s deep bitterness and his quest for revenge.  
In contrast to Mononotto’s unabated animosity toward the English, close 
relationships soon develop between Magawisca and Everell and between Oneco and 
Faith, suggesting that ties of affection in the younger generation can foster healing and 
forgiveness between these two groups.  Oneco and Faith are virtually inseparable from 
the first moment of their acquaintance, and Everell and Magawisca likewise share a 
strong sympathy of mind and spirit.  In a letter to William, Martha describes the 
mutual cultural exchange that Magawisca and Everell engage in: “She … doth take 
much delight in describing to him the customs of her people, and relating their 
traditionary tales, which are like pictures, captivating to a youthful imagination.  He 
hath taught her to read, and reads to her Spenser’s rhymes, and many other books of 
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 the like kind” (32).  The relationship between the two is characterized by reciprocity; 
at least on an interpersonal level, it conforms more to a romance narrative than to a 
seductive narrative.  Conversely, on a cultural level, the relationship between the two 
could be condemned as seduction because they engage in crossing cultural boundaries.  
Although Magawisca is structurally in a disempowered position compared to Everell, 
their relations on a personal level are on a more equal footing, and neither one is 
attempting to win the others’ attractions through stratagems of any sort.  The depiction 
of a developing romantic relationship between the two is quite radical because—albeit 
to a limited extent—Sedgwick depicts how being lead away from one’s own culture 
can be enlightening rather than threatening.  However, this is a seductive possibility 
that she is only willing to pursue so far.   
In the same letter, Martha goes on to confide her concern over the growing 
intimacy of Magawisca and Everell, and, since Faith and Oneco are both two young 
for romantic love at this point, the possibility of interracial desire is first raised with 
the older siblings.  Using images from nature to show the spontaneity and sincerity of 
their attraction, Martha describes the interaction between Magawisca and Everell: 
that innocent and safe as the intercourse of these children now is, it is 
for thee to decide whether it be not most wise to remove the maiden 
from our dwelling.  Two young plants that have sprung up in close 
neighbourhood, may be separated while young; but if disjoined after 
their fibres are all intertwined, one, or perchance both, may perish.  
(33) 
According to Martha, there is simply no place for interracial marriage; in fact, she 
views it as potentially fatal for one or both of the children.  Martha is acting out of 
concern for Magawisca in whom she detects the signs of a romantic attachment to 
Everell: “when I see her, in his absence, starting at every sound, and her restless eye 
53 
 turning an asking glance at every opening of the door; every movement betokening a 
disquieted spirit, and then the sweet contentment that stealeth over her face when he 
appeareth …” (33).  Martha also observes that Magawisca produces similar feelings in 
Everell, and she believes the best course of action is to separate the two before a 
forbidden love fully develops between them.   
As it turns out, Martha’s fears are resolved by a violent and tragic series of 
events.  Nelema, an elderly Indian woman who lives near the Fletcher homestead, 
gives Martha a warning that danger is afoot by leaving a rattlesnake omen at her feet, 
which Magawisca interprets for Martha as “‘the symbol of death’” (40).  Suspecting 
her father may be preparing for a raid, Magawisca ventures into the nearby forest to 
seek information about her father’s plans.  Upon her return, Magawisca meets Everell, 
and she utters an ominous pronouncement in regard to violent cycles of aggression and 
retaliation: “‘Then listen to me; and when the hour of vengeance comes, if it should 
come, remember it was provoked’” (48).  Magawisca is indisputably an eloquent and 
powerful spokeswoman for the Pequot nation, and Sedgwick grants her considerable 
narrative authority to contest the official versions of Puritan history, as critics such as 
Dana Nelson and Sandra Zagarell have shown.26  Sedgwick announces her intention to 
grapple with historical events and figures in her preface, and, by granting Magawisca 
the power to narrate her own firsthand account of the massacre at Mystic, Sedgwick 
rewrites Puritan versions of the same events.27  Zagarell asserts that “the novel 
challenges the official history of original settlement by exposing the repositories of the 
nation’s early history, the Puritan narratives, as justifications of genocide” (53).   
                                                 
26 See pp. 193, 195-197 of Nelson’s article, and see pp. 53-55 of Zagarell’s article. 
27 Gould’s article gives a comprehensive overview of issues surrounding the status of history in Hope 
Leslie and of the Puritan sources that Sedgwick drew on; foremost among these sources are John 
Winthrop’s The History of New England and William Hubbard’s A Narrative of the Troubles with the 
Indians in New England.   
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 Magawisca’s narration of the awful events of the Mystic massacre makes it 
clear that the Puritan attack was genocide: “‘Thus did the strangers destroy, in our own 
homes, hundreds of our tribe’” (51).  Magawisca provides copious details about the 
event, and the following excerpt is representative of the whole: 
“No enemy’s foot had ever approached this nest, which the eagles of 
the tribe had built for their mates and their young.  Sassacus and my 
father were both away on that dreadful night.  (48) … Those fearful 
guns that we had never heard before—the shouts of your people—our 
own battle yell—the piteous cries of the little children—the groans of 
our mothers, and, oh! worse—worse than all—the silence of those that 
could not speak— …  Then was taken from our hearth-stone, where the 
English had been so often warmed and cherished, the brand to consume 
our dwellings.  They were covered with mats, and burnt like dried 
straw.”  (50) 
The Mystic fort is in a vulnerable state because the two chiefs, Sassacus and 
Mononotto, are away, and the advanced European weaponry overwhelms the Pequot.  
The suffering of the innocent is underscored by “the piteous cries of the little 
children—the groans of our mothers …” (50).  Magawisca also points out the bitter 
irony of the English burning the homes of those who had previously welcomed them 
with a “brand” from their “hearth-stone” (50).  Nelson discusses the affective quality 
of Magawisca’s narrative on Everell, noting that he cries after hearing her speak of the 
massacre; moreover, she stresses that “once one is conscious of the political aspect of 
historical representation, quite different versions can be constructed—versions more 
balanced and hence more accurate” (196).   In her preface, Sedgwick refers to the 
“high-souled courage and patriotism” of the Indians (4), and Magawisca’s narration of 
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 the Mystic massacre complicates any assessment of the retaliatory massacre that 
occurs at the Fletcher homestead. 
Shortly before the raid on Bethel, Magawisca is “racked with apprehensions, 
and conflicting duties, the cruellest rack to an honourable mind” (57).  On the one 
hand, Magawisca feels allegiance to her father and her people; on the other hand, she 
wants to protect the Fletchers from harm, as the narrator explains, “Magawisca’s first 
impulse had been to reveal all to Mrs. Fletcher; but by doing this, she would jeopard 
her father’s life” (57).  If she informs the Fletchers of the likelihood of an attack, she 
would be disobeying her father, as well as betraying the memory of those who died.  
The stakes of her dilemma are life and death for two groups of people who both have 
claims to her affection and loyalty.  The male servants and Mr. Fletcher are away from 
the home when the assault begins, and Philip Gould comments on the significant 
parallels between the two massacres:  
It is essential here to recognize that the Puritan attack at Mystic Fort 
and Mononotto’s revenge at Bethel are equivalent violations of the 
home.  Sedgwick takes her cue from the sublimated guilt in both 
Puritan and early national accounts of the attack, which exhaustively 
defended Mason’s assault upon the one of two forts inhabited mostly 
by women and children.  (650) 
The violence and injustice of the Puritan’s attack is juxtaposed to the revenge attack 
staged by Mononotto and his Mohawk allies on the Fletcher home, which prevents 
simplistic moral judgments about the events.   
Magawisca pleads for the lives of the Fletchers, but her father’s grief has 
transformed his formerly generous and trusting nature.  He is now guided by a 
monomaniacal desire for revenge, and her cries fall on his deaf ears: “‘they have 
spread the wing of love over us—save them—save them—oh it will be too late,’ she 
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 cried, springing from her father, whose silence and fixedness showed that if his better 
nature rebelled against the work of revenge, there was no relenting of purpose” (65-
66).  Even in this scene of bloody revenge, Sedgwick illustrates that there is still a 
streak of humanity left in Mononotto, as the Fletcher baby boy kindles his 
compassion: “Mononotto’s heart melted within him; he stooped to raise the sweet 
suppliant …” (67).  In true melodramatic fashion, it is but a brief reprieve for the baby 
because one of the Mohawks steps in and ruthlessly kills him, yet Sedgwick shows 
that Mononotto is not capable of such a monstrous act.28  Magawisca’s first act of 
heroism is noted by one of the Mohawk warriors as she tries to defend Mrs. Fletcher 
by interposing her body between his hatchet and Mrs. Fletcher: “The warrior’s 
obdurate heart … was thrilled by the courage of the heroic girl …” (66).  Significantly, 
Magawisca earns the admiration of the warrior because of her daring act of bravery; 
however, it is equally important that she does not act as an agent of violence.  She 
earns praise for acting with the culturally-defined male virtue of courage, but she does 
not go so far as to transgress culturally-defined female virtue by violently attacking the 
warriors.  Rather, Magawisca would be a martyr for Mrs. Fletcher’s sake: “‘You shall 
hew me to pieces ere you touch her,’ she said, and planted herself as a shield before 
her benefactress” (66).  Despite the best efforts of Magawisca and Everell, Mrs. 
Fletcher, her daughters, and her baby son are murdered by Mononotto and his 
Mohawk allies. 
As a result of the Bethel massacre, Everell and Faith are taken captive; Everell 
escapes relatively quickly through Magawisca’s intervention whereas Faith eventually 
marries Oneco.  Mononotto plans to kill Everell as retribution for the death of 
Samoset, his brave and beloved son who was killed by the English.  Although 
                                                 
28 Of course, Sedgwick is significantly rewriting a similar scene in The Last of the Mohicans; see 
Karcher pp. xx-xxi of her “Introduction” to Hope Leslie and Zagarell pp. 52-53. 
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 Magawisca desperately tries to persuade him otherwise, Mononotto is unyielding on 
this matter, and she recognizes the futility of further argument with him: “Magawisca 
must feel, or feign submission; and she laid her hand on her heart, and bowed her head 
in token of obedience” (78).  However, Magawisca, in actuality, does not submit so 
readily to her father’s wishes; she is constantly on the alert for a chance to facilitate 
Everell’s escape.  At one point, Digby and some other English men are so close to 
Mononotto and his captives that a call for help would surely reach the rescuers, but the 
cost of the call for help would be her father’s likely imprisonment and death: 
“[Magawisca’s] heart had again been rent by a divided duty; one word from her would 
have rescued Everell, but that word from her would have condemned her father; and 
when the boat retired, she sunk to the ground, quite spent with the conflict of her 
feelings” (83).  At this moment, Magawisca’s romantic feelings for Everell must be 
subordinated to her father’s authority and to her national allegiance, leaving her 
frustrated and near despair with the plethora of bad choices that she faces.   
Arguably, the most dramatic and, what Mary Kelley calls “the most heroic act 
in the entire novel” (xxvii), occurs when Magawisca abruptly intervenes in the 
imminent revenge killing of Everell by thrusting her body between Mononotto’s 
descending hatchet and Everell.  After escaping from the guard whom her father 
appoints to keep her from interfering in the execution, Magawisca scales the mountain 
to reach the sacrifice rock just in time to save Everell:  
The chief raised the deadly weapon, when Magawisca, springing from 
the precipitous side of the rock, screamed—“Forbear!” and interposed 
her arm.  It was too late.  The blow was leveled—force and direction 
given—the stroke aimed at Everell’s neck, severed his defender’s arm, 
and left him unharmed.  The lopped quivering member dropped over 
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 the precipice.  Mononotto staggered and fell senseless, and all the 
savages, uttering horrible yells, rushed toward the fatal spot.  (97) 
Although everyone is momentarily stunned by her daring intervention, Magawisca is 
the first to recover her senses, telling Everell to flee.  Oddly enough, the nature of their 
relationship is transformed by this sudden event: “He threw his arms around her, and 
pressed her to his heart, as he would a sister that had redeemed his life with her own, 
and then tearing himself from her, he disappeared” (97).  As we have previously seen, 
a romance is budding between the two, but now their relationship is described in terms 
of sibling affection, as the phrase “as he would a sister” connotes (97).  Sedgwick, in a 
seemingly arbitrary fashion, prevents this interracial romance from coming to fruition 
by making Magawisca’s redemption of Everell’s life cause her to lose the possibility 
of ever becoming his wife.  While Magawisca’s action is heroic because it saves the 
life of an innocent character (significantly, this scene also reverses the dominant 
pattern of a man rescuing a woman),29 her heroism exacts a heavy cost – she loses an 
arm and Mononotto experiences a severe breakdown after grievously wounding his 
own daughter.   
The description of the severed arm as a “lopped quivering member” (97) 
sounds more like castration than an amputation, and this act of eroticized violence is 
perpetrated by the father.  According to the Oedipal myth, castration is a threat uttered 
by the father as a punishment for incestuous wishes for the mother, and, according to a 
Lacanian revision of the castration complex, castration is tied to alienation in language 
and to prohibitions instituted by rules of social co-existence.  The castrating wound 
that Magawisca receives does function as a punishment for transgressing her father’s 
wishes, and her castration is alienating in that, from that moment forward, she must 
                                                 
29 Drawing on Barnett’s The Ignoble Savage, Ross discusses the conventions of frontier romance, one 
of which involves a man rescuing a woman; see p. 322. 
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 forsake her romantic desire for political duty.  Although she loses an arm and not the 
phallus, the dismemberment of Magawisca’s arm nevertheless effects a transformation 
of her gender identity, as Fetterley observes, “she has acquired substantial political 
power in the world of the fathers, effectively displacing [Oneco] in her father’s 
affection and, more significantly, in his council … In a word, she is the daughter 
understood as son” (90).30  Suzanne Gossett and Barbara Bardes offer another helpful 
reading of the wounding of Magawisca’s body in regard to gender roles: 
the mutilation is symbolic of her destruction as a complete female 
person.  She has broken out of the restraints of womanhood by heroic 
action and by being more, has become less.  She will never marry.  At 
the same time, the action symbolizes her altruistic female nature and 
ties her to her benefactress, Mrs. Fletcher, the bird whose wing was 
broken while stretched over her children.  (21) 
Gossett and Bardes make a number of important points about Magawisca’s heroism; 
first of all, the native woman pays a heavy price for this act of altruism.  At a later 
point, the narrator reports on native attitudes toward disfigurement: “Magawisca might 
have at once identified herself, by opening her blanket, and disclosing her person; but 
that she did not, no one will wonder who knows that a savage feels more even than 
ordinary sensibility at personal deformity” (191).  The narrator’s use of “savage” 
speaks to the level of acceptable racism prevalent at the time (191), but the comment 
also gives a clue as to how much Magawisca sacrificed for Everell.  Since Magawisca 
will remain single as a result of this incident, Sedgwick once again subtly advances 
her portrayal of the Indians as a dying race because Magawisca will not be producing 
                                                 
30 Karcher similarly comments on the “phallic overtones” of this dismemberment (xxv), and she makes 
arguments similar to Gossett and Bardes’s about Magawisca’s defeminization and to Fetterley’s 
analysis of her subsequent role as “son” to Mononotto (Karcher “Introduction” to Hope Leslie xxiv-
xxv; Fetterley 90). 
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 any progeny to replace even a small number of those who were massacred at Mystic.  
Thus, the dismemberment has additional sexual connotations in the fact that the 
castrating gesture effectually renders her infertile.   
 While Kelley’s assessment of Magawisca’s intervention as “the most heroic 
act in the entire novel” rightly points to the bravery and courage of her act (xxvii), the 
far-reaching implications of the self-sacrificing dimension of her invention demand 
further interrogation.  In her analysis of nineteenth-century images of white and native 
women, Faery discusses the historical and cultural significance of Magawisca’s 
extended arm: “The extended arm of the Native woman, however, defends and 
protects not her own life, but that of the white colonists … It is a gesture of willing 
self-sacrifice, as in so many of the pictorial representations of Pocahontas’s rescue of 
Smith and in Catharine Maria Sedgwick’s novel Hope Leslie …” (178). 31   
Previously, we have seen that Magawisca places her body in front of Mrs. Fletcher’s 
in an effort to save her life during her father’s raid, and Magawisca’s comparable but 
more consequential effort to defend Everell communicates a similar message of 
implicit validation of Anglo-American culture because she so willingly sacrifices 
herself for its sake.  It is not only that Magawisca is willing to give her life for one of 
the white characters, but also that her individual sacrifice masks a hidden agenda of 
insisting on the superiority of Anglo-American culture to that of American Indian 
culture.   
 The relationship between Magawisca and Mononotto closely resembles that of 
Françoise and Talasco, characters in Sedgwick’s short story, “The Catholic Iroquois,” 
which was originally published in the Atlantic Souvenir in 1826, a year before Hope 
Leslie was published.  “The Catholic Iroquois” recounts the story of a seventeenth-
                                                 
31 For a further discussion of Pocahontas in relation to Hope Leslie, see Karcher’s “Introduction” to 
Hope Leslie p. xxiv, Faery pp. 178, 188-196, and Tilton p. 78. 
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 century French missionary, Père Mesnard, who proselytizes among the Ottawa near 
the regions of Niagara and Montreal.  An Ottawa chief presents Père Mesnard with 
two Iroquois Indians girls whom he has captured, explaining to the priest that “‘they 
are the daughters of my enemy—of Talasco, the mightiest chief of the Iroquois—the 
eagle of his tribe—he hates Christians—make his children Christians, and I shall be 
revenged’” (54).  The two girls are baptized with the names Rosalie and Françoise, 
and Rosalie fervidly embraces Catholicism and eventually becomes a nun.  Françoise, 
however, falls in love with a French officer, Eugene Brunon, who is Père Mesnard’s 
nephew, and they have a short-lived but happy marriage.  Genanhatenna, Françoise’s 
mother, pleads with her to return to help ensure that their family line will continue: 
“‘if you return not, [Talasco] perishes without a single scion from his stock’” (56).  
Her mother’s plea reinforces the representation of Indians as a vanishing race, but 
despite her affection for her mother and her people, Françoise refuses to renounce her 
Catholic faith, as her father insists.   
 Accompanied by French soldiers, Eugene rescues Françoise after Talasco 
forcibly recaptures her, and Genanhatenna utters an ominous pronouncement to 
Françoise shortly before she flees with Talasco in the face of the threat posed by the 
French: “‘Yes, one word—Vengeance.  The day of your father’s vengeance will 
come—I have heard the promise in the murmuring stream and in the rushing wind—it 
will come’” (57).  As has been previously discussed, Magawisca likewise forewarns 
Everell of her father’s likely plans for revenge: “‘Then listen to me; and when the hour 
of vengeance comes, if it should come, remember it was provoked’” (48).  The 
Iroquois stage an attack on the Ottawa, overwhelming them and killing Eugene in the 
attack.  Françoise faints after seeing her husband killed and then beheaded by her 
father, and she is carried back to an Iroquois village.  Talasco wants Françoise to 
renounce Catholicism and to marry Allewemi, an Iroquois chief, but she prefers to die 
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 the death of a martyr.  The dynamics of the father’s law and the daughter’s 
transgression occur in both this story and Hope Leslie, and in both texts the daughter’s 
body suffers great violence at the hands of her father.  Françoise refers to herself as “a 
Christian martyr” (65), and she dies a melodramatic and lurid death upon the pile: 
[Talasco] leaped upon the pile, and tearing the crucifix from her hands, 
he drew his knife from his girdle, and made an incision on her breast in 
the form of a cross—“Behold!” he said, “the sign, thou lovest—the sign 
of thy league with thy father’s enemies—the sign that made thee deaf 
to the voice of thy kindred.” 
 “Thank thee, my father!” replied Françoise, with a triumphant 
smile; “I might have lost the cross thou hast taken from me, but this 
which thou hast given me, I shall bear even after death.” 
 The pile was fired—the flames curled upwards; and the Iroquois 
martyr perished.  (66) 
Although the parallels between Françoise and Magawisca are not exact, they are 
nonetheless significant; each character defies her father’s wishes on behalf of a 
character or a principle associated with Anglo-American culture.  The emphasis on 
fathers and daughters in Sedgwick’s fiction emphasizes the entanglement of political, 
religious, and romantic factors, and both Françoise and Magawisca partly make their 
sacrifices, which have both personal and political implications, because of a love affair 
with a white character.  As we shall see, Sedgwick is much more willing to inflict 
grievous penalties on native characters than on white characters for their respective 
acts which contest patriarchal authority.   
 Magawisca offers her life on behalf Mrs. Fletcher at the Bethel homestead and 
on behalf of Everell at the sacrifice rock, and she undertakes great risks to arrange for 
a meeting between Hope and her long-lost sister, Faith.  Just as the Pequot’s initial 
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 hospitality toward the English settlers is not reciprocated, Magawisca gives up far 
more than she receives in return for her sacrifices for all three of the above mentioned 
characters.  As a sign of gratitude for Hope’s rescue of Nelema from an unjust prison 
sentence, Magawisca agrees to arrange a meeting between Hope and Faith, whom 
Hope has not seen since Faith’s capture during the Bethel raid.  Faith has adapted to 
the culture of her captors, and she has married Oneco.  At the secret reunion of the 
sisters, Hope’s first reaction to Faith’s appearance is one of recoil: “At this first 
assurance, that she really beheld this loved, lost sister, Hope uttered a scream of joy; 
but when, at a second glance, she saw her in her savage attire, fondly leaning on 
Oneco’s shoulder, her heart died within her; a sickening feeling came over her …” 
(237).  It is not simply the fact that Faith looks different in her Indian clothing but that 
she embraces Indian culture, which affects Hope so strongly.  Moreover, Faith’s 
affection for Oneco is illustrated in their physical touch, “fondly leaning on Oneco’s 
shoulder” (237).  Hope is overcome by a sense of distance from her sister, and she 
places more emphasis on culture than nature, as the narrator’s comment reveals, 
“Hope knew not how to address one so near to her by nature, so far removed by habit 
and education” (239).  After Mononotto liberates his children from their captivity at 
Bethel, he commands Oneco to change out of “his English dress” (67): “‘Thou shalt 
return to our forests,’ he continued, wrapping a skin around him, ‘with the badge of 
thy people’” (67).  In regard to the obsession with clothing and identity in The Last of 
the Mohicans, Samuels observes that the significance accorded to dress implies that 
one can change one’s identity through cultural and linguistic signs: “the disguises and 
substitutions of the novel indicate a rather more fundamental uneasiness about the 
constructedness of identity, or about whether the body is more than a theater for the 
performance of identity” (104).  The same could also be said of Hope Leslie because 
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 much attention is paid to dress and its role in signaling the instability of cultural and 
racial affiliations. 
In contrast to Rowlandson, Faith offers an example of a white captive who 
“goes native,” and although the personal relations between Faith and Oneco are based 
on mutual affection and devotion to each other, Sedgwick’s portrayal of them 
discloses considerable reservations about their union, revealing her unease about the 
captive woman who is seduced.  Magawisca warns Hope that Faith no longer speaks 
English; commenting on Faith’s nature, Magawisca says “‘some, you know, are like 
water, that retains no mark; and others like the flinty rock, that never loses a mark’” 
(200).  Faith is obviously of the former disposition, and she is further characterized by 
“vacancy,” suggesting that she lacks willpower and the strength to act on her own.  
During her reunion with her sister, the narrator describes the appearance of Faith’s 
face as “pale and spiritless, [and] only redeemed from absolute vacancy by an 
expression of gentleness and modesty” (240). 32  Previously, Hope “[shudders] as if a 
knife had been plunged in her bosom” when she learns of her sister’s marriage (196), 
and now she experiences a similar physical sensation of pain and revulsion when she 
sees her sister.  Hope is one of the more enlightened characters in the novel, and it is 
easy to imagine how much more scandalized the rest of the white community would 
be at the sight of this interracial couple.   
In the discussion of Rowlandson’s relations with her Indian captors, we saw 
that the subject of the seducibility of the white woman was a major concern of the 
Puritan community, and the same fears about the crossing of boundaries are evident in 
Sedgwick’s representation of Faith and Oneco’s marriage.  Faith has also converted to 
                                                 
32 For an interesting discussion of Hope’s reaction to her sister’s appearance, see Fetterley p. 89.  Faery 
also offers a useful critique of the politics of interracial marriage in Hope Leslie, see pp. 188-189.  
Karcher asserts that Sedgwick’s portrayal of Faith and Oneco’s relationship strongly argues against 
interracial marriage; see pp. xxii-xxiii. 
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 Catholicism, tapping into another deep-seated prejudice of the Puritan community.  In 
regard to her son, Rowlandson writes that “it might have been worse with him, had he 
been sold to the French, than it proved to be in his remaining with the Indians” (89).  
Rowlandson fears the French Catholics more than the heathen Indians because, like 
most Puritans, she worries about the seductive powers of the French to convert people 
to what they considered decadent and devilish practices of the Roman Catholic 
Church.33  Faith has been doubly seduced by both Indian culture and by the Catholic 
religion, but her vulnerability to seduction is depicted as arising from her easily 
influenced character. 
In reference to Faith and Oneco’s marriage, Castiglia dubs it the “the only 
happy interracial marriage in nineteenth-century American literature” (“In Praise” 10).  
A number of other nineteenth-century writers also depicted interracial romances or 
marriages, but the couple was usually separated in some way, ultimately revealing 
white society’s rejection of such unions.  Faery reports that “[f]ive books appeared in 
the 1820s that addressed in varying ways the issue of intermarriage … These texts 
provided sites for the highly charged erotic encounters of white women and Indian 
men” (179).  For example, in Lydia Maria Child’s Hobomok (1824), which is set in 
the 1630s in New England, Mary Conant, daughter of a stern Puritan father, defies the 
authorities and conventions of the Puritans by marrying an Indian.  Prior to her 
marriage to Hobomok, Mary’s father refuses to allow Mary to marry Charles Brown 
because he is an Anglican, a theme which Sedgwick employs in William and Alice’s 
star-crossed romance.  After hearing of Brown’s supposed drowning on a shipwreck, 
Mary tells Hobomok, the noble Indian, that she will marry him: “‘I will be your wife, 
Hobomok, if you love me’” (121).  Driven by despair, Mary turns to Hobomok 
                                                 
33 I am drawing on Toulouse’s discussion of Puritan attitudes toward Roman Catholicism; see pp. 141-
43. 
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 because he is the only one left to love her. Child does not fully sanction Mary’s 
decision to marry because Mary is described as suffering from “a partial derangement 
of [her] faculties” when she makes this choice (120).  However, as time passes, 
Hobomok’s unwavering devotion and his strength of character wins over Mary: “So 
much love could not but awaken gratitude; and Mary by degrees gave way to its 
influence, until she welcomed his return with something like affection” (135).  The 
bonds between Faith and Oneco are much stronger than those between Mary and 
Hobomok, and this may have something to do with the fact that Faith is taken captive 
as a young child, essentially forgetting everything about her family and their culture.   
Mary still lives near her former home, and her internalization of Puritan views 
of Indians remains in her consciousness: “she knew that her own nation looked upon 
her as lost and degraded; and, what was far worse, her own heart echoed back the 
charge” (136).  For the most part, Mary’s marriage to Hobomok is happy, but the 
sudden reappearance of her true love, Charles Brown, prompts the end of this 
interracial marriage.  After being released from a period of captivity overseas, Brown 
returns to New England, and, upon meeting Hobomok in the forest, Hobomok, in 
martyr-like fashion, realizes the superiority of Brown’s claims to Mary:  
Good and kind she has been; but the heart of Mary is not with the 
Indian.  In her sleep she talks with the Great Spirit, and the name of the 
white man is on her lips.  Hobomok will go far off among some of the 
red men in the west.  They will dig him a grave, and Mary may sing the 
marriage song in the wigwam of the Englishman.  (139) 
In her sleep, Mary unconsciously reveals the truth of her heart’s desire, and so Child’s 
portrayal of Hobomok’s decision to end their marriage in order that Mary and Charles 
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 can marry is conveniently sanctioned by the dictates of true love.34  Faith and Oneco 
are not separated, at least not permanently separated as are Mary and Hobomok, but, 
even so, Castiglia’s characterization of their marriage as “the only happy interracial 
marriage in nineteenth-century American literature” requires further clarification (“In 
Praise” 10).  While it may be a “happy” marriage, it is not represented as entirely 
positive, as we have seen.   
Various critics have identified the historical figure, Eunice Williams, as a 
source for Faith Leslie.35  Eunice Williams was a distant relative of Sedgwick’s who 
was taken during a raid on her home in Deerfield, Massachusetts, in 1704, and she 
subsequently married a Caughnawaga Indian, converted to Catholicism, and refused to 
return to white society despite the pleas of friends and family (Kolodny 69, Namias 
91).  Originally taken as a captive in 1758 from her frontier home in Pennsylvania, 
Mary Jemison, like Eunice, ultimately chose to stay with her captors, the Seneca 
Indians, and her narrative also offers a positive model of acculturation, which shows 
the permeability of cultural boundaries, at least in the direction of a Euroamerican 
woman moving into American Indian culture.  Having been taken at about age fifteen, 
Jemison retained her knowledge of English, and in 1824 her narrative was published 
after James Seaver transcribed and edited it (Namias 189).  As June Namias reports, A 
Narrative of the Life of Mrs. Mary Jemison, was an international bestseller that went 
through numerous editions and printings: “Within the next 105 years it went through 
twenty-seven printings and twenty-three editions ranging from 32 to 483 pages.  … a 
remote frontier event became a nationally, indeed internationally, known story” (152).  
The bestseller status of white women’s captivity narratives was most likely related to 
                                                 
34 For a further discussion of the interracial marriage in Hobomok, see Faery pp. 185-186, and Karcher’s 
“Introduction” to Hobomok a good overview of sexual and racial politics in this novel. 
35 For example, see Karcher pp. xii, xviii, xxiii (“Introduction” to Hope Leslie); Person pp. 679; 
Kolodny pp. 69-70; and Faery p. 184. 
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 the dominant culture’s unease with the apparent fluidity of cultural and racial 
boundaries set forth in such narratives. 
Certain passages in Jemison’s narrative would have been quite subversive; for 
example, Jemison openly speaks of her love for her first husband, Sheninjee, whom 
she describes as “a noble man; large in stature; elegant in his appearance; generous in 
his conduct; courageous in war; a friend to peace, and a great lover of justice” (147).  
From his attractive physical appearance to his fine character, Sheninjee is presented as 
possessing desirable characteristics frequently sought after in a husband.  Similar to 
the fictional Mary Conant, Jemison admits that she initially felt some reluctance to be 
involved in an interracial relationship, but those feelings prove to be temporary:36  
The idea of spending my days with him, at first seemed perfectly 
irreconcilable to my feelings: but his good nature, generosity, 
tenderness, and friendship towards me, soon gained my affection; and, 
strange as it may seem, I loved him! – To me he was ever kind in 
sickness, and always treated me with gentleness; in fact, he was an 
agreeable husband, and a comfortable companion.  (147) 
Jemison’s culturally ingrained prejudice is quickly overcome by her positive 
interactions with her husband.  Commenting on the cultural significance of race and 
national identity, Faery makes the following argument: “The gender reversal [of white 
man and native woman] makes the racial mixing more ideologically charged; the 
white woman, icon of the racial purity of the nation, had to remain closed to 
penetration by ‘dark savages’ if the white identity of the country was to be preserved” 
(179).37   
                                                 
36 See Kolodny for an interesting comparative discussion of Hobomok and Jemison’s narrative, pp. 70-
71. 
37 In her discussion of violent acts against women and children in The Last of the Mohicans, Samuels 
also analyzes the role of reproduction and the status of the female body in respect to questions of 
national identity; see pp. 105-112.  Moreover, Kolodny points out that there was greater acceptance of 
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 Annette Kolodny discusses another violation of gender norms evident in 
Jemison’s narrative: 
A comfortable and secure life ‘in my own house, and on my own land’ 
(MJ, p. 143), bespoke the reward for surmounting wilderness hardships 
that had previously been accorded to men—but never to a woman—in 
American literary history.  As such, Jemison’s Life was ‘revolutionary’ 
not for the generic alterations [Richard] Slotkin cites, but because it 
represented the first text in American literature to move a real-world 
white woman beyond the traditional captivity pattern to something 
approaching the willing wilderness accommodations of a Daniel 
Boone” (80).  
Jemison enjoys the rights of property ownership, and she adapts to life in the 
wilderness, a space that was typically reserved for men.38  Jemison’s and Williams’s, 
as well as their fictional counterparts’, preferences for their respective Indian husbands 
is also at odds with stereotypical constructions of feminine sexuality as passive or non-
existent since these women endured the scorn of their birth cultures to remain with 
these men.  As the real-life events of Mary Jemison and Eunice Williams testify, there 
could be a positive outcome to seduction of a white woman by Indian captors; white 
women could live fulfilling and independent lives in various Indian communities.  In 
spite of these real-life examples, Sedgwick’s fictional portrayal of Faith and Oneco’s 
marriage is less daring. 
                                                                                                                                            
interracial unions involving white men and Indian women: “few English colonials were as yet prepared 
to accept the fact of apparently willing miscegenation, especially where the white partner was a woman.  
(That male hunters and traders often took Indian ‘squaw wives,’ as they were scornfully termed, was 
common knowledge; but most whites preferred to see these as temporary unions of convenience, or else 
wrote off the white hunter as hopelessly ‘Indianized’)” (70). 
38 See Kolodny pp. 70-71 for a further discussion of the place of men and women in the frontier 
wilderness. 
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 Jemison and Williams both had children with their Indian husbands, but 
Sedgwick shies away from addressing this issue in Hope Leslie by portraying Faith 
and Oneco as childless.39  One of the reasons Jemison cites for remaining with the 
Seneca is that she feared how white society would treat her children: “I had got a large 
family of Indian children, that I must take with me; and that if I should be so fortunate 
as to find my relatives, they would despise them, if not myself; and treat us as 
enemies; or, at least with a degree of cold indifference, which I thought I could not 
endure” (178).  Jemison is fully aware of the racism she and her children would face if 
they were to attempt to integrate into white society, and her knowledge of the strict 
policing of this boundary is one factor in her decision to remain with the Seneca.  In 
Hobomok, Mary and Hobomok have a son, and Mary explains the child’s name to the 
long-lost Charles: “‘According to the Indian custom, he took the name of his mother,’ 
answered Mary, ‘I call him Charles Hobomok Conant’” (149).  By legally carrying his 
mother’s name and by sharing his first name with his mother’s first love, the child is 
associated with this couple.  The child is originally called Hobomok, after his Indian 
father, but the narrator comments that “by degrees his Indian appellation was silently 
omitted” (150).  Physically, the child retains marks of his Indian heritage with his 
“glossy black hair” (148), “swarthy” complexion (149), and “roguish black eye” 
(149), but culturally, he grows into a white man who attends Harvard and then 
“finish[es] his studies in England” (150).  Commenting on Child’s version of 
assimilation, Carolyn Karcher equates it to “cultural genocide” in her “Introduction” 
to Hobomok (xxxii).  Faery asserts that “racial absorption of Indians by whites” was 
more evident in eighteenth-century texts, but that the opponents of interracial marriage 
had gained ascendancy in the nineteenth century (179).  This is borne out in 
Magawisca’s bitter sarcasm when she responds to Hope’s despair at the news of her 
                                                 
39 See Karcher’s “Introduction” to Hope Leslie p. xxiii for a discussion of their childlessness.  
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 sister’s marriage to an Indian: “‘Think ye that your blood will be corrupted by 
mingling with this stream?’” (197).   
The meeting of the long-separated sisters is short-lived because Sir Philip 
Gardiner, Hope’s duplicitous and fawning suitor, alerts the Puritan authorities about 
the meeting because he wants to ingratiate himself with the colony’s elite.  When the 
Puritan authorities disrupt the clandestine meeting of the sisters, Faith is temporarily 
separated from Oneco.  Moreover, Magawisca is recaptured, and she is eventually put 
on trial for allegedly organizing a pan-Indian confederation whose purpose is to revolt 
against the English settlers.  At her trial, Magawisca proudly wears her native 
clothing: 
Her national pride was manifest in the care with which, after rejecting 
with disdain the Governor’s offer of an English dress, she had attired 
herself in the peculiar costume of her people.  Her collar—bracelet—
girdle—embroidered moccasins, and purple mantle with its rich border 
of bead-work, had been laid aside in prison, but were now all resumed 
and displayed with a feeling resembling Nelson’s, when he emblazoned 
himself with stars and orders to appear before his enemies, on the fatal 
day of his last battle.  (297-298) 
Like Nelson, Magawisca has lost an arm, and the allusion to his “fatal day of his last 
battle” conveys the heroic but doomed destiny of both leaders.  Sedgwick provides 
considerable detail about Magawisca’s dress in this scene, and her dress signifies her 
pride as well as her defiance when she appears before the Puritan magistrates. 40 
Sedgwick also raises Magawisca’s trial to the level of national epic by comparing her 
to Nelson, and she also symbolically associates Magawisca with Anne Hutchinson, the 
                                                 
40 Zagarell offers a further discussion of the significance of Magawisca’s dress on this occasion; see p. 
55. 
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 outspoken and outcast Puritan woman who challenged the authority of Puritan 
ministers:  
[Hutchinson’s] significance is further underscored by the prominence 
in Hope Leslie of Governor Winthrop, historically the architect of her 
persecution, and by the fact that the trial of Magawisca corresponds 
with the date of Anne Hutchinson’s death.  Since the supporters of 
Hutchinson refused to take part in the expedition against the Pequods, 
we might be justified in reading the trial of Magawisca as coded 
representation of the trial of Anne Hutchinson.  (Fetterley 96-97) 
Fetterley also notes that Anne Hutchinson is mentioned during the same conversation 
in which William Fletcher tells his wife about the arrival of Hope and Faith, and she 
remarks that such an allusion “hardly seems accidental” (96).  At her trial, Magawisca 
refuses to submit to Puritan authorities, informing them that “‘I deny your right to 
judge me.  My people have never passed under your yoke—not one of my race has 
ever acknowledged your authority’” (302).  Magawisca’s eloquent defiance, though 
admired by some, is not permissible or tolerable within the Puritan community, and, 
like Hutchinson, she becomes an outcast. 
Governor Winthrop notices a similar trait of outspokenness and rebellion in 
Hope: “‘I know thou art ever somewhat forward to speak the dictates of thy heart’” 
(288).  As previously discussed in chapter one, Lonna Malmsheimer notes that Puritan 
women’s public functions were extremely curtailed by a rigid gender hierarchy.  
Therefore, we see that Hope and Magawisca are very radical in their transgression of 
social, religious, and political codes that excluded women from engaging in public 
affairs.41  However, Hope’s violations of these codes are tolerated and sometimes even 
                                                 
41 Kelley also offers a helpful discussion of the subordination of women within Puritanical culture; see 
pp. xxxiv-xxxv.  
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 smiled upon by the Puritans, but Magawisca’s conduct, though equally valiant, is in no 
way excused. 
In a comparison of Hope and Magawisca’s acts of disobedience what is most 
notable is that Hope and Magawisca face very different consequences and receive 
vastly disparate penalties for their defiance of established authority, and this is true not 
only on the individual level but also on the broader level of the respective 
communities that they represent.  Magawisca’s interactions with Puritan characters 
lead to her imprisonment and finally to her exile from her homeland.  Even though 
Hope similarly opposes authority figures, the negative consequences of her rebellion 
are in no way equivalent to those that Magawisca must endure.  At most, Hope 
receives a proverbial slap on the wrist for her participation in illegal acts, and as 
mentioned above, even the Puritan patriarchs often covertly admire her transgressions.  
Whereas Magawisca exercises agency by performing courageous physical deeds, ones 
which are culturally coded as masculine, Hope, to a certain extent, trades on her 
feminine charms, as Magawisca remarks to Hope, “‘that no one can look on you and 
deny you aught; that you can make old men’s hearts soft, and mould them at your will 
…’” (199).  In order to perform the culturally-coded masculine deeds, Magawisca 
sacrifices a portion of her femininity when she loses her arm, and she essentially 
assumes the role of son to her father, counseling him in matters of state and political 
and military decisions, as Fetterley puts it “she is the daughter understood as son” 
(90).   
Hope’s power partly rests on her ability to seduce with her attractive 
appearance, and in the case of William Fletcher, her adoptive father, it is Hope’s 
resemblance to her mother that draws her to him through an emotion markedly 
different than parental love.  Hope is described as “the child of [Fletcher’s] affections, 
whom he loved with even more than the tenderness of a parent” (262), and his feelings 
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 toward Hope interfere with his ability to instruct her in the mode of feminine 
submission to male authority.  Previously, William describes his passionate love for 
Hope’s mother, Alice, and his love for Alice is, in part, transferred to Hope: “[he] 
infused into the parental affection he felt for the daughter, something of the romantic 
tenderness of the lover of her mother” (127).  There is a certain eroticization of the 
paternal relationship in William’s affection for Hope, which compromises his role as 
disciplinarian, but his love for her is also what creates the opportunity for her to 
exercise a limited form of agency.   
Hope acts on her own conscience not on the strict letter of the law as 
promulgated by male religious and political authorities, but ultimately and luckily for 
her, her personal desire coincides with the political goals of the colony.42  In 
accordance with her sense of justice, Hope masterminds a plan to release Magawisca 
from her captivity in the Boston prison.  Hope first convinces the warden, Barnaby, to 
let her visit Magawisca without the required pass from the Governor, which she 
accomplishes through playing to his affections for her: “‘Well, well,’ he said, after 
hesitating and jingling his keys for a moment, ‘dry up your tears, my young lady; a 
‘wayward child,’ they say, ‘will have its way;’ and they say too, ‘men’s hearts melt in 
women’s tears,’ and I believe it; come, come along, you shall have your way’” (325).  
Hope’s feigning of the appearance of weakness, as manifested in her tears, becomes an 
element of strength, a classic strategy of seduction.  In a scene that illustrates the 
instability of both gender and racial identities, Hope effects a substitution of Master 
Craddock for Magawisca by having her don his “wig, hat, boots, and cloak” (327), and 
this masquerade, along with some further cajoling on Hope’s part, is successful in 
                                                 
42 As Kelley notes, Magawisca and Hope, although they profess different religions, operate on the same 
basic ethical principle: “Rooted in identical spiritual ground, Hope and Magawisca find personal 
integrity and ethical behavior not in the dictates of external authority, but in the impulses of the heart” 
(xxii). 
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 getting Magawisca out of jail and in enabling her to rejoin Mononotto, Oneco, and 
Faith.43   
As Kelley points out, Hope transgresses laws only on behalf of others (xxiii), 
and so her insubordination and her transgression conform to what Zagarell terms “a 
conservative ethos of feminine self-sacrifice …” (56).  Zagarell proceeds to argue that 
“in Hope Leslie, women’s acts in support of liberty, though never committed for the 
gain of the perpetrator, are assertively political: they undermine the Puritans’ 
patriarchal authority” (56).  Certainly, it is true that Hope generously and 
courageously acts on behalf of others, and her actions do contradict the dictates of her 
Puritan elders on a surface level but on a deeper level Hope’s desires and the political 
goals of the Puritan rulers overlap.  Barnes argues that “seduction fiction puts 
sociopolitical anxieties concerning the nature of authority into a personal context, 
where private interpersonal relations intersect with public concerns” (9).  Sedgwick’s 
novel frequently brings together public and private concerns, and she employs the 
conventions of seduction fiction to offer a limited critique of blind obedience to 
patriarchal authority, although her criticism of this authority in relation to gender is 
more progressive than it is in relation to race.   
Even though the jailbreak is a grave crime, Hope faces no serious 
repercussions for her involvement in this action; in fact, her freeing of Magawisca 
turns out to benefit the whole Puritan community.  Intertribal warfare breaks out 
shortly after Magawisca’s release, and Governor Winthrop wants to avoid giving the 
Indians a common cause to rally around, which would be the likely outcome of any 
action that resulted in Magawisca’s recapture and trial by the Puritans.  Inadvertently 
and conveniently, Hope’s illicit action proves fortuitous for the Puritans, but it is never 
                                                 
43 For a further discussion of the use of disguise in Hope Leslie, see Faery p. 187.  Fetterley also offers 
an argument about the differences between gender and racial crossovers; see p. 95.   
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 the case that Magawisca’s generous actions on behalf of the Puritans ever benefit the 
Pequot in a similar fashion.  Kelley argues that the “parallel between Magawisca and 
Hope is most striking in their challenge to established authority,” and, as has been 
previously quoted, she goes on to assert that Magawisca’s intervention in Mononotto’s 
intended execution of Everell is “the most heroic act in the novel” (xxvii).   
However, any valorization of Magawisca’s heroism must also attend to the 
ways in which her heroism causes tremendous suffering for herself and for her nation.  
To be more specific, are Magawisca’s heroic deeds justified by the often devastating 
consequences that proceed from them?  I would argue that it is more accurate to call 
Magawisca a martyr rather than a hero; even though her martyrdom is not as explicit 
or as extreme as Françoise’s, she does sacrifice personal fulfillment and compromise 
her political position to help the white characters prosper in New England.  There is 
indeed something very troubling in the extent to which Magawisca endures bodily 
violence and mental and emotional suffering for the sake of various white 
characters.44  Because Magawisca and the Pequot are in such a disempowered 
position, their acts of resistance to white settlers are doomed to failure, and 
Magawisca’s defiance of authority, whether her father’s authority or that of the Puritan 
elites, brings about severe consequences for herself and her people. 
Sedgwick provides the following account of Magawisca’s feelings for Everell 
and of the rationale guiding her choices and actions: 
[Magawisca] had done and suffered much for him, and she felt that his 
worth must be the sole requital for her sufferings.  She felt too, that she 
had received much from him.  He had opened the book of knowledge to 
                                                 
44 Faery makes a similar point: “The novel repeatedly articulates a belief in Indian nobility, especially in 
its delineation of the character of Magawisca, but can do so because Magawisca asks little or nothing in 
return for the sacrifice of her arm that has liberated Everell” (187). 
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 her—had given subjects to her contemplative mind, beyond the mere 
perceptions of her senses; … but above all, he had gratified her strong 
national pride, by admitting the natural equality of all the children of 
the Great Spirit … (276) 
Magawisca endures emotional, mental, and physical pain on Everell’s behalf and 
indirectly on behalf of the culture he represents, but her pain is not masochistic—the 
pain is not an avenue to pleasure.  Magawisca’s suffering comes closest to that of a 
martyr; her pain finds its justification in Everell’s “worth” (276).  Both Everell and 
Magawisca lose family members due to violence between Indians and settlers, but 
Everell is not required to sacrifice romantic fulfillment or to risk bodily injury on 
Magawisca’s behalf.  He is depicted as a gracious and honorable young man, but her 
gratitude is founded on more than his individual worth.  We see the Eurocentric bias in 
Sedgwick’s portrayal of Magawisca’s sense of indebtedness; Everell bestows on her 
the wealth of Western culture, “the book of knowledge” (276), a heritage that 
apparently inspires her gratitude.  Although Everell espouses an enlightened position 
on the differences among races, claiming that cultural factors not innate abilities 
produce differences in achievements and technology, his recognition brings into focus 
Magawisca’s disempowered standpoint because the dominant power relations 
unequivocally privilege Western culture over Pequot culture.    
By asserting that the benefits which she receives from her relationship with 
Everell are sufficient compensation for her sacrifices, Sedgwick implies that 
Magawisca accepts the superiority of Anglo-American culture, but other examples 
suggest that Magawisca does not concede this point.  What white culture finds most 
daring and threatening about Magawisca is that she publicly denies the superiority of 
Anglo-American culture.  To name two examples: Magawisca firmly maintains her 
belief in native religion despite repeated attempts by Anglo-American characters to 
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 convert her to the Christian God, and she refuses to accept Anglo-American dress, 
preferring to wear her native clothing at her trail even though it alienates the Puritan 
audience.  After escaping from jail and being reunited with her remaining family 
members, Magawisca is left with no choice but to leave her former home, as the 
narrator recounts, “Before the dawn of the next morning, this little remnant of the 
Pequod race, a name at which, but a few years before, … all, English and Indians, 
‘grew pale,’ began their pilgrimage to the far western forests.  That which remains of 
their story, is lost in the deep, voiceless obscurity of those unknown regions” (359).  
For a novel that has paid so much attention to history, the consignment of the Pequot 
to “the deep, voiceless obscurity of those unknown regions” is hardly a desirable fate; 
additionally, the description of “this little remnant of the Pequod tribe” evokes the 
rhetoric of the Indians as a dying race.  Sedgwick ultimately resolves the question of 
whether or not Magawisca concedes to the superiority of Anglo-American culture by 
presenting Magawisca as sadly yet fixedly leaving her former homeland.  
Despite the fact that she is a fugitive, Hope and Everell are portrayed as 
desperately trying to convince Magawisca to remain with them, and it is Magawisca 
who enunciates the harsh reality of her situation: “‘we must part—and part for ever’” 
(350).  The painful parting of these characters reverses the historical reality of Indian 
removal because Magawisca is the one who is presented as enforcing a self-imposed 
banishment while the benevolent white characters urge her to stay.  Faery perceptively 
discusses how scenes of “the ‘cooperative’ willing disappearance of Indians” in novels 
such as Lydia Maria Child’s Hobomok and Hope Leslie affects white audiences (186): 
“Indian characters who voluntarily removed themselves embodied the deep-seated 
desires of white Americans for Indians to disappear without whites’ having to resort to 
violence” (191).  While offering no recognition of their complicity in political 
structures that facilitate the disappearance of Indians, Hope and Everell appear heroic 
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 in their efforts to convince Magawisca to remain with them.  This is indeed a 
seductive narrative strategy, one which subtly advances a political goal; the line 
between coercion and consent is blurred, obfuscating the true reason behind 
Magawisca’s departure.  
As she is saying her farewells to Hope and Everell, Magawisca sanctions their 
long-awaited marriage with the following blessing: “Her voice faltered for the first 
time, and, turning from her own fate to what appeared to her the bright destiny of her 
companions, ‘my spirit will joy in the thought,’ she said, ‘that you are dwelling in love 
and happiness together’” (350).  The contrast between “her own fate” and “the bright 
destiny of her companions” is stark (350), and, as her faltering voice suggests, it must 
be extremely painful for Magawisca to give her blessings to this couple because of her 
own former romantic attraction to Everell.  Digby, the Fletcher’s servant, raises the 
issue of their youthful attraction in his reflections to Everell: “‘time was, when I 
viewed you as good as mated with Magawisca …’” (223-224).  But, he goes on to 
approve the rightness of Hope and Everell’s relationship: “‘for I believe it would have 
broken Magawisca’s heart, to have been put in that kind of eclipse by Miss Leslie’s 
coming between you and her.  Now all is as it should be; as your mother—blessed be 
her memory—would have wished, and your father, and all the world’” (224).  
Everell’s response confirms the former possibility of a romance with Magawisca: 
“‘Yes, Digby, I might have loved her—might have forgotten that nature had put 
barriers between us’” (224).  The reference to “nature” is a convenient excuse for the 
impossibility of their relationship, and with Digby’s pronouncement that “all the 
world” rejoices in their union, Sedgwick goes to great lengths to naturalize the union 
of Hope and Everell.   
In her analysis of early American novels, Samuels offers a key insight about 
the marriage plot in many of these texts: “Put simply, the marriages of the characters 
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 in these novels typically depend on their political commitments and produce a 
founding of the family that founds the state” (17).  Of course, Faith and Oneco also 
marry, but they are clearly not a suitable couple for producing future citizens of the 
nation.  Although the marriage plot is subordinate to the plots of captivity, 
imprisonment, and escape, the union of Hope and Everell, both of whom are white, 
wealthy, and tolerant Christians, is crucial to Sedgwick’s agenda of envisioning New 
England as a land of new possibilities and freedom for a certain kind of Anglo-
American.45  
While Magawisca and Hope share much in common, especially in their 
commitment to obeying the truth of their own hearts, in some ways, Magawisca may 
be more like Esther Downing, the meek and subservient young woman who is often 
praised as a model of Puritan womanhood.  In a gesture similar to Magawisca’s 
renunciation of love and to her self-imposed banishment, Esther gives up her claim to 
Everell to whom she becomes engaged through one of Hope’s impetuous impulses.  In 
a letter explaining her decision, Esther writes, “And to thee, my loving—my own 
sweet and precious Hope Leslie—I resign him.  And may He, who, by his signal 
providence, hath so wonderfully restored in you the sundered affections of your 
parents … —may He make you his own dear and faithful children in the Lord” (367).  
After renouncing her claim to Everell, Esther returns to England for a number of years 
before coming back to New England.  With “her disinterested devotion” to all those 
who need her help (371), Esther is essentially depicted as a saint, and she overcomes 
her love for Everell through her devotion to religious duty.  The Puritans praise Esther 
                                                 
45 Fetterley argues that “Hope Leslie is decidedly antiromantic” (94).  Castiglia’s article also offers a 
persuasive reading of Sedgwick’s critique of romance; for instance, he perceptively comments on the 
way Sedgwick glosses over the marriage ceremony: “Defying narrative conventions, Sedgwick 
minimalizes the importance of the marriage: while we are told the ultimate fate of every minor character 
in the novel in some detail, we learn nothing about the actual wedding: all we learn is that it makes 
society happy” (“In Praise” 10). 
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 for her passivity and submission, but Everell criticizes Esther for her “‘slavish 
obedience to the letter of the law’” (292).  While Magawisca is willing to violate her 
father’s law for Everell’s sake, ultimately she is able to transcend her love for Everell 
through her overwhelming commitment to her nation: “Her tenderness for Everell, and 
her grateful recollections of his lovely mother, she determined to sacrifice on the altar 
of national duty” (203).  Both Esther and Magawisca endure the hardship of 
sacrificing personal desire for the sake of a higher duty in order that Hope and Everell 
can marry.   
Sedgwick also contrasts Hope and Everell’s marriage to Sir Philip and Rosa’s 
scandalous relationship, and Rosa’s story is a classic version of a cautionary tale of 
seduction and abandonment, as critics such as Fetterley, Karcher, and Castiglia point 
out.46  Sir Philip is an unscrupulous character on many fronts: he deceives the Puritans 
by masquerading as a Puritan when he is in fact a Catholic, and he betrays Hope by 
alerting the authorities to her secret meeting with Magawisca and Faith.  Before Sir 
Philip even arrives in the colony, he seduces an orphaned, young girl named Rosa.  
Raised in a convent, Rosa is sheltered and naïve, and she believes Sir Philip’s 
promises of love.  She later accompanies Sir Philip to New England in a not very 
convincing disguise as his page, Roslin.  Upon first speaking with Hope, Rosa says “I 
have lost my way” (175), an allusion to her seduction by Sir Philip.  Rosa describes 
her passion for Sir Philip in terms of bondage: “‘My heart is steeped in this guilty 
love.  If my master but looks kindly on me, or speaks one gentle word to me, I again 
cling to my chains and fetters’” (256).  As Karcher points out, Sedgwick connects 
Rosa and Faith, noting that “vacancy” is descriptor applied to each character and that 
                                                 
46 Fetterley reads the story of Sir Philip and Rosa as a version of the Charlotte Temple plot of seduction 
and abandonment; see p. 81. Karcher also discusses Hope Leslie in relation to Charlotte Temple; see p. 
xi of her “Introduction” to Hope Leslie.  Castiglia also offers a useful reading of Rosa and Sir Philip’s 
relationship in regard to the dangers of religion and romance for women; see pp. 9-10 of “In Praise …”. 
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 both characters are Catholics (“Introduction” to Hope Leslie xxiii).  At Magawisca’s 
trial, Rosa/Roslin is described as “[staring] vacantly about, as if her reason were 
annihilated …” (307), and toward the end of the novel, she says to Sir Philip, 
“‘Thoughts rush so fast, so wildly through my poor head—and then, again, all is 
vacancy’” (337).  For both Faith and Rosa, vacancy is used to denote a lack of mental 
vigor and perhaps an inability to act independently.  Karcher further asserts that 
“despite [Faith’s] expression of ‘modesty,’ [she] is in some sense a fallen woman and 
that she, too, is wearing a disguise (her Indian costume) that marks her as 
transgressive” (“Introduction” to Hope Leslie xxiii).  If both characters are considered 
as fallen women, then we can see that seduction is a sexual act, as well as a cultural 
act involving the crossing of racial boundaries.  The example of these two characters 
supports Toulouse’s argument about the double connotations of seduction in Puritan 
New England as both a sexual act and a crossing of cultural boundaries. 
Although Rosa recognizes Hope’s noble qualities, she is nevertheless 
exceedingly jealous of her because she knows that Hope has replaced her in Sir 
Philip’s affections.  Sir Philip, in turn, speaks of Hope as a seductress: “the most 
provoking, bewitching, and soul-moving creature that ever appeared in the form of 
woman, is my tempter” (208).  In a desperate attempt to secure Hope, who has 
consistently rebuffed him, Sir Philip concocts a wild plan to abduct her and bring her 
back to England on a ship that is sailing from Boston.  In one of several cases of 
mistaken identity, Sir Philip’s henchmen kidnap the wrong woman.  Unaware of this 
fact, Sir Philip whispers to the servant woman who has been kidnapped in Hope’s 
place: “‘Do not struggle thus—you have driven me to this violence—you must forgive 
the madness you have caused.  I am your slave for life’” (341).  Sedgwick warns 
against relationships of slavish love through portrayals of dangerous relationships of 
seduction, those that are based on extreme forms of domination and submission, and 
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 she most dramatically conveys this in the explosion of the ship, showing that slavish 
love and obedience leads to death: “The explosion was instantaneous—the hapless, 
pitiable girl—her guilty destroyer—his victim—the crew—the vessel, rent to 
fragments, were hurled into the air, and soon engulfed in the waves” (342).   
Rosa throws the lamp she is carrying into an uncovered barrel of gunpowder, 
causing the explosion on the ship, and this is a powerful rewriting of Susanna 
Rowson’s Charlotte Temple (1794), which tells of how Charlotte is seduced and 
abandoned by her deceitful lover after she sails with him to the British colonies from 
England.  In addition to alluding to an important text in the emergent American 
literary tradition, the scene of lovers and ships is self-referential within Sedgwick’s 
own novel.  Whereas the young cousins, Alice and William Fletcher, are separated on 
the shores of England, Hope remains safely on the shores of New England, happily 
betrothed to Everell.  Alice is subject to her father’s authority; he physically separates 
her from her lover and chooses a husband for her.  Hope, however, exercises a 
significant measure of agency in both her private and public affairs; thus, Sedgwick 
suggests that independence is an attractive quality and that personal autonomy is a 
crucial element of a successful romantic relationship, at least when personal desire and 
political duty coincide.  Yet, the parameters of feminine agency in Hope Leslie are 
confined to the desires of the father.  After all, Hope marries her stepfather’s son, 
keeping romantic relations squarely within the family unit.  The marriage, at any rate, 
fulfills William Fletcher’s desire; the father still manages to exert control, just in a less 
overt, physical manner.   
In Rowlandson’s and Sedgwick’s texts, seduction as border crossing and 
seduction as sexual temptation are primarily linked through the encounters of the 
captive woman and her captors.  The captives become open to the possibility of 
seduction because they are displaced from their home culture, and narratives of 
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 captivity typically involve seductive scenarios in which a woman’s desire and her 
agency are brought into conflict with both the father’s love and his law.  The 
unresolved and candid contradictions of Rowlandson’s narrative reveal the difficulties 
surrounding the expression of women’s desire and the representation of women’s 
agency in Puritan society, but the attempts of the ministers to direct the reception and 
interpretation of her text do not fully manage to stifle the glimpses of Rowlandson’s 
rebellion within the text.  While Sedgwick’s novel is seemingly quite progressive 
about stressing the need for women’s independence, there is something insidious 
about the collusion of the father’s agenda with the desires of his daughter in Hope 
Leslie.  On a political level, both texts encourage love for the other when the other 
resembles yourself; thus, promoting what would become in later years a racializing 
project of coding U.S. national identity as white.  In terms of the gender implications 
of each text, the seductive scenarios that involve border crossings trouble the political 
project of constructing a white national identity, and they also challenge patriarchal 
law that places women in subordinate roles to men because the captives’ 
transgressions against patriarchal law unsettle this authority, even if they do not 
entirely dismantle it.
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 CHAPTER THREE 
 
Designs of Her Own: A Perilous Journey from Slave Girl to Free Woman in 
Jacobs’s Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl 
 
 
Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl recounts many of the major events of 
Harriet Jacobs’s life under the pseudonym of Linda Brent, including her youthful 
experiences as a slave in North Carolina, her nearly seven years spent in hiding, her 
eventual escape around 1842, and her experiences as a fugitive slave in the North.  In 
order to escape from her master, Dr. James Norcum (identified as Dr. Flint in her text), 
Jacobs spent close to seven years enclosed in a tiny garret—measuring nine feet long, 
seven feet wide, and at its tallest point, three feet high—located in a shed near her 
grandmother’s house.47  In 1852 Jacobs was granted legal freedom when her employer 
and friend, Cornelia Grinnell Willis (the second wife of Mr. Bruce in her narrative), 
purchased Jacobs for $300 and subsequently freed her along with her children, who 
were also purchased by Willis.48  Jacobs is not the only captive to have her freedom 
redeemed by a monetary transaction; for example, Mary Rowlandson is ransomed for 
twenty pounds.  However, in the case of white women who were captives of Indians, 
their status as property was situational not categorical.  In the antebellum era, the bill 
of sale served as the legal guarantee of freedom, but the fact of its existence is of no 
comfort to Jacobs.  When Jacobs learns of the document securing her freedom, she 
experiences this knowledge as an act of violence: “A gentleman near me said, ‘It’s 
                                                 
47 Following the conventions of much of the recent criticism on Jacobs’s text, I will refer to Jacobs as 
Jacobs rather than as Brent, the pseudonym she uses in her text.  The veracity of Jacobs’s narrative is 
well-established, and it makes the most sense to refer to her by her real name.  Most scholars refer to 
the other people described in her text by the pseudonyms that she gives them, and to avoid any 
unnecessary confusion, I will refer to them by their pseudonyms as well. 
48 I am drawing on Yellin’s Harriet Jacobs: A Life for this overview of the major events in Jacobs’s 
life; see pp. 114-116 for an account of the securing of her freedom. 
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 true; I have seen the bill of sale.’ ‘The bill of sale!’ Those words struck me like a 
blow” (300).   
As in the earlier narratives of Indian captivity that have been discussed in 
chapters one and two, the tension between the male authorities in official positions of 
power and socially marginalized women come into conflict, often in scenes of 
seduction, and these confrontations demonstrate the shifting dynamics of domination 
and submission in which we see women abandoning roles of passive submission in the 
face of extreme confinement and duress.  In chapter one, seduction as a mode of 
border crossing and as a mode of contesting patriarchal authority frequently appears in 
narratives of Indian captivity; in this chapter, seduction is analyzed primarily as a 
mode of verbal persuasion and as a mode of amorous pursuit.  In Jacobs’s text, she 
resists her master’s stratagems to make her his mistress by foiling him with stratagems 
of her own, and at least in her textual representation of their relationship, it is his 
increasing frustration with her resistance that provides her with opportunities to loosen 
the bonds that tie her to him.  Jacobs also uses seductive narrative strategies to 
persuade her reader of her virtue by artfully deploying the conventions of sentimental 
fiction to encourage her reader to identify with her situation while simultaneously 
insisting on recognition of the racist foundations which influence the construction of 
racial others in the antebellum era.   
In Seduction, Jean Baudrillard theorizes on the connections among seduction, 
appearances, the reversibility of signs, and the position of weakness: “To seduce is to 
appear weak.  To seduce is to render weak.  We seduce with our weakness, never with 
strong signs or powers.  In seduction we enact this weakness, and this is what gives 
seduction its strength” (83).  While they have different philosophical and political 
orientations, Saidiya Hartman, who analyzes “the law’s discourse of seduction” (103), 
and Baudrillard both emphasize that seduction is a strategy of power that operates 
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 from a position of weakness or that derives its strength from weakness, and, as such, it 
presents itself as a possible mode of resistance for those who are enslaved.  In his 
relations with Jacobs, Dr. Flint puts himself in a position of weakness through 
assuming the role of a spurned lover, and this is a strategy that opens up the space of 
seduction, as well as the problem of seduction and servitude.  Hartman’s astute 
exposition of the dangers of seduction in slave law and the limited yet important 
assertion of agency that Jacobs achieved through seduction examines the stakes of 
seduction as, to quote Hartman, “a strategic disavowal of power” (103).  
Psychoanalytic theory offers a model of seduction based on theorizations about 
sexuality and the unconscious.  According to Freud, seduction, whether it is a real 
event or an imagined scenario, is a sexual experience or an initiation into sexual 
knowledge that profoundly influences a person’s psychic life and subsequent sexual 
relationships and erotic fantasies.  Freud goes through a number of complicated stages 
in his thinking on seduction; in “The Aetiology of Hysteria” (1896), he proposes that 
“no hysterical symptom can arise from a real experience alone, but that in every case 
the memory of earlier experiences awakened in association to it plays a part in 
causing the symptom” (197).  A hysterical symptom is one that arises from the 
combination of unconscious jouissance at play in the hysteric’s unconscious and from 
an organic manifestation of this jouissance in the physical body.   Freud asserts that 
hysterical symptoms invariably arise from a traumatic sexual encounter in the 
subject’s childhood: “Whatever case and whatever symptom we take as our point of 
departure, in the end we infallibly come to the field of sexual experience” (199); Freud 
elaborates on the possible nature of the sexual experience:  
In some cases, no doubt, we are concerned with experiences which 
must be regarded as severe traumas—an attempted rape, perhaps, 
which reveals to the immature girl at a blow all the brutality of sexual 
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 desire, or the involuntary witnessing of sexual acts between parents, 
which at one and the same time uncovers unsuspected ugliness and 
wounds childish and moral sensibilities alike, and so on.  (“Aetiology” 
200) 
Although Jacobs never reveals whether or not Flint raped her, she does depict a social 
and familial world in which slaves were frequently exposed to what Freud refers to 
above as “the brutality of sexual desire.”   It is clear that Jacobs suffers physical and 
emotional trauma from the sexual abuse that Dr. Flint inflicts on her, and while it is 
not possible to diagnose her as suffering from hysterical symptoms on the basis of her 
text, Freud’s investigations of sexual trauma and hysteria nevertheless provide a 
crucial framework for understanding the implications of the positions of seducer and 
seduced in Jacobs’s text.  Freud’s early texts on seduction offer one definition of 
seduction as rape or molestation, and he considers the specific case of incest between 
fathers and daughters.  Jacobs also exposes the father, the head of what she calls the 
“‘patriarchal institution’” as incestuous rapist (114), and she shows that seduction, 
understood as amorous pursuit, and rape are hopelessly intertwined in various sexual 
relationships described in her text. 
In another early case history of hysteria, “Katharina” (1895), Freud meets the 
eighteen-year-old woman of the eponymously entitled case history, who is the 
daughter of an innkeeper; she seeks his help because of the hysterical symptom of 
“breathlessness” that is affecting her (133).  During her treatment, Katharina reveals 
the following memory, which occurred when she was fourteen.  She recalled staying at 
an inn with an “uncle” who comes into her room and then into her bed after a night of 
drinking and gambling:  
She was not sound asleep when he came up, but then she fell asleep 
again and suddenly woke up and ‘felt his body’ in the bed.  She jumped 
89 
 up and reproached him. ‘What are you up to, Uncle?  Why don’t you 
stay in your own bed?’  He tried to talk her into it, ‘Go on, you silly 
girl, keep quiet, you don’t know how good it is.’ – ‘I don’t much like 
your idea of good, not even letting a person sleep.’  She stayed by the 
door, ready to escape out onto the landing, until he left off and fell 
asleep himself.  Then she got back into her bed and slept until morning.  
From the way in which she reported having fended him off, it would 
seem to follow that she did not clearly recognize the attack as sexual.  
(133) 
Katharina’s recollection of the memory suggests that the uncle blended direct and 
indirect methods in an attempt to compel her submission.  Pressing “his body” up 
against hers (Katharina later confesses that she felt his erection), the uncle forcefully 
attacks her while she is sleeping, but he also tries to cajole her into having sex with 
him with his promise of “‘how good it is’” (133).  Katharina represses the sexually 
threatening memory until she witnesses a sexual scene involving the same uncle and 
another woman, her cousin Franziska, at which point she develops her symptom of 
breathlessness.  In a footnote added in 1924, Freud writes that “I venture now, after a 
great many years, to lift the veil of discretion that I observed at the time” (138), 
revealing that it was Katharina’s father, not her uncle, who subjected her to “the 
nocturnal assault,” as he puts it, and other sexually aggressive acts (134).49  The 
euphemistic “veil of discretion” is an ambiguous image; it is unclear who is meant to 
                                                 
49 Various critics have rebuked Freud for his so-called abandonment of the seduction theory; Masson’s 
The Assault on Truth: Freud’s Suppression of the Seduction Theory is one of the most sensational 
examples of this.  While Freud’s seduction theory moves from a general though not exclusive 
identification of the father as the seducer to later identifying the mother or substitutes for her (nurses, 
governesses) as the seducer in his essays on “Female Sexuality” (1931) and “Femininity” (1933), Freud 
never denied the fact of sexual abuse of children.  Rather, his seduction theory develops from 
psychoanalyzing the effects of material experiences of sexuality in childhood to emphasizing the 
importance of fantasy, or psychical reality, in human subjectivity.  See Cummings for a balanced 
treatment of the controversy over Freud’s seduction theory and for a development of his theory, 
especially the introduction and chapter one. 
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 be protected by this masked identity: Katharina, her father, both of them, or perhaps 
even the reader.   
Jacobs recounts the many “nocturnal assault[s]” that she endures in the 
household of Dr. Flint (“Katharina” 134), but unlike Katharina, Jacobs knows all too 
well the sexual nature of Flint’s designs.  In the introduction to Jacobs’s text, Lydia 
Maria Child, an abolitionist and the editor of Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, 
addresses the difficulty of conveying the sexual material of the text in terms that 
resemble Freud’s note to the “Katharina” case history: 
I am well aware that many will accuse me of indecorum for presenting 
these pages to the public; for the experiences of this intelligent and 
much-injured woman belong to a class which some call delicate 
subjects, and others indelicate.  This peculiar phase of Slavery has 
generally been kept veiled: but the public ought to be made acquainted 
with its monstrous features, and I willingly take the responsibility of 
presenting them with the veil withdrawn.  I do this for the sake of my 
sisters in bondage, who are suffering wrongs so foul, that our ears are 
too delicate to listen to them.  (8) 
Child introduces a theme that Jacobs takes up within her text: the connection between 
knowledge and sexuality, or to put it another way, the dependence of a certain kind of 
innocence on ignorance.  Just as Jacobs is stripped of her innocence by Flint’s 
attempts at seduction, so too will her reader lose the comfortable but hypocritical 
stance of ignorance by reading her text.  Drawing aside the veil, Child sets the stage 
for the reader’s seduction, but she still uses euphemistic terms—“delicate subject,” 
“peculiar phase,” and “monstrous features”—to allude to the common practices of 
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 rape and miscegenation under slavery (8).50  Child is unwilling to discuss directly the 
sexual abuses under slavery; in fact, it is not Child who really “present[s] these pages 
to the public” but Jacobs.  Child pleas “for the sake of my sisters in bondage” (8); an 
attempt to establish a relationship between free women of the North and enslaved 
women of the South that is based on bonds of similarity and of love, at least of 
familial love.  Child asks the reader to identify with Jacobs and with her cause, but as 
Jacobs makes her claims for subjectivity she must negotiate between the problem of 
being subsumed under white agency or of being reduced to an object of pity, lust, or 
hatred. 
The assumptions about the reader that are evident in Child’s introduction are 
based on the nineteenth-century model of true womanhood, which stressed piety, 
purity, submissiveness and domesticity.51  The entanglement of innocence and 
ignorance was dictated by the cult of true womanhood, but there was also a great deal 
of hypocrisy in this posture because most people were aware, at the very least, of 
miscegenation.  In his research on the popularity of slave narratives, Dwight McBride 
also suggests that the readers’ claims of innocence may have been disingenuous, or at 
least exaggerated: 
The sensationalism of slave narratives should not be ignored.  That 
public demands placed on slave testimony included that they be 
increasingly revealing and even pruriently detailed about suffering 
under slavery might explain why Harriet Jacobs, for instance, had far 
more difficulty by 1860—some fifteen years after Douglass’s Narrative 
came out—trying to secure publication of her narrative.  (154)  
                                                 
50 See Smith for an extended discussion of the significance of Child’s introduction and its use of 
euphemism in relation to the conventions and expectations of a nineteenth-century readership; pp. 37-
41. 
51 For a fuller discussion of the cult of true womanhood, see Welter p.44. 
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 Admittedly, the evidence that McBride offers is speculative, but other critics make 
similar claims about the salacious appeal of slave narratives, lending credence to 
McBride’s argument.  In his essay on masochism, “A Child is Being Beaten,” Freud 
offers empirical evidence for the prurient qualities of texts about slavery; he reports 
that a significant number of his patients’ beating fantasies were aroused by Harriet 
Beecher Stowe’s famous novel: “In my patient’s milieu it was almost always the same 
books whose contents gave a new stimulus to the beating phantasies: those accessible 
to young people, such as the so-called “Bibliothèque rose,” Uncle Tom’s Cabin, etc.” 
(98).  Citing the work of Freud, Marcia Marcus, and Richard Krafft-Ebing, Marianne 
Noble likewise discusses the phenomenon of Uncle Tom’s Cabin and other narratives 
about slavery and their “function as such a notoriously successful supply of material 
for masochistic erotic fantasy” (127).  Noble points out that Uncle Tom’s Cabin was a 
powerful force in mobilizing abolitionist groups, but she notes that the limitation of 
the combination of pleasure and politics in what she calls “sentimental masochism” is 
that “the slaves [are] erotic objects rather than fully human subjects” (127). 
Meditating on the problematic relationship of slave or former slave authors and 
their readers, Hartman identifies the crux of the matter:  
At issue here is the precariousness of empathy and the uncertain line 
between witness and spectator.  Only more obscene than the brutality 
unleashed at the whipping post is the demand that this suffering be 
materialized and evidenced by the display of the tortured body or 
endless recitations of the ghastly and the terrible.  In light of this, how 
does one give expression to these outrages without exacerbating the 
indifference to suffering that is the consequence of the benumbing 
spectacle or contend with the narcissistic identification that obliterates 
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 the other or the prurience that too often is the response to such 
displays?  (4) 
Texts are invariably read and interpreted in a multitude of ways that cannot be 
predicted or controlled, and the act of sharing painful memories, or even just recalling 
painful memories, entails an inevitable risk for the author of slave narratives.  At the 
end of her narrative, Jacobs writes: “It has been painful to me, in many ways, to recall 
the dreary years I passed in bondage.  I would gladly forget them if I could” (303).  
Like Jacobs, Hartman ponders the difficulties inherent in writing about sexual 
exploitation and slavery; such writing can serve as a crucial tool to advance the urgent 
goal of emancipation but it carries with it the possibility of erotic objectification of the 
slaves’ suffering.  For the enslaved or the formerly enslaved, the challenge lies in 
agitating for political change without compromising the integrity of one’s experience; 
in other words, one must evoke sympathy while avoiding the collapse of difference in 
the moment of sympathetic identification.  Jacobs withholds details about scenes of 
sexual abuse, decreasing the likelihood of a reader’s strictly prurient interest in her 
text, and her accounts of sexual abuse focus on the failure of Flint as a seducer, 
emphasizing his ineptitude and cruelty.  Jacobs frequently addresses her readers, 
instructing and educating them in the way to read her text; she becomes a seducer of 
her reader through the rhetorical designs of her text.  
Carla Kaplan asserts that “the reader [is] the constitutive feature of Jacobs’s 
narrative strategies” (63), and the most difficult issue that Jacobs must negotiate as she 
constructs her narrative for an overwhelmingly white Northern female audience is 
feminine sexuality, and more specifically, black feminine sexuality.  The conditions of 
slavery, most obviously the practice of institutional rape, made it impossible for 
female slaves to conform to the prescriptions of piety, purity, submissiveness and 
domesticity dictated by the nineteenth-century model of true womanhood.  Black 
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 women were also subject to pernicious stereotypes about their supposedly irrepressible 
sexuality, as Hazel Carby explains, “Confronted by the black woman, the white man 
behaved in a manner that was considered to be entirely untempered by any virtuous 
qualities; the white male, in fact, was represented as being merely prey to the rampant 
sexuality of his female slaves” (27).  Depicted as seductress, the slave woman 
shouldered the burden of guilt while the master was exonerated from his crimes.  As 
she prepared her narrative for mass consumption, Jacobs had to struggle against her 
readers’ attitudes and prejudices against black feminine sexuality in particular, as well 
as cultural prescriptions of reticence on the subject of feminine sexuality in general.  
One of Jacobs most important historical scholars, Jean Fagan Yellin, remarks: 
“Publication of this book marked, I think, a unique moment in our literary history.  
Incidents defied the taboos prohibiting women from discussing their sexuality—much 
less their sexual exploitation—in print” (“Written” 209).   
Karen Sánchez-Eppler interprets the conventions surrounding sexuality, 
knowledge, and narration to suggest “that the reader shares in this story’s sexual risk” 
(102), a view that is supported by Child’s description of the women who preserve their 
innocence by refusing sexual knowledge.  Perhaps, some Northern readers could claim 
ignorance of the sexual abuse associated with slavery, but Jacobs goes to great lengths 
to show that in the South it is impossible for either master or slave to remain 
unaffected by the sexual practices of slavery.  Jacobs recounts numerous examples of 
the all too common abuse of slave girls by their masters, as she says:  
The slave girl is reared in an atmosphere of licentiousness and fear.  
The lash and the foul talk of her master and his sons are her teachers.  
When she is fourteen or fifteen, her owner, or his sons, or the overseer, 
or perhaps all of them, begin to bribe her with presents.  If these fail to 
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 accomplish their purpose, she is whipped or starved into submission to 
their will.  (79) 
The close living arrangements of various slaves and masters also resulted in 
the slave owner’s families being corrupted by the daily spectacles of abuse: 
The slaveholder’s sons are, of course, vitiated, even while boys, by the 
unclean influences every where around them.  Nor do the master’s 
daughters always escape.  Severe retributions sometimes come upon 
him for the wrongs he does to the daughters of the slaves.  The white 
daughters early hear their parents quarreling about some female slave.  
(80) 
For example, Jacobs describes the sadistic behavior of a bed-ridden young master 
toward his slave Luke, whom he beats mercilessly and subjects to “the strangest freaks 
of despotism … [some of them] were of a nature too filthy to be repeated” (289).  
White women were also agents of violence, participating in brutal beatings of their 
slaves.  Jacobs cites the following actions of Mrs. Wade, a neighboring mistress of a 
plantation: “At no hour of the day was there cessation of the lash on her premises.  Her 
labors began with the dawn, and did not cease till long after nightfall.  There she 
lashed the slaves with the might of a man” (74).  In addition to brute physical 
violence, white women had the power to exploit slaves sexually; for example, Jacobs 
recounts the incident of a slave-owner’s daughter who bears a child by one of her 
father’s slaves: “She selected the most brutalized, over whom her authority could be 
exercised with less fear of exposure” (80).  Thus, Southern white men and women 
were thoroughly steeped in the abusive practices of slavery, and any pretense to 
ignorance was gross hypocrisy. 
Hartman aptly remarks on “the perverse domesticity of the paternal institution” 
(103), and this “perverse domesticity” is a frequent target of Jacobs’s critique.  The 
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 triangulated relationship of the slave and “an unprincipled master and a jealous 
mistress,” to use Jacobs’s words (49), is at the root of the tortured relations among the 
members of a slave-owning family.  Starting from the age of fourteen, Flint 
relentlessly pursued Jacobs, employing various strategies to compel her to submit, but 
Jacobs responded with a pugnacious attitude: “The war of my life had begun; and 
though one of God’s most powerless creatures, I resolved never to be conquered.  
Alas, for me!” (31). Jacobs was determined to resist Flint to the utmost, but her 
dashing defiance was also mixed with an acknowledgment of the hopelessness of her 
situation.  The interjection, “Alas, for me!”, sounds like a moment of retrospection, 
moving the narrative ahead in time.  Is this sigh of sadness over her long struggle 
against Flint, or is it a sigh of resignation over her ultimate defeat?  Jacobs leaves open 
these questions, and many silences surround passages about sexuality in her text.52   
However, Mrs. Flint certainly recognized her husband’s lascivious interest in 
the young slave, and her jealously added to Jacobs’s oppression.  In a situation of 
structural parallelism, Mrs. Flint steps into the role that her husband occupied in 
relation to Jacobs: “She watched her husband with unceasing vigilance; but he was 
well practised in means to evade it” (49).  After learning of her husband’s plans to 
have Jacobs sleep in his room to attend to his youngest daughter, who was also 
sleeping in his room, Mrs. Flint countered her husband’s sleeping arrangements for 
Jacobs with plans of her own, leading to another bizarre bedroom scenario in which 
Jacobs was instructed to sleep in a room next to Mrs. Flint’s: 
                                                 
52 Critics often note that there is never a full disclosure of her sexual past; there is considerable 
speculation but no definitive answer as to whether or not her master raped her.  For instance, Hartman 
suspects that she is raped; see p.107.  Kaplan, however, believes that she is not; see p. 56. Building on 
the work of Foreman, Emsley agrees with Foreman’s speculation that the verbal abuse masks physical 
or sexual abuse, and, while the type(s) of abuse is uncertain, it is clear that his propositions put her in 
jeopardy.  See Foreman pp. 317-318, and Emsley 153-154. 
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 There I was an object of her especial care, though not of her especial 
comfort, for she spent many a sleepless night to watch over me.  
Sometimes I woke up, and found her bending over me.  At other times 
she whispered in my ear, as though it was her husband who was 
speaking to me, and listened to hear what I would answer.  …  At last, I 
began to be fearful for my life.  It had been often threatened; and you 
can imagine, better than I can describe, what an unpleasant sensation it 
must produce to wake up in the dead of the night and find a jealous 
woman bending over you.  (54) 
The positioning of bodies in these nocturnal meetings of mistress and slave is very 
strange; a mixture of psychological terror and physical intimacy characterizes Jacobs’s 
description of what she calls Mrs. Flint’s “vigils” (54).  Is Mrs. Flint merely reenacting 
her husband’s tactics of seduction when she whispers into Jacobs’s ear, or is there an 
element of her own desire in this staging of seduction?  Although she has previously 
ordered Jacobs to swear on the Bible about the truth of her relationship with her 
husband, Mrs. Flint, whether she recognizes it or not, demonstrates that she believes 
truth can be discovered in the unconscious by her strategy of surprising the truth out of 
a sleeping Jacobs.  Hortense Spillers suggests that these nightly encounters might 
manifest a sexual wish on the part of Mrs. Flint, in which she expresses her desire by 
stepping into the role of her husband (77).  Sánchez-Eppler similarly interprets these 
encounters: “As she bends over her sleeping slave, her mouth at Linda’s ear, Mrs. 
Flint occupies precisely the position of erotic dominance repeatedly denied the doctor” 
(96).  Jacobs faltered in her ability to recount these bedroom scenes, trusting that the 
reader “can imagine, better than I can describe” what these incidents were like (54); 
such an open-ended statement lends itself to any number of possibilities.   
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 In a critique of the frequently invoked paternalistic model of slavery in which 
slaveholders and their slaves are said to comprise an extended family, Sandra Gunning 
makes another key point about Flint’s stratagem: “[Jacobs] depicts this delicacy under 
assault by the white master ‘father’ who seeks to suppress the detailed discussion of 
sexual – and therefore incestuous – exploitation of a surrogate daughter” (342).  
Gunning’s observation is made in reference to Jacobs’s description of the onset of 
Flint’s harassment; in this passage, Jacobs’s stresses her innocence which partly arises 
from her youth.  At this point, Jacobs is fifteen and Flint is approximately forty years 
older than her: “I was compelled to live under the same roof with him—where I saw a 
man forty years my senior daily violating the most sacred commandments of nature” 
(44-45).  The “most sacred commandments of nature” sounds like an invocation of the 
incest prohibition, and while Flint rather ineptly assumes the role of a seducer or a 
spurned lover, in the initial stages of his sexual advances, Jacobs highlights their 
inappropriateness by showing how far he deviates from his supposed role of father.   
As Jacobs withstands Flint’s assaults, he becomes increasingly persistent and 
indefatigable in his efforts to force her into submission.  Flint begins stalking Jacobs: 
“My master met me at every turn, reminding me that I belonged to him, and swearing 
by heaven and earth that he would compel me to submit to him.  If I went out for a 
breath of fresh air, after a day of unwearied toil, his footsteps dogged me.  If I knelt by 
mother’s grave, his dark shadow fell on me even there” (46).  While there is the 
potential for violence and violation, what we see is a prolongation of Flint’s quest, a 
quest that resembles and mimics a courtship, albeit a perverted one.  As the chase goes 
on, Flint seems more and more like a desperate man rather than the tyrannical master, 
though all of the institutional and political power remains on his side.  At first, Flint 
tries to coerce Jacobs into submission through verbal persuasion, and even though it 
does not yield immediate results, he still carries on with that method, increasing its 
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 frequency and intensity.  The expression, “his footsteps dogged me” (46), evokes the 
metaphor of romantic pursuit as the chase, but, in the South, the chase is also the terror 
of the fugitive slave hunted down by ferocious packs of hound dogs.  Although Jacobs 
is not yet a fugitive, her depiction of herself evading Flint’s authority through the 
figure of the fugitive slave foreshadows the more extreme forms of evasions she will 
later be forced to undertake.   
In her reading of Jacob’s narrative, Hartman demonstrates how “the law’s 
discourse of seduction” was only a convenient excuse for the failure to provide official 
legal protections for slaves (103):  
In the effort to attend to the interests of master and slave, the law 
elaborated a theory of power in which the affection of slave owners and 
the influence of the enslaved compensated for its failures and 
omissions.  It contended that affection and influence bridged the 
shortcomings of law concerning the protection of black life.  The ethic 
of perfect submission recognized the unlimited dominion of the slave 
owner yet bounded this dominion by invoking the centrality of 
affections in regulating the asymmetries of power in the master-slave 
relation.  (90)   
In Jacobs’s representations of Dr. Flint’s efforts to seduce her, she shows that he often 
puts himself in a position of weakness by assuming the role of a spurned lover, 
claiming that his affection for Jacobs restrains him from physically forcing her to 
comply with his sexual wishes.  Although he appeals to her pity and pleads for her 
affection, Flint possesses concrete forms of power, and he cruelly exercises this power 
by imprisoning Jacobs’s relatives and by brutally striking her as well as her children, 
to cite a few examples.  Moreover, while Flint does not technically have the legal 
power to kill Jacobs, there is little in actuality that would prevent him from doing so.  
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 Jacobs exposes what Hartman calls “the law’s discourse of seduction” as a total sham 
(103), one that provides the slaveholders with power and privilege while leaving the 
slaves in a state of extreme vulnerability.  Thus, there is a significant tension between 
the historical reality of the brutal inequality of master/slave relations and Jacobs’s 
frequent portrayal of Flint as a suitor for her affections.   
In addition to exposing Flint’s phony posturing as a spurned lover, Jacobs 
deflates his lover’s discourse with her description of the “foul words” that he pours 
into her ear (44), and she finds the letters that he sends to her equally offensive.  
Elizabeth Fox-Genovese notes that the exchange of letters appears as a staple in “the 
conventions of domestic fiction” (381), and the letters and the focus on the imperiled 
heroine shares some resemblances to Samuel Richardson’s epistolary novels, as 
various critics have remarked.53  Valerie Smith asserts that “Jacobs could thus expect 
her readers to identify with her heroine” because she employs the common model of 
the heroine who values her chastity and who repels the advances of her seducer (37).  
However, Smith recognizes the limits of the comparison of Jacobs’s actual situation as 
a slave to that of heroines of epistolary novels, as well as to those of sentimental 
fiction, because Jacobs’s options were far more constrained by the institution of 
slavery (37).  Any exercise of agency or assertion of will was often a case of choosing 
between the lesser of two evils.54  Even though she knew that many of her readers 
might judge her harshly for breaching the codes of true womanhood, Jacobs painfully 
and reluctantly wrote of her decision to take an unmarried white lover rather than 
submit to Flint because this affair afforded her protection from Flint, as well as a small 
degree of agency in her personal life.   Jacobs’s white lover, Mr. Sands seduced her 
                                                 
53 See also Kaplan p. 51. 
54 Hartman’s and Sharpe’s work on the possibilities and constraints of slave women’s agency has 
influenced my analysis of this topic.  See Hartman’s chapter on “Seduction and the Ruses of Power,” 
especially pp. 105-112, and Sharpe’s  “Introduction,” especially pp. xviii- xx. 
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 with “his kind words” (85), and it is a “calculated” decision on her part because he can 
shield her, to some extent, from Flint’s advances.55  And so, she hoped this act would 
move her away from Flint’s clutches.  At the narrative level, Hartman points out that 
Jacobs uses her position of weakness to gain her audience’s favor by acknowledging 
the superiority of their moral codes while simultaneously forcing them to view the dire 
situation of slavery from her perspective (106-107).  The reader is the one who must 
be convinced of the wrongs of slavery and moved to action through the narrative, but 
Jacobs lacks legal or social authority to influence her readers in this direction.  Thus, 
she uses her own verbal persuasion to seduce her readers by convincing them to 
identify with the enslaved, and we see that seduction can play a role, even if a small 
one, in facilitating her goal of achieving a life of freedom. 
Whereas Flint engages in seduction to compel Jacobs’s submission, she uses 
seduction to move her toward her goal of escaping from his tyranny.  In the context of 
master/slave relations, seduction is a limited strategy in the quest for freedom; if 
slaves were to achieve a measure of protection by winning their master’s affections (as 
the doctrine of seduction suggests), then they could not act for themselves because 
they must act in accordance with what they believe to be the desire of their masters in 
order to retain their goodwill.  Such a scope of action is obviously very restricted.  
Jacobs’s Incidents exposes the hypocrisy of “the centrality of affections” as a doctrine 
that protects slaves from their masters’ unlimited power (Hartman 90).  Flint’s 
protestations of “‘kindness and forbearance’” toward Jacobs ring false (62), and she 
was never deceived by them.  Jacobs also exposes how short-lived such affection can 
be when she describes how Flint sold a slave woman who bore his child: “When the 
mother was delivered into the trader’s hands, she said, ‘You promised to treat me 
                                                 
55 Concerning her relationship with Sands, Jacobs writes: “I knew what I did, and I did it with deliberate 
calculation” (83).    
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 well’” (24).  Even Sands, the father of Jacobs’s two children, who originally seduced 
Jacobs with his eloquence and solicitous attention, ultimately abandoned her and 
failed to fulfill his promise to free their children, as she recalls, “but the links of such 
relations as he had formed with me, are easily broken and cast away as rubbish.  Yet 
how protectingly and persuasively he once talked to the poor, helpless slave girl!  And 
how entirely I trusted him!” (215).   
Jacobs describes how Flint thwarted her desire to marry a free black man, and 
the end of Jacobs’s dream of marriage and a conventional family irrevocably severs 
her plotline from those common to the sentimental and domestic novel heroines: 
“Reader, my story ends with freedom; not in the usual way, with marriage” (302).  
Because of her captivity experience, Jacobs was forced into a position where she could 
critique gender roles, especially those put forth by the myth of true womanhood and 
that of the figure of the black seductress.  Unlike the popular heroine, Charlotte 
Temple, of the eponymously titled novel by Susanna Rowson, Jacobs did not conform 
to the trajectory that condemns the seduced and abandoned heroine to death, as 
Charlotte Temple dies after bearing her daughter out of wedlock.  Thus, Jacobs’s 
narrative also revises the conventions of the seduction novel, which stressed the dire 
consequences to young women of disobedience of parental authority.  In contrast, 
Jacobs succeeds in securing freedom for herself and her children and in providing 
them with a home; furthermore, Jacobs’s daughter eased her mother’s mind by 
affirming her love for her mother: “‘I know all about it, mother,’ she replied; ‘I am 
nothing to my father, and he is nothing to me.  All my love is for you’” (283).   
As an unwed mother, Jacobs’s social status was marginal in comparison to the 
dominant white society, a point which concerns Spillers in her reflections on the 
importance of matriarchal organization in African-American families, as she writes: 
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 This different cultural text actually reconfigures, in historically 
ordained discourse, certain representational potentialities for African-
Americans: 1) motherhood as female bloodrite is outraged, is denied, at 
the very same time that it becomes the founding term of a human and 
social enactment; 2) a dual fatherhood is set in motion, comprised of 
the African father’s banished name and body and the captor father’s 
mocking presence.  In this play of paradox, only the female stands in 
the flesh, both mother and mother-dispossessed.  This problematizing 
of gender places her, in my view, out of the traditional symbolics of 
female gender, and it is our task to make a place for this different social 
subject.  In doing so, we are less interested in joining the ranks of 
gendered femaleness than gaining the insurgent ground as female social 
subject” (80).   
Although the specific circumstances of each female captive vary greatly, the captivity 
experience forces the captive to challenge norms of conduct and gender roles.  
Jacobs’s narrative is concerned with the traffic in women, or more to the point, the 
status of slave women as property, and one of her most steadfast ambitions is not to 
circulate as object of property in the marketplace.  As Spillers argues, the captivity 
experience necessitates the establishment of new roles for women at the level of the 
family and the social sphere, ones that are not structured along the model provided by 
patriarchal organization. 
In his relations with Jacobs, we see that Flint assumed the role of seducer, 
although he was neither effective nor convincing in this role, but Jacobs’s 
representations of his use of the rhetoric of seduction create an opportunity for her to 
exercise a small measure of agency in the dynamics of their twisted relationship.  
Whereas a slave cannot easily rebuff her master, at the level of narrative 
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 representation, the beloved can reject her suitor.  Jacobs masterfully plays with 
appearances, and Flint’s protracted pursuit of her ultimately destroys him.  Jacobs 
represents herself as the victim of a tortured courtship, or seduction; she represents 
Flint as assaulting her virtue, emphasizing her weakness and vulnerability.  Even 
though Flint is empowered by legal and social institutions, Jacobs portrays him as 
undone by his desire for her.  While it leaves intact the oppressive legal and social 
structure, the failure of Flint’s seduction is nevertheless a small success for Jacobs.  
Instead of referring to slavery as the South’s “peculiar institution,” Jacobs typically 
speaks of it as the “patriarchal institution” (114, 222, 288); by underscoring the 
father’s position in the institution of slavery, Jacobs exposes the father as incestuous 
rapist and tyrannical master.  In Freud’s analysis of the “Katharina” case history, the 
father utilizes physical aggression and verbal persuasion in his attempted rape of his 
daughter.  At least in her textual representation of their relationship, Jacobs suggests 
that Flint fluctuates between the poles of coercion and consent, but his measures are 
far more extreme than those of Katharina’s father.  Jacobs reports that “a razor was 
often held to my throat to force me to change this line of policy [her resistance to his 
propositions]” (51).  On other occasions, he resorts to bribes, like offering her a 
cottage of her own.   
In her analysis of Jacobs’s portrayal of Flint as seducer, Smith considers the 
stakes of Jacobs’s allusions to the plot of Richardson’s Pamela; she argues that “[as] is 
always the case when one attempts to universalize a specific political point, Jacobs 
here trivializes the complexity of her situation when she likens it to a familiar 
paradigm” (37).  Smith notes that two key options are available to Pamela that are in 
no way available to Jacobs: Pamela can return to “the refuge of her parent’s home,” or 
she can marry a transformed and repentant Mr. B. who would “[elevate] her and their 
progeny to his position” (Smith 37).  Certainly, Smith’s points about the limitations of 
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 the generic comparison of Jacobs’s situation to that of the heroines of sentimental 
fiction are accurate, but surely Jacobs acknowledges these limitations at length 
through her exhaustive and various depictions of the abuses of slaves by their masters.  
Smith remarks on the mystery of Flint’s apparent restraint: “Her master, for some 
reason reluctant to force her to submit sexually, harassed her, pleaded with her, and 
tried to bribe her into capitulating in the manner of an importunate suitor like 
Richardson’s seducer” (36).  Scholars venture different opinions on whether or not 
Jacobs was raped by Flint, but since her text gives no definitive answer on this topic, 
we can only speculate on the reasons why she withheld this information and the 
effects of this withholding.  It is easy to imagine many personal reasons why she 
would choose not to write about being raped, if were indeed the case that she had been 
raped by Flint.  Moreover, I would argue that one significant effect of Jacobs’s 
portrayal of Flint’s efforts to secure her consent is that she conveys the impression that 
Flint wants something more from her than the physical act of sex.  Without her 
submission to his will, his dominion over her cannot be confirmed, and this suggests a 
psychic dimension to the struggle for domination or submission between the master 
and slave.  If she were to mentally and spiritually submit to his desire, that act would 
affirm her status as an erotic object, and it would be an admission of his mastery over 
her, both of which she adamantly rejects.  
Although we never hear Flint express feelings of affection for Jacobs, he 
repeatedly says that he wants to make her happy, and his hesitation over the final and 
irreversible act of killing her can possibly be accounted for by his feelings for her, 
which stay his hand.  Another more plausible reason for Flint’s reluctance to kill 
Jacobs for refusing to become his mistress is that he would rather extract the triumph 
of breaking her will than the empty victory of ending her life.  As has been argued 
above, if he were to succeed in breaking her will, then he would receive confirmation 
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 of his own power; just as the master receives recognition from the slave after he 
emerges victorious from their fight, according to Hegel’s dialectic.  It is likely that 
Flint’s maniacal behavior arises from his failure to crush Jacobs’s “determined will” 
(130); his status as master cannot be confirmed while his slave evades and avoids 
complete surrender to his will.  Paul Gilroy discusses “the Hegelian impasse” that 
ensues between Frederick Douglass and his master when Douglass physically resists 
his authority; Douglass defeats his master and experiences a sense of freedom that 
seals his determination to escape from slavery (62-63).  Jacobs and Flint are locked in 
their own Hegelian impasse, and her unwavering rejection of Flint’s advances 
constitute her fight for a recognition of personhood, even if the state continued to deny 
her the rights of political and legal subjectivity.  
Although she is discussing a different context, Joan Dayan offers commentary 
that sheds light on Flint’s behavior: “The forbidden complicities portrayed in most 
gothic fiction find their source in enslavement or bondage.  In a bind of covert 
mutuality, where masters become slaves and slaves, masters—the reversible world 
Hegel would later describe—the proprietor becomes possessed by his possession” 
(197).  In Flint’s case, he becomes possessed by Jacobs precisely because he cannot 
possess her; in fact, he cannot even lay his hands on her because he does not know 
where she is.  After deciding to make her bid for freedom, Jacobs hides in a small 
room in the home of a woman who is sympathetic to Jacobs plight even though she is 
also a slaveholding woman, and she observes Flint walking by as she peers out the 
window, remarking on the “satisfaction” that she takes in outwitting him: “Anxious as 
I was, I felt a gleam of satisfaction when I saw him” (154).   
Later, Jacobs moves to the garret near her grandmother’s house, where she 
spent the next seven years of her life; Hartman writes that the garret is “a space of 
freedom that is at the same time a space of captivity …” (9).  The freedom is literally 
107 
 and figuratively circumscribed, but Jacobs describes a number of key reversals in her 
relationship with Flint that result from her enclosure in secret hiding spots.  While in 
the garret, Jacobs further vexes Flint by having a friend of hers send him letters 
postmarked from New York, as she explains, “I resolved to match my cunning against 
his cunning” (193).  Flint travels to New York a number of times in pursuit of Jacobs, 
and it is clear that he is not trying to recover his “property” for monetary reasons, 
especially as he has received many offers from Jacobs’s friends to purchase her.  In 
fact, Flint borrows $500 in order to finance his trips to New York.  From an economic 
standpoint, Flint’s actions make no sense, and his behavior with respect to Jacobs has 
been monomaniacal ever since her adolescence.  At the time of his death, Flint has lost 
most of his wealth, and despite vigorous and sustained efforts, he failed to recapture 
Jacobs. 
Jacobs, of course, suffers unspeakably more than Flint; she certainly endures 
physical violence at his hands, as well as sexual harassment.  The seven years spent in 
the cramped and suffocating quarters of her grandmother’s shed leave her with chronic 
ailments, and the seven lost years with her children grieve her most of all.  The 
specificities of Jacobs’s psychic trauma are unknowable, but the rampant sexual 
abuses practiced under the institution of slavery suggest that such trauma must be 
tremendous.  Michelle Burnham reports that “Jacobs wrote her narrative secretly, at 
night in the attic of her employer’s house—a scenario that repeats the confining 
conditions of her own escape from slavery …” (148).  Burnham further observes that 
the chapter entitled, “The Loophole of Retreat,” is at “the exact center of the text” 
(148), and she astutely comments on the text’s “concern with secrecy as much as with 
exposure” (150).  Analyzing the various definitions provided by the Oxford English 
Dictionary of a loophole as “‘[a] narrow vertical opening, usually widening inwards, 
cut in a wall or other defence, to allow of the passage of missiles’” (153) and “‘[a]n 
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 outlet or means of escape.  Often applied to an ambiguity or omission in a statute, etc., 
which affords opportunity for evading its intention’” (154), Burnham observes that 
Jacobs makes the most of her imprisonment in her grandmother’s garret to turn the 
power of gaze and surveillance on Flint (153-154).  Even though she is so close to her 
home, Jacobs is nevertheless in exile from her home.  To say the least, the “loophole 
of retreat” is an ambivalent source of power and agency for Jacobs; like the mode of 
seduction, it brings together the opposing pairs of strength and weakness, and coercion 
and consent.  The very fluctuation between the opposing poles of these pairs creates 
moments in which Jacobs can resist her master and eventually secure her freedom.  
Turning her gaze first on her master, Jacobs sets in motion the process that will result 
in her freedom; turning her narrative over to the reading public, she hopes to facilitate 
the movement that will lead to emancipation of all slaves.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
What Does a Woman Want?: Desire and Seduction in Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale 
 
Although Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale is set in the future, the 
setting of the novel is recognizable as Cambridge, Massachusetts, and the theocratic 
government that is portrayed in the novel, the Republic of Gilead, recalls many of the 
same prejudices seen in the society of the seventeenth-century Puritan settlers of this 
region.  The campus of what was formerly Harvard University serves as the backdrop 
for much of the novel’s action, and this setting evokes the Puritanical heritage of both 
the institution and the country because the university was named after a Puritan 
minister, John Harvard.  Atwood dedicates the novel to Mary Webster and to Perry 
Miller, both of whom also share a connection to the Puritans.  Mary Webster was an 
ancestor of Atwood’s whom the Puritans condemned to death for witchcraft, and 
despite the fact that she was indeed hanged, Webster amazingly and strangely 
survived, as Atwood relates: 
Luckily, they had not yet invented the drop: in those days they just sort 
of strung you up.  When they cut Mary Webster down the next day, she 
was, to everyone’s surprise, not dead.  Because of the law of double 
jeopardy, under which you could not be executed twice for the same 
offence, Mary Webster went free.  I expect that if everyone thought she 
had occult powers before the hanging, they were even more convinced 
of it afterwards.  She is my favorite ancestor, more dear to my heart 
even than the privateers and the massacred French protestants, and if 
there’s one thing I hope I’ve inherited from her, it’s her neck.  (qtd. in 
Evans 177) 
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 Atwood explains that Webster was charged with “‘causing an old man to become 
extremely valetudinarious’” (qtd. in Evans 177).  Specifically, Webster was accused of 
practicing witchcraft on the old man, causing his illness.  As a graduate student at 
Harvard, Atwood worked with Perry Miller, whom she describes as “the man who 
more or less resurrected the study of seventeenth-century Puritans in America” 
(Dodson 97).  Webster and Miller make an unlikely pair: Webster is a representative 
of the disempowered and silenced female voice, and Miller is one of the academic 
elite who shapes the collective memory of the nation through the histories that he 
publishes.   
 Mary Webster haunts The Handmaid’s Tale in figurative as well as in literal 
manifestations.  Public executions by hanging are mandatory spectacles for the 
citizens of Gilead, and the first-person narrator, Offred, is often arrested by the sight of 
dangling bodies on the Wall.  “The Wall,” as Offred tells us, “is hundreds of years old 
too; or over a hundred, at least.  Like the sidewalks, it’s red brick, and must once have 
been plain but handsome.  Now the gates have sentries and there are ugly new 
floodlights mounted on metal posts above it, and barbed wire along the bottom and 
broken glass set in concrete along the top” (31).  The Wall becomes a site of terror: the 
modifications made to it emphasize surveillance and brutality.  Moreover, the Wall is 
one of the many barriers that enclose and order the lives of Gileadean citizens.  As 
Offred goes about her daily shopping errands with her partner Ofglen, they pass by the 
Wall and stand transfixed in front of it, as she explains: “We’re supposed to look: this 
is what they are there for, hanging on the Wall.  Sometimes they’ll be there for days, 
until there’s a new batch, so as many people as possible will have the chance to see 
them” (32).  The witchcraft mania and the absolute intolerance for dissent that marked 
the colonial Puritan era returns with a vengeance in Gilead, and numerous men and 
women are unjustly persecuted – often to the point of death.  People of color, religious 
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 dissenters, homosexuals, scientists, doctors who used to perform abortions, and all 
others who are suspected of subversive activity are subject to imprisonment or 
banishment, both of which typically precede the penalty of death.   
The Puritanical heritage of the country is not the only important historical 
reference that serves as a foundation for Atwood’s text.  In an interview with Danita 
Dodson, Margaret Atwood identifies African American slave narratives as a source for 
The Handmaid’s Tale (101).  In particular, Harriet Jacobs’s Incidents in the Life of a 
Slave Girl, as Written by Herself, which was published in 1861, provides considerable 
insight into the dynamics of domination and submission that characterize the twisted 
relationship between handmaids and Commanders in Atwood’s depiction of the 
fictional twenty-first century Republic of Gilead.  Both Atwood and Jacobs are 
concerned with the eroticization of women’s servitude and with the sexual exploitation 
of women under conditions of servitude, even though they are writing under very 
different circumstances.  Jacobs is responding to the devastating material, social, and 
psychic conditions of black women’s oppression under slavery, and she decides to 
write and publish her narrative to bolster support for the abolitionist cause.  Atwood’s 
novel intervenes in debates about women’s liberation staged between groups ranging 
from religious right fundamentalists to anti-pornography feminists, and although she is 
clearly interested in exposing the dangers of both of these extreme positions, her novel 
is ultimately more focused on the significance of the psychical conditions associated 
with Offred’s servitude.   
The voice of Offred, the first-person narrator of Margaret Atwood’s The 
Handmaid’s Tale, reaches the reader from a space of exile.  Offred addresses and 
implores the reader, and like Jacobs, she speaks in a confessional tone: “By telling you 
anything at all I’m at least believing in you, I believe you’re there, I believe you into 
being.  Because I’m telling you this story I will your existence.  I tell, therefore you 
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 are” (268).  Offred invokes the reader with an aphorism that playfully revises 
Descartes’ cogito and that sounds like an incantation with its repetitious formulations.  
While Jacobs beseeches the reader for a pressing political goal, Offred’s address to the 
reader is also urgent; narration is an existential act for her.  After her apparent escape 
from Gilead, Offred’s exact location is unknown, but the tape recording of her 
narrative of captivity is found in Bangor, Maine.  In the “Historical Notes” concluding 
section of Atwood’s novel, Professor Pieixoto reveals that Bangor was a stop on “‘The 
Underground Femaleroad’” (301), and, like Jacobs, various characters in Atwood’s 
novel are confined in restrictive spaces as part of the Gileadean regime’s policies of 
control or as part of their escape routes from the regime.  While the situations of 
women in Atwood’s and Jacobs’s texts are by no means equivalent, various structures 
of oppression are operating in similar ways in each of the societies depicted; women 
are subjected to sexual exploitation, spatial confinement, rigorous surveillance, and 
dehumanizing treatment as objects, or more precisely, as the property of their various 
masters.  In addition to the Underground Femaleroad, Atwood alludes to slavery 
through descriptions of the prohibition on female literacy (resembling antebellum 
injunctions against teaching slaves to read and write), the public spectacles of torture, 
and the rupture of kinship bonds among handmaids and their children.  On a formal 
level, these two works have the common feature of being written in an 
autobiographical and confessional mode, and issues of interpretative authority are 
highly contested in Jacob’s narrative and Atwood’s novel.   
Jacobs critiques yet nevertheless utilizes romance conventions to reveal the 
limits and possibilities of seduction as “a strategic disavowal of power,” as Hartman 
describes it (103), and to represent the psychic battle between master and slave in 
which Jacobs resists her master’s desire by refusing to be an erotic object for him.  
More so than in the historical or fictional Indian captivity narratives, Jacobs represents 
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 herself as deliberately manipulating her master in order to gain small freedoms for 
herself.  The Handmaid’s Tale can also be read as staging the problem of seduction 
through the depiction of the complicity of the narrator, Offred, in her servitude as a 
handmaid.  In The Daughter’s Seduction: Feminism and Psychoanalysis, Jane Gallop 
writes, “as with all seductions, the question of complicity poses itself.  The dichotomy 
active/passive is always equivocal in seduction, that is what distinguishes it from rape” 
(56).  Jacobs is evasive on the question of whether or not Flint rapes her, but it is clear 
that she would in no way consent to any sexual activity with her master.  Offred’s 
acceptance of her servitude, especially her compliance with the monthly sexual ritual 
called the Ceremony, markedly distinguishes her situation from that of Jacobs.  The 
mystery of Offred’s acquiescence to her servitude can be explained by the seduction 
fantasy as theorized first by Freud and later developed by Lacan in his account of the 
mirror stage.   
Lacan’s formulation of the mirror stage offers a crucial theory for 
understanding  seduction: the coherent image of the body reflected in the mirror is 
assumed by the subject as its ideal ego, which allows the subject to repress the 
experience of the fragmented body, corps morcelé, in favor of a unified body image.  
The ego is formed as the object of desire for the Other; in terms of the mirror stage, 
the mother’s smile directed at the child’s image in the mirror illustrates this 
phenomenon of ego formation as object of desire for the Other.  The seduction fantasy 
allows the subject to repress the unsettling force of the erotic drive and to avoid 
experiencing desire, the state of a lack of satisfaction, of a lack of any object to satisfy 
the drive.56  Unlike Jacobs who resists her enslavement to the utmost of her abilities, 
                                                 
56 I am drawing on Lacan’s account of ego formation in “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function 
of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience,” and the formulation of seduction as described in 
McNulty’s The Hostess: Hospitality, Femininity, and the Expropriation of Identity; see pp. 175, 179-
180. 
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 Offred, the first-person narrator of The Handmaid’s Tale, displays a willingness to 
submit to her master, called the Commander.  Atwood’s novel can be read as staging 
the problem of seduction, what Gallop calls “the question of complicity” (56), through 
the depiction of Offred’s voluntary servitude as a handmaid, a condition that allows 
her to avoid taking any responsibility for her own desire by simply submitting to the 
commands of her masters, whether they are male or female authority figures. 
Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale, published in 1985, describes a future society 
in which a right-wing, fundamentalist faction overthrows the United States 
government and installs a totalitarian theocracy in its place.  Racial segregation, class 
stratification, and rigid gender roles characterize the new regime, which enforces its 
rule through warfare, torture, surveillance, and tightly scripted social and sexual roles 
for the variously classed men and women who live in the Republic of Gilead.  The 
Handmaid’s Tale is often discussed as a dystopian novel, and it envisions a future 
time that, in various ways, seems not wholly unlike the present day.  The novel’s 
epilogue, entitled “Historical Notes,” goes even further into the future, to the year 
2195, and the setting is an academic conference during which it is revealed that the 
text has been constructed from a series of tape recordings made by Offred.  Long 
before readers reach the end of the novel, however, they are well aware of the oral 
quality of the text, as the narrator, Offred, early on explicitly informs the reader that 
she can speak of her experiences but that she cannot record them in written form: 
“Tell, rather than write, because I have nothing to write with and writing is in any case 
forbidden” (39).  Yet, this life of severe deprivation, which involves confinement in 
physical spaces, restrictive clothing resembling a nun’s habit, and a lack of personal 
relationships and intellectual pursuits, is not necessarily unwelcome from Offred’s 
point of view.  For instance, after her friend Moira escapes from the training center for 
handmaids, Offred reflects on her situation and that of the other women at the center: 
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 “Already we were losing the taste for freedom, already we were finding these walls 
secure” (133).  Offred’s imprisonment behind the walls of the fortress-like training 
center provides her with a measure of security and seemingly even comfort; aside 
from her obedience, little is asked of her and she asks for little in return. 
As many critics of the novel observe, Offred is, for the most part, an apathetic 
and detached narrator.  At one point, she defends her passive stance as a coping 
strategy: “One detaches oneself.  One describes” (95).  The grammatical construction 
of the sentence even performs this state of alienation; instead of saying “I detach 
myself,” Offred uses the impersonal and anonymous subject of “One.”  In another sign 
of her detachment, Offred never directly discloses her real name to the reader, 
although she later shares it with her lover, Nick.  Emotionally she may be numb to the 
world around her, but she is also firmly grounded in the material world.  In spare 
prose, she catalogs the objects and the physical environment around her: the garden, 
house, and paths of the city that she travels are precisely recorded.  The physical 
setting is largely composed of barriers and boundaries of one sort or another—whether 
it is the front gate of the Commander’s house or one of the many security 
checkpoints—the landscape and interior spaces are regulated and divided into 
exclusive territories that can only be accessed by certain people, depending on their 
gender or on their rank in the regime.   
Whereas the exterior world lends itself to concrete, objective narration, 
Offred’s narration of her interior world of emotions, memories, and fantasies is much 
more variable.  Although the prose style is spare, the content is very cerebral.  Just as 
Offred enjoys playing Scrabble with the Commander, she engages in all sorts of 
language games, including word associations, puns, etymologies, and other varieties 
of word play.  For example, after Moira breaks out of the center, Offred says of her, 
“Moira had power now, she’d been set loose, she’d set herself loose.  She was now a 
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 loose woman” (133), playing on the different meanings of the word loose.  Words 
themselves, as signifiers, structure Offred’s thought patterns, and her attentiveness to 
language calls to mind the importance of linguistics and language to psychoanalytic 
theory, as Lacan asserts, “The unconscious is fundamentally structured, woven, 
chained, meshed, by language.  And, not only does the signifier play as big a role there 
as the signified does, but it plays the fundamental role” (Psychoses 119).  The sliding 
of signifiers within Atwood’s text, especially the word “blank,” which appears in a 
variety of contexts, encourages the reader to trace its reoccurrence because, as Lacan 
also explains “the signifier is the instrument by which the missing signified expresses 
itself” (Psychoses 221).  Behind the blanks in Offred’s discourse, one may discover 
how she both orientates herself in relation to the experience of jouissance and emerges 
as a subject of desire.  
Offred explains that she voluntarily accepts the duties of a handmaid, which 
revolve around the goal of bearing a child for the Commander and his wife:  
My red skirt is hitched up to my waist, though no higher.  Below it the 
Commander is fucking.  What he is fucking is the lower part of my 
body.  I do not say making love, because this is not what he’s doing.  
Copulating too would be inaccurate, because it would imply two people 
and only one is involved.  Nor does rape cover it: nothing is going on 
here that I haven’t signed up for.  There wasn’t a lot of choice but there 
was some, and this is what I chose.  (94)   
Offred makes this assertion during the monthly impregnation ritual, called The 
Ceremony, which involves an outrageous positioning of the three bodies of the 
Commander, his wife, and the handmaid in a decidedly un-erotic ménage à trois.  The 
participants all remain clothed, or, at least, as much as possible, and the handmaid lies 
on top of the wife while her husband has sex with the handmaid.  The triangulation of 
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 bodies in this scene recalls what Hartman describes as “the perverse domesticity of the 
paternal institution” (103).   
Although she states that she accepts the duties of a handmaid, Offred struggles 
to find the right vocabulary to describe her submission to the Ceremony, or perhaps 
her complicity in it.  Offred’s physical description of the fragmentation of her body, 
which is divided into halves, and her passivity in this scene cast some doubt on her 
assertion that “this is what I chose” (94).  Yet, there are numerous other examples that 
demonstrate Offred’s acquiescence to her servitude, and we should take seriously her 
statement of consent to the Ceremony.  Occasionally, Offred deviates from perfect 
submission as a handmaid, but she does not radically reject her condition of servitude, 
as some other characters in the novel do.  So, we might wonder if seduction serves any 
subversive function in Atwood’s novel.  Does it open up any possibilities for 
contesting power relations or gender roles?  Furthermore, erotic pleasure is not the aim 
of this encounter, so we are left wondering what the stakes of this perverse scenario 
are, aside from the declared intent of procreation.  Moreover, what are we to make of 
her voluntary servitude? 
If it is indeed true that Offred chooses this position of servitude, then Juliet 
Flower MacCannell’s assertion “[t]hat Gilead is [Offred’s] fantasy is not to be 
doubted” offers a way of making sense of the perverse scenario that is the Ceremony  
(Hysteric’s 210).  As MacCannell argues in The Hysteric’s Guide to the Future 
Female Subject, Offred’s relationship with the Commander can be read as an example 
of a pervert/hysteric couple, and as she argues the real command of Gileadean social 
and sexual organization is not reproduction; rather it is: “the demand to sacrifice 
totally her jouissance to the jouissance of the Other, to obviate her desire” (215).  
Néstor Braunstein discusses the difficulty of pinning down a definition for jouissance, 
but he does describe the relationship between desire and jouissance as one of 
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 “antinomic polarity” (103).  Despite the complexity of the term in French and the 
attendant challenges of translating it, Braunstein offers an incisive explanation of 
jouissance: 
Jouissance is the dimension discovered by the analytic experience that 
confronts desire as its opposite pole.  If desire is fundamentally lack, 
lack in being, jouissance is positivity, it is a “something lived by the 
body when pleasure stops being pleasure.  It is a plus, a sensation that 
is beyond pleasure. (104) 
 
Desire points toward a lost and absent object; it is lack in being, and the 
craving for fulfillment in the encounter with the lost object.  Its 
concrete expression is the phantasy.  Jouissance, on the other hand, 
does not point to anything, nor does it serve any purpose whatsoever; it 
is an unpredictable experience, beyond the pleasure principle, different 
from any (mythical) encounter.  The subject finds himself split by the 
polarity jouissance/desire.  This is why desire, phantasy, and pleasure 
are barriers on the way to jouissance.  (106-07) 
The sacrificial economy of jouissance between Offred and the Other as described by 
MacCannell allows Offred to avoid facing lack and encountering desire because the 
sacrificial relationship between the hysteric and the Other is not an ethical or real 
solution to the experience of overwhelming jouissance within her.  The sacrificial 
model supposedly solves the dilemma by making the Other responsible for jouissance 
and for placing a limit on jouissance, but the Other only exists as an empty point of 
address.  The ethical solution to the experience of jouissance is castration, an 
acceptance of solitude and the impossibility of total satisfaction that is the structural 
byproduct of the subject’s alienation in language.  As an alternative solution to that of 
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 the hysteric/pervert couple, which allows the hysteric to repress jouissance within her 
by making the Other responsible for it, MacCannell suggests the possibility of 
“feminine castration”: “[a] specifically feminine castration, through a ‘ladies’ way’ of 
accepting the signifier that grants her a special deal with the unbearable, uncastrated 
jouissance within her—her horror, her Thing” (198). 
In her article “Perversion and Hysteria,” Lucie Cantin, elucidates the dynamic 
governing the pervert/hysteric couple:  
It is then clear that the pervert who offers to be the Master takes the 
place of this Other who will make it possible for the hysteric to avoid 
castration.  The pervert takes on responsibility for the jouissance at 
work in the hysteric (such as that from the hysteric’s mother), by 
promising a total satisfaction and the occlusion of any encounter with 
lack.  (163)   
Thus, Offred’s position as a hysteric allows her to avoid facing the loss entailed by 
castration; in Lacanian thought, “[c]astration suggests the subject’s entry into the 
world of irreducible lack and loss, the impossibility of total satisfaction that 
necessarily accompanies the entry into the symbolic order of language and social law” 
(Hughes and Malone 27).  In regard to unconscious sexuation, the hysteric remains 
indecisive with respect to the question: “Am I a man or a woman?”, and because the 
acceptance of castration is a prerequisite to joining the social order as a sexed subject, 
the hysteric cannot assume an ethical social position (MacCannell Hysteric’s 12, 32).  
A further consequence of the failure to accept castration, as MacCannell points out, is 
that the hysteric cannot emerge as an ethical feminine subject who pursues her own 
desire because desire is predicated on the experience of loss and the lack of 
satisfaction (Hysteric’s 196, 198). 
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 As clearly demonstrated in the performance of the Ceremony, sexual conduct 
and sexual practices—at least on the official level—are limited to biological functions 
with a strict aim of reproduction; expressions of desire and lust are prohibited.  The 
Gileadean regime is also concerned with population control and eugenics; that is, it 
aims to increase the white population.  Thus, Puritanical morality and racism are the 
foundations of sexual conduct in Gilead.  The regulation of sexuality as a strictly 
biological function is completely opposed to the understanding of human sexuality as 
proposed by psychoanalytic theory, as Charles Shepherdson explains,  
Thus, sexuality is not governed by the laws of nature, or reducible to an 
instinctual force; on the contrary, the sexual drive departs from the 
natural pathway of instinct precisely in so far as the drive is subject to 
representation, which Freud speaks of in terms of ‘displacement,’ 
‘condensation,’ ‘substitution,’ and so on.  The energy of human 
sexuality is therefore not a purely biological energy, a ‘physics of 
libido’ governed by natural laws—chemistry or biology or 
mechanics—but is rather an energy regulated by the laws of language, 
the laws of representation.  (167) 
Even though Offred is outwardly compliant in her duties as a handmaid, she 
nonetheless indulges in inventing hypothetical scenarios, “what if” situations in which 
she imagines alternate actions unfolding other than the one she actually experiences, 
and we see that she at least recognizes the impossibility of the official policy on 
sexuality.   
While Offred is at the training center, she recounts a fantasy shared by the 
handmaids of seducing the Angels, a division of military men who guard the training 
facility, as she says, “Something could be exchanged, we thought, some deal made, 
some tradeoff, we still had our bodies.  That was our fantasy” (4).  The collective 
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 nature of the fantasy speaks to its status as an enactment of prevalent gender 
stereotypes; women gain small favors by trading on their role as sex objects for men.  
In this instance, the seduction scenario is constructed along conventional lines of 
sexual desirability and attractiveness.  At an early point in her role as a handmaid, 
Offred imagines how she might seduce the young male Guardians who police the 
checkpoints: “What if I were to come at night, when he’s on duty alone—though he 
would never be allowed such solitude—and permit him beyond my white wings?  
What if I were to peel off my red shroud and show myself to him, to them, by the 
uncertain light of the lanterns?” (21).  The possibility is phrased as a question, and it is 
a dare that goes to the heart of the regime’s attempt to eradicate eroticism.   
Offred’s internal narration often presents subversive scenarios that contradict 
the surface appearance of order and discipline that characterizes the exterior space of 
Gilead.  Yet, the scenario is only subversive in that it imagines a violation of the 
Gileadean rules of sexual conduct; in other respects, Offred’s supposedly daring 
attempt at seduction is in total conformity to stereotypical heterosexual patterns of 
seduction in which a woman presents her body as an object of desire to a male subject.  
We see that seduction can be a strategy for eliciting the erotic desire of another person, 
but this fascination with strategies of seduction is a ruse for the real issue of the 
psychoanalytic fantasy of seduction in which the ego comes into being as an object of 
desire for the Other.  Offred’s passivity is part of a precarious balancing act in which 
she is the object for the Other; it allows her to maintain the fantasy in a static 
condition.  She is able to avoid agency and to sidestep responsibility as a desiring 
subject by maintaining the seduction fantasy. 
Other than her daily shopping excursion, which takes her into the center of 
town, Offred rarely has much to do with her days, or her nights for that matter.  In 
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 fact, she frequently spends time thinking about the empty hours that must be idled 
away somehow or another:  
There’s time to spare.  This is one of the things I wasn’t prepared for—
the amount of unfilled time, the long parentheses of nothing.  Time as 
white sound.  … I remember walking in art galleries, through the 
nineteenth century: the obsession they had then with harems.  Dozens 
of paintings of harems, fat women lolling on divans, turbans on their 
heads or velvet caps, being fanned with peacock tails, a eunuch in the 
background standing guard.  Studies of sedentary flesh, painted by men 
who’d never been there. … They were paintings about suspended 
animation; about waiting, about objects not in use.  They were 
paintings about boredom. (69)   
Like the women in these nineteenth-century paintings, Offred is also a sex object of 
sorts, though her status as such is rather ironic.  Handmaids are cloaked from head to 
foot in long, loose red gowns, and nothing about their appearance is meant to elicit the 
lust of a male viewer.  Yet, Offred’s milieu could be said to resemble a harem in that 
she mostly lives in a woman’s world.  Gilead is divided into male and female spaces, 
and strict guidelines, at least officially, prohibit any crossovers between them.  The 
paintings are also notable in that they are fantasies, or male projections of what harems 
were like, since as Offred tells us, they were “painted by men who’d never been there” 
(69).  Unlike the male painter who presents a fanciful evocation of female life, the 
narrator is in a privileged, insider’s position, providing an eye-witness account of the 
realities of women’s lives in Gilead.  To a certain extent, the image of the women in 
“suspended animation” and the idea of “the long parentheses of nothing” (69) 
accurately characterize the empty hours of Offred’s life, which she refers to as “blank 
time” (70).  On the other hand, Offred quickly fills in the “blank time” of the present 
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 moment with her memories of prior visits to art galleries, and the layering of present 
and past in her imagination suggests a movement between daily lived experience and 
psychic reality. 
Atwood entitles the fourth section of her novel, “Waiting Room,” and the 
dynamic of space and time as implied in this title points toward the temporal 
dimension of the future and the spatial dimension of a physical place.  Just as the title 
“Waiting Room” gestures, at least in part, toward a future moment, the many images 
of blankness and emptiness in the text also suggest a potentiality, something waiting to 
be written or created.  A waiting room also refers to a state of suspended activity, 
which coincides with Offred’s listless attitude and her passive behavior.  The concept 
of blankness is related to Offred’s passivity and to the idea of waiting because all three 
evoke a state of inactivity, and blankness also suggests the possibility of forgetfulness, 
or even repression, as in the familiar phrase: “I’m drawing a blank.”  In his 1915 essay 
“Repression,” Freud explains,  
repression is not a defensive mechanism which is present from the very 
beginning, and that it cannot arise until a sharp cleavage has occurred 
between conscious and unconscious mental activity—that the essence 
of repression lies simply in turning something away, and keeping it at a 
distance, from the conscious.  (147, emphasis in the original)   
In Freud’s case history on Dora, he also discusses the characteristic gaps in memory 
which signal repression, and the reoccurrence of blanks in the text cause us to wonder 
if there is something (the repressed) behind the blank (5, 11).  By maintaining the 
seduction fantasy, Offred represses the inevitable truth that is the lack in the Other, a 
lack that is at the center of the subject’s address to the Other, and this lack is 
illuminated through the preponderance of blank and empty spaces in Atwood’s text.  
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 Yet, repression and its relation to a traumatic incident in the past is only one aspect of 
the significance of blankness and emptiness.   
The temporal dimension of the future is evoked by the expectation of an event 
that would come at the end of the period of waiting, and the opportunity for artistic 
creation offered by the drive to fill in the blank spaces raises the possibility of 
sublimation.  If Offred finds a way to accept castration, which is understood as an 
effect of language on the human subject that results in a loss of a natural object for the 
drives and the absence of the Other,57 then the effects of repression will be loosened 
and the possibility of sublimation can become real.  Sublimation takes the form of 
creative work that can develop new ways of dealing with the disruptive energies of the 
drive, or jouissance.58  The emphasis on emptiness in Lacan’s Ethics Seminar: Book 
VII (1959-1960), and its relation to sublimation also elucidates the significance of 
emptiness and blanks in The Handmaid’s Tale.  The status of the Thing is also a 
central concern of the Ethics seminar:  
This Thing, all forms of which created by man belong to the sphere of 
sublimation, this Thing will always be represented by emptiness, 
precisely because it cannot be represented by anything else – or, more 
exactly, because it can only be represented by something else.  But in 
every form of sublimation, emptiness is determinative.  (130)  
The Thing is Freud’s das Ding, the Mother, what Lacan describes as “the object of 
incest, [which] is a forbidden good” (Ethics 70), and he goes on to explain that das 
Ding is “the Other whose primacy of position Freud affirms in the form of something 
entfremdet, something strange to me, although it is at the heart of me, something that 
                                                 
57 I am drawing on McNulty’s explanation of castration theory in “Feminine Love and the Pauline 
Universal”; see pp. 192, 204, 206. 
58 For this account of sublimation, I am drawing on MacCannell’s discussion of feminine jouissance, 
the Thing, sublimation, and art; see pp. 238-39 in The Hysteric’s Guide to the Future Female Subject. 
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 on the level of the unconscious only a representation can represent” (Ethics 71).  If das 
Ding is “a forbidden good” (Ethics 70), then a subject cannot satisfy his or her desire 
by direct access to das Ding, but sublimation provides an opportunity for the drive to 
receive partial satisfaction, or to sustain desire even while accepting the impossibility 
of total fulfillment, through intellectual or artistic pursuits.    
Images of blankness and emptiness are central to Atwood’s text, and such 
images appear in four main categories: time, physical objects, the female body, 
especially the womb, and narrative, either written or verbal.  For Offred, time is a 
blank, a gaping hole, a void in which her boredom expands, and she reflects on the 
relation between time and space: “Waiting is also a place: it is wherever you wait.  For 
me it’s this room.  I am a blank, here, between parentheses” (227-28).  For Offred, 
waiting is a metaphorical space of suspension or expectation in which she experiences 
the mundane, and it is also a literal space—she calls her room in the Commander’s 
house “a waiting room” (50).  A waiting room is a common area in the offices of 
health and business professionals, and so to call her own room a waiting room 
suggests the collapse of public and private spheres.  In Gilead, the highly regimented 
roles for men and women leave little room for individuality, resulting in scant 
distinction between public and private realms.  Whereas the line between public and 
private spaces is indistinct, the line between male and female spaces is hard and fast, 
so Offred is startled, even alarmed, when she discovers the Commander intruding 
upon what she is surprised into calling her room: “My room, then.  There has to be 
some space, finally, that I claim as mine, even in this time” (50), but her statement 
reads more like a concession than an assertion of rights, reflecting her passivity and 
apathy.  On a literal level, the segregation of male and female spaces relates to issues 
of gender politics as they play out in Gilead, especially in regard to reproduction, but 
the division of physical space into male and female is also one way in which the novel 
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 metaphorically evokes the psychoanalytic subject of sexual difference.   That is, 
sexual difference understood in a Lacanian sense as the way in which a subject aligns 
himself or herself with respect to castration by language, the process by which the 
subject experiences the loss of natural aims and accepts the absence of the Other.59
Although the Commander’s interactions with Offred are supposed to be limited 
to the Ceremony, he seeks out her company and invites her to his office (strictly 
speaking, it is not an invitation she could refuse).  Offred is trespassing by venturing 
into this strictly male territory, as her reflections on her first visit to his office reveal: 
“I raise my hand, knock, on the door of this forbidden room where I have never been, 
where women do not go.  Not even Serena Joy [his wife] comes here, and the cleaning 
is done by Guardians” (136-37).  In contrast to the barrenness of her room, Offred 
finds a plethora of contraband items in the Commander’s office, including books, 
women’s magazines, and games, most notably Scrabble.  When she transgresses 
against the rules governing male and female spaces by entering his office, Offred says, 
“Behind this particular door, taboo dissolved” (157).  The Commander allows, even 
encourages, Offred to read, and once he even permits her to write.  The complicity that 
develops between them changes their official, public interactions with each other, and 
she starts to abandon her posture of blind obedience to the Commander, at least in 
these private interactions with him.  After Offred sarcastically replies to him, she 
addresses the reader with this aside: “You can see from the way I was speaking to him 
that we were already on different terms” (162).   
One night during the Ceremony, Offred reports that the Commander nearly 
reveals their secret by making an attempt to stroke her face, a prohibited gesture of 
                                                 
59 In Encore, Lacan announces “there’s no such thing as a sexual relationship …” (59), in reference to 
the different ways in which a masculine or feminine subject accepts castration.  I am also drawing on 
McNulty’s account of sexual difference in “Feminine Love and the Pauline Universal”; see pp. 193, 
206. 
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 intimacy.  Serena Joy, the Commander’s wife, would surely suspect something if she 
were to notice her husband’s deviation from proscribed ritual.  Offred warns the 
Commander not to slip up like that again: “You could get me transferred, I said.  To 
the Colonies.  You know that.  Or worse.  I thought he should continue to act, in 
public, as if I were a large vase or a window: part of the background, inanimate or 
transparent” (162).  The personal and private interactions between the two inevitably 
start to influence their public conduct, try as they might to avoid this.60  In this same 
chapter, Offred continues to meditate on the nature of her relationship with the 
Commander:  
But even so, and stupidly enough, I’m happier than I was before.  It’s 
something to do, for one thing.  Something to fill the time, at night, instead of 
sitting alone in my room.  It’s something else to think about.  I don’t love the 
Commander or anything like it, but he’s of interest to me, he occupies space, 
he is more than a shadow. 
And I for him.  To him I’m no longer merely a usable body.  To him 
I’m not just a boat with no cargo, a chalice with no wine in it, an oven—to be 
crude —minus the bun.  To him I am not merely empty.  (163) 
Offred again draws a connection between empty time and space, and her time with the 
Commander assuages the long and boring hours of a typical day which she must face.  
The state of being transparent, like the vase or window in the example quoted above, 
is like being flat, like “a shadow,” or like being empty as in the series of clichés and 
metaphors that Offred cites.  Her illicit meetings with the Commander “fill the time,” 
as she puts it (163), and from his perspective, Offred is no longer a nonentity.  
                                                 
60 My thinking on the private versus public interactions of the Commander and Offred has been 
influenced by MacCannell’s analysis of Sophie Calle’s experiment with Paul Auster, as MacCannell 
writes: “Double Game’s implied claim is that private sexual arrangements can amend public life.  It 
strains credulity.  But there it is” (“Death Drive” 71). 
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 However, their secret relationship does not remain secret: Serena Joy learns of it, and 
it seems very likely that the government’s spy network learns of the Commander’s 
infractions, which means that he will lose his position and most likely his life as well. 
Toward the end of the novel, the Commander surreptitiously escorts Offred to 
an illegal but tolerated whorehouse, known as Jezebel’s, for elite officials and foreign 
visitors.  Aside from the obvious point of exposing the hypocrisy of the regime’s elite, 
we also see how empty and formulaic the rituals of heterosexual seduction have 
become.  The women are dressed in tattered and tawdry costumes of Playboy bunnies, 
cheerleaders, and the like, and the sad state of their outfits conveys the pathetic and 
hackneyed quality of the whole routine.  As in the scenarios that Offred imagines 
involving the Angels and the Guardians, women are performing the role of seductress 
to please the male viewer, and this scenario again reinforces a male-dominated power 
structure of gender relations.  Atwood, however, complicates the critique of seduction 
by showing that the attempt to seduce is a male as well as a female endeavor, as the 
Commander is the one attempting to seduce Offred.  Offred realizes that the 
Commander’s flouting of the rules is his way of “showing off to me” (236), and he 
engages in other innuendos meant to convince her that he is well-versed in the rites of 
seduction, such as the look he gives her after getting a key to a room: “He shows it to 
me, slyly.  I am to understand” (251).  Previously, we see Offred submitting to the 
prescribed sexual rites of the Ceremony, and this is largely because passivity is the 
only thing required of her.  Now, in the private setting of the hotel room, the 
Commander wants to introduce an erotic element into their sexual encounter, but she 
balks at his proposition, saying “I lie there like a dead bird” (255), as he starts to 
undress her.  The darkly comic image of Offred as a “dead bird” lying on the bed in 
her tattered outfit shows how the Commander’s attempts at seduction have utterly 
failed, and she internally shouts: “Fake it, I scream at myself inside my head” (255).  
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 Offred’s behavior is in dramatic contrast to her submission during the Ceremony, 
which requires only her passivity, but the demand to exhibit signs of pleasure is a 
radical challenge to her detached posture. 
From the start of her interactions with the Commander, Offred expresses 
ambivalence toward him: “I ought to feel hatred for this man.  I know I ought to feel 
it, but it isn’t what I do feel.  What I feel is more complicated than that.  I don’t know 
what to call it.  It isn’t love” (58).  Just as he does at Jezebel’s, the Commander relies 
on stereotyped and staged behavior to seduce Offred on the first occasion of her visit 
to his office: “It’s such a studied pose, something of the country squire, some old 
come-on from a glossy men’s mag.  He probably decided ahead of time that he’d be 
standing like that when I came in” (137).  The Commander wants to look relaxed and 
casual as he stands in front of the fireplace, but the actual circumstances of their 
meeting make his pose, “some old come-on from a glossy men’s mag,” seem all the 
more absurd.   
After one of their many rounds of Scrabble, Offred comments on the way the 
Commander plays with the dynamic of domination and submission: “Sometimes, after 
the games, he sits on the floor beside my chair, holding my hand.  His head is a little 
below mine, so that when he looks up at me it’s at a juvenile angle.  It must amuse 
him, this fake subservience” (210).  With his head poised “at a juvenile angle” and his 
posture of “fake subservience” (210), the Commander is enacting the seduction that 
Hartman describes as “a strategic disavowal of power” (103).  Like the slaveholders of 
the antebellum South, the Commander wants to “mask” the reality of the violent 
means that secure his dominant position, and he wants to extract something along the 
lines of consent or approval from Offred.  Offred knows that his desire to secure her 
complicity in the power structure of Gilead offers a small but not insignificant opening 
for her to trouble the balance of power between them, as she muses, “It’s difficult for 
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 me to believe I have power over him, of any sort, but I do; although it’s of an 
equivocal kind” (210).  Offred also knows that the Commander is vulnerable, at least 
to some extent during their meetings, and she speculates on how she could attempt to 
injure him by pretending to invite intimacy only to strike him with a sharp object as he 
comes close to her.  She says, “I think about the blood coming out of him, hot as soup, 
sexual, over my hands” (140).  Yet, Offred quickly dismisses this possibility, claiming 
that “[i]n fact I don’t think about anything of the kind.  I put it in only afterwards” 
(140).  She chooses not to exploit the opportunities created by his efforts to seduce 
her; instead, she asks for hand cream, a modest request.  Offred’s shopping partner, 
Ofglen, is a member of an underground resistance movement, and she encourages 
Offred to join the movement by spying on the Commander.  But, Offred’s actions are 
not directed toward the goal of escape or of support for the underground movement.  It 
seems possible that Offred could use seductive stratagems to exert agency for 
subversive purposes, but, with the Commander, she generally remains in a passive 
role, allowing him to direct their relationship.  Through their interactions, however, 
Atwood exposes the limitations and hollowness of conventional romantic codes by 
stressing the Commander’s reliance on false and flat seductive routines. 
Serena Joy sets Offred up with the chauffeur, Nick, in an attempt to get her 
pregnant because this event would both advance Serena Joy’s social standing and 
secure the Commander’s career.  Nick, however, does not wait for Serena’s 
instructions to begin his flirtations with Offred; in the beginning of the novel, she 
passes by him and “he winks” (18), suggesting his interest and willingness to break the 
rules.  While the whole household is assembled for the prayers preceding the 
Ceremony, he also flirts with her by pushing his shoe up against hers (81).  At first, 
Offred rebuffs his advances, but, when the two meet in the still of the night, Offred 
admits to her longing to touch him and to be touched by him: “I want to reach up, taste 
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 his skin, he makes me hungry” (98).  Although she takes pleasure in imagining what it 
would be like to commit the sacrilege of having sex with Nick in Serena’s parlor, 
neither of them can take such a huge risk.  After Serena arranges for them to have sex 
in the relative privacy of Nick’s studio apartment, Offred rehearses a number of 
different scenarios involving conventional romance narratives, but then she denies that 
any of the scenarios that she has just related truly describe how their affair begins: “It 
didn’t happen that way either.  I’m not sure how it happened; not exactly.  All I can 
hope for is a reconstruction: the way love feels is always only approximate” (263).   
Offred’s narrative equivocations demonstrate how difficult it is to have a 
sexual relationship that is not deformed by conventional gender roles and rites.  Of the 
coy banter that they supposedly exchange, she says, “Possibly nobody ever talked like 
that in real life, it was all a fabrication from the beginning” (262).  Such a statement 
implies that desire requires different linguistic and cultural codes in order to be 
expressed and that the scripted roles of seduction, with the roles of seducer and 
seduced, agent and victim, should be revised, rewritten, or outright rejected.  Atwood 
is addressing the question of how to express desire, and Offred’s difficulty in 
describing their relationship evokes Lacan’s pronouncement “that there’s no such 
thing as a sexual relationship” (Encore 59).  The masculine subject’s response to the 
lack of the sexual relation is to seek phallic jouissance and to compensate for the 
failure of the relation by seeking in his partner the object a, “the cause of his desire” 
(Encore 63, 72, 80).  For the feminine subject, Lacan postulates that “for Woman, 
something other than object a is at stake in what comes to make up for (suppléer) the 
sexual relationship that does not exist” (Encore 63).  Even the fact that Lacan insists 
that Woman be written “with the slanted line with which I designate what must be 
barred” reveals the problems with signification and a feminine subject’s relationship to 
castration and the symbolic order (Encore 63).  Lacan speaks of the feminine subject’s 
132 
 relationship to “a supplementary jouissance,” and the apparent impossibility of 
speaking about this jouissance (Encore 73, 74-75), which is very different from the 
masculine subject’s response to the lack of a sexual relation through an approach to 
object a through fantasy.  Atwood’s depiction of Offred’s inability to describe her 
meetings with Nick suggests the limitations of the symbolic order, and she proposes 
that creating better ways of expressing desire and love in new symbolic forms and 
through different gender expectations would be a possible first step out of passive 
compliance to the will of others. 
Despite the risk and the precariousness of their situation, Offred and Nick 
become regular lovers.  Madonne Miner reads The Handmaid’s Tale as a critique of 
romance plots, and she argues that Nick “functions as a fairy-tale prince” through his 
apparent rescue of Offred at the novel’s conclusion (161).  Such a reading emphasizes 
Offred’s passive stance and places her in a stereotypical feminine role of victim, but in 
actuality there are not any hard and fast lines between victim and hero in their 
relationship.  And, Atwood certainly does not leave us with a happily ever after 
ending.  It is also notable that their affair brings about the ruin of the Commander’s 
career; as Offred is led away from the Commander’s house, she ominously remarks: “I 
am above him, looking down; he is shrinking.  There have already been purges among 
them, there will be more” (294).  Another consequence of their affair appears to be 
less liberating; Offred explicitly states that her affair discourages her from attempting 
to escape: “The fact is that I no longer want to leave, escape, cross the border to 
freedom.  I want to be here with Nick, where I can get at him” (271).  But, Offred has 
previously defined being “here with Nick” as a space outside of official Gileadean 
discourse and policy: “Being here with him is safety; it’s a cave, where we huddle 
together while the storm goes on outside” (269).  A cave is a rare instance in which an 
interior space created by nature is mentioned in the text, and such a space further 
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 demonstrates how distant their relationship is from the boundaries of Gilead.  The 
stakes of their relationship are very complicated, and, while their relationship does not 
offer a wide-ranging solution to the problems of sexual relations and of desire that are 
posed in the novel, it does lead to a small collapse of the oppressive social order. 
 In contrast to her affair with Nick, Offred draws a connection between her 
husband, Luke, and the Commander partly through the imagery of emptiness and 
blankness.61  In addition to the abstract image of “blank time” (70), as has been 
previously discussed, Offred also describes various physical objects as “blank” or 
“empty.”  For instance, the brick wall that surrounds the former Harvard University, 
which is now a regime headquarters, has become a site of terror, a place where the 
dead bodies of traitors and resistors to the regime are hanged, as Offred remarks: 
“Somehow the Wall is even more foreboding when it’s empty like this.  When there’s 
someone hanging on it at least you know the worst.  But vacant, it is also potential, 
like a storm approaching” (166).  The emptiness of the Wall is menacing because of 
the uncertainty of not-knowing who will next appear on the Wall but also because of 
the certainty that someone will be sure to appear there.  Offred fears discovering Luke, 
her husband from what she calls the Time Before, hanging on the Wall, and while 
walking through town to do her shopping errands, Offred and Ofglen pause before the 
Wall.  Upon ascertaining that none of the bodies hanging from the Wall is that of her 
husband, Offred says, “What I feel towards them is blankness.  What I feel is that I 
must not feel.  What I feel is partly relief, because none of these men is Luke” (33).  
“Blankness” is the emotion of detachment and apathy, which characterizes Offred’s 
                                                 
61 See MacCannell for an astute comparison of the Commander and Luke in which she argues that 
“[Offred’s] Commander in Gilead is clearly no more (no less) than an exaggerated aspect of Luke …” 
(Hysteric’s 210).  Miner also offers a persuasive critique of Luke and compares him to the Commander; 
see pp. 157-159. 
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 state throughout much of the narrative, and the images of blankness and emptiness are 
conjoined with material objects and emotional states.   
 The Commander takes Offred to the same hotel where she previously meets 
with Luke, prior to his divorce from his first wife.  As we have seen, Offred dreads 
having sex with the Commander under the simulated conditions of a romantic 
evening; to avoid this moment, she lingers in the bathroom, focusing on “the blank 
towels”: “I sit on the edge of the bathtub, gazing at the blank towels.  Once they would 
have excited me.  They would have meant the aftermath, of love” (252).  “Blank” is an 
unusual word to pair with “towels.”  Instead, the reader might expect white, clean, or 
fresh as an adjective which would modify the noun towels, but the adjective blank 
connects with the feelings of terror associated with the bodies on the Wall and the 
emotional remoteness of the narrator, suggesting that the prospect of an illicit sexual 
encounter with the Commander is hardly appealing from Offred’s perspective.  
Because she is in the same hotel as the one she previously visits with Luke, it suggests 
that the nature of her relationship with the Commander is very similar to that of her 
relationship with Luke.  
Arguably, the most important and surely the most frequently described object 
of blankness and emptiness is the space on the ceiling in Offred’s room where the 
chandelier has been removed.  The constantly morphing space on the ceiling, which 
has been plastered over after the removal of the chandelier, suggests two different 
vicissitudes of the drive: repression and sublimation.  It signifies repression in so far as 
we wonder what has been plastered over, what is behind the blank, empty space.  And, 
this space gestures toward sublimation in that it offers imaginative and creative 
possibilities in the shapes that the space assumes.  Offred’s predecessor hanged herself 
from the light fixture, thus necessitating its removal to prevent any future incidents of 
this kind.  Yet, the absence of the chandelier captivates Offred’s imagination; when 
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 she is in her room, a point of fixation for Offred is the plaster ornamentation on the 
ceiling, which is first described as “a relief ornament in the shape of a wreath, and in 
the center of it a blank space, plastered over, like the place in a face where the eye has 
been taken out” (7).  The simile that compares the missing chandelier to “the place in a 
face where the eye has been taken out” is a strange way of talking about the 
disfigurement of a face (7).  The image of gouging an eye also calls to mind Oedipus’s 
veiled allusion to castration through his action of blinding himself; thus, the space 
suggests the penalty for transgressing beyond prohibitions.  However, in this instance, 
no agent of violence is named; rather, an anonymous person or collectivity performs 
this action.  The image of the eye, even if the eye is absent or blind, signifies the 
presence of the gaze, and Offred’s preoccupation with the eye also suggests the 
presence of the Other to whom she directs her address.  While she lies awake in bed 
one night, Offred imagines the eye watching her, as she says: “In the semidark I stare 
up at the blind plaster eye in the middle of the ceiling, which stares back down at me, 
even though it can’t see” (97).  In Gilead, no one escapes from the all-encompassing 
network of surveillance, and even in what used to be the private retreat of a bedroom, 
Offred lacks anything resembling privacy.  Certainly, the image of the eye evokes a 
key disciplinary mechanism of a totalitarian government, the omnipresent gaze of 
authority, but the blind or missing eye also points to the absent Other at the center of 
human address.  
Offred is obsessed with “the blank space” on her ceiling, and, even though it is 
ostensibly a space of nothingness, it is also always something else, or something more 
than just a hole.  She imagines it to be any number of objects in addition to “the plaster 
eye in the ceiling” (37) and “the blind plaster eye” (97), and later she describes how it 
metamorphoses as she stares at it:  
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 I look up at the ceiling, tracing the foliage of the wreath.  Today it 
makes me think of a hat, the large-brimmed hats women used to wear 
at some period during the old days: hats like enormous halos, festooned 
with fruit and flowers, and the feathers of exotic birds; hats like an idea 
of paradise, floating just above the head, a thought solidified.  (128)   
On this particular day, Offred joins the other handmaids for a birth ceremony because 
one of the other handmaids (Ofwarren) is giving birth and the rest of the handmaids 
gather to support her.  It is a festive event in that the birth of a baby is a triumph for 
the handmaids but also a bittersweet occasion because they remember the births of 
their own children who have been taken away from them.  After she returns from the 
Ceremony, Offred lies in bed and beholds the transformation of the ceiling ornament 
and the hole at the center of it into an old-fashioned and showy hat, which reminds her 
of parties and social gatherings, but such events are very distant from the present time 
as indicated by the outmoded fashion of the hat.  In this instance, we see a movement 
from a material object of the hat to the immaterial idea of “a thought solidified” (128), 
emphasizing the shifting mental representations that the empty space assumes in 
Offred’s mind.   
On a later occasion, she sits in her room, and the space assumes yet another 
form: “I sit in my chair, the wreath on the ceiling floating above my head, like a frozen 
halo, a zero.  A hole in space where a star exploded.  A ring, on water, where a stone’s 
been thrown.  All things white and circular” (200).  The hole is produced by an 
explosion or a stone disrupting the surface of the water, suggesting the violent nature 
of the hole’s creation, and the equation of the ceiling ornament to “a frozen halo, a 
zero” evokes the nothingness or emptiness that indicates the Thing—the way in which 
the Thing resists representation.  The circle imagery is reinforced as Offred envisions 
the blank circular space as a charm:  
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 I look up at the ceiling, the round circle of plaster flowers.  Draw a circle, step 
into it, it will protect you.  From the center was the chandelier, and from the 
chandelier a twisted strip of sheet was hanging down.  That’s where she was 
swinging, just lightly, like a pendulum; the way you could swing as a child, 
hanging by your hands from a tree branch.  She was safe then, protected 
altogether, by the time Cora [a Martha, or housemaid] opened the door.  
Sometimes I think she’s still in here, with me.  (211)   
Offred pictures the suicide of the former handmaid as a game of child’s play, making 
the actual suicide seem surreal.  All of her imaginings of the various objects that the 
hole assumes repress the actual cause of the hole in the ceiling, and, despite the fact 
that she clearly knows that the hole is created by the removal of the chandelier, she 
rarely ever references the handmaid’s suicide, revealing her wish to distance herself 
from this event and to disavow its reality.  The act of suicide is in opposition to 
Offred’s acceptance of her servitude, and consequently she blocks out the act of 
suicide from her consciousness. 
As I mentioned earlier, images of blankness and emptiness are also associated 
with the female body, and the dominant and determining fact of Offred’s status is her 
empty womb, as her own conception of her body reveals, “I’m a cloud, congealed 
around a central object, the shape of a pear, which is hard and more real than I am and 
glows red within its translucent wrapping.  Inside it is a space, huge as the sky at night 
and dark and curved like that, though black-red rather than black” (73-74).  If Offred 
were to become pregnant, she would be saved, meaning that she would never be 
declared an Unwomen, though it is not really clear what advantages that would entail.  
Presumably, she would not be sent to the dreaded Colonies where workers clean up 
toxic waste, but we do not really know anything about the fate of handmaids who 
successfully bear children because none are depicted in the novel.  The handmaids are 
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 indoctrinated with religious ideology, and they are taught to pray for emptiness, as 
Offred recalls: “What we prayed for was emptiness, so we would be worthy to be 
filled: with grace, with love, with self-denial, semen and babies” (194).  The prayer 
moves from spiritual values to the hard facts of biology, the “semen and babies,” and 
the handmaid is supposed to be nothing more than a cipher in the childbearing process.   
Toward the end of the novel, Offred realizes that she is vulnerable and that she 
could be convicted of state crimes and thus subject to the death penalty, and she prays 
in earnestness and in desperation: “I’ll obliterate myself, if that’s what you really 
want; I’ll empty myself, truly, become a chalice” (286).  During the course of the 
novel, Offred engages in a number of transgressive activities, secretly meeting with 
the Commander and taking Nick, the Commander’s chauffer who doubles as a 
government spy, as her lover.  Even though it is doubtful that Offred believes in God, 
the urgency of the moment leads her to this belated prayer of repentance.  The 
comparison of her body to a vessel, the chalice, again stresses the role of her body as 
an instrument for fulfilling the regime’s command that she reproduce.  Her claim that 
“I’ll empty myself, truly, become a chalice” implies that (286), up to this point, she 
has not fully sacrificed herself to the service of the regime.  She only makes this 
declaration in the face of a crisis; nevertheless, her failure to submit entirely leaves 
open the possibility that she can assume the status of a subject, rather than being 
trapped in the object position. 
Offred classifies her oral narration as a “reconstruction”: “This is a 
reconstruction.  All of it is a reconstruction.  It’s a reconstruction now, in my head, as I 
lie flat on my single bed rehearsing what I should or shouldn’t have said, what I 
should or shouldn’t have done, how I should have played it.  If I ever get out of here−” 
(134).  In the same section, she goes on to lament the inadequacy of language: “It’s 
impossible to say a thing exactly the way it was, because what you say can never be 
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 exact, you always have to leave something out …” (134).  While Offred rightly 
comments on the lack of a direct correspondence between reality and representation, it 
is not at all clear that she wants her narration to be a faithful recording of her 
experiences.  Offred can be an unreliable and even a reluctant narrator, as evidenced 
by her explicit statement: “I don’t want to be telling this story” (225).  When Offred 
labels her narration a reconstruction, she often insinuates that what she is saying is a 
fiction, in the sense of it being a lie.  As we have seen, when she first goes to Nick’s 
room to have sex with him, she recounts different versions of the way they break the 
ice, so to speak, as they initiate what becomes an affair.  Twice Offred retracts her 
narration of the event, first saying: “I made that up.  It didn’t happen that way.  Here is 
what happened” (261).  And, then adding a new disclaimer after giving another 
version of the events: “It didn’t happen that way either.  I’m not sure how it happened; 
not exactly” (263).  Offred relates multiple versions of the events but never identifies 
which one, if any of them, is the true one.  Atwood is self-consciously playing with the 
issues of narrative (in)stability, as well as narrative authority, by revealing that the text 
itself has been reconstructed from a series of tape recordings whose original ordering 
is still somewhat uncertain. 
Yet, the multiple or hypothetical scenarios are not the only liberties taken by 
the narrator.  At an early point in the novel, Offred remembers the time before the 
Gileadean takeover, and she claims that even in the previous period the space outside 
of official public discourse allows for greater possibilities: “We were the people who 
were not in the papers. We lived in the blank white spaces at the edges of print.  It 
gave us more freedom.  We lived in the gaps between the stories” (57).  When she 
makes this statement, Offred is recalling the stories of women who were victims of 
violent crimes, and one of the ways in which the regime justifies itself is by declaring 
that the new strict regulation of the social order provides a safer environment for 
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 women.  Understood metaphorically, the “blank white spaces” create an opportunity to 
imagine what is not signified or what is waiting to be signified (57), and it alludes to a 
potential narrative space, one not readily accessible through current social and 
linguistic discourse.  Since the “we” presumably refers to women, “the blank white 
spaces” may also indicate the marginal status of women’s discourse and the failure of 
language to symbolize fully their desire (57).   
Toward the end of the novel, Offred sits in her room meditating on space, 
waiting, and language: “I am a blank, here, between parentheses” (228).  Offred 
locates herself in language, “here, between the parentheses” (228), and the space 
enclosed by the parentheses is outside of the flow of standard discourse, offering a 
break, interruption, or pause.  The space “between the parentheses” relates to Lacan’s 
declaration in his Encore seminar that “if what I claim is true— namely, that woman is 
not-whole—there is always something in her that escapes discourse” (33).  The idea of 
woman being “not-whole”, as Lacan puts it (33), is also related to a feminine subject’s 
experience of feminine jouissance.  Lacan describes feminine jouissance as “the one 
concerning which woman doesn’t breathe a word, perhaps because she doesn’t know 
it, the one that makes her not-whole” (60), and he offers this additional theorization of 
feminine jouissance: “The fact remains that if she is excluded by the nature of things, 
it is precisely in the following respect: being not-whole, she has a supplementary 
jouissance compared to what the phallic function designates by way of jouissance” 
(Encore 73).   Tracy McNulty explains the connection between the overwhelming 
experience of feminine jouissance and the signifier in the following terms: “‘not-all 
under the phallic function’ means not wholly inscribed within the signifier that limits 
jouissance (and thus subject to an excess that the signifier is unable to limit)” 
(“Feminine” 206).  The excessive quality of femininity, which the phallic function 
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 cannot treat, relates to the non-signified element concealed in “the blank white spaces” 
of Offred’s narration (57).   
First, the hysteric’s work of repressing the drive, or the jouissance within her, 
must be undone; what’s behind the blank must be revealed.  Then, the task ahead is to 
find a way to express the experience of feminine jouissance, which is related to the 
images of blankness and emptiness that are associated with narrative, either written or 
spoken, in Atwood’s text. The space “between the parentheses” could also be seen as a 
hole of sorts, and the blank space is a mark of nothingness that invites creation of a 
new mode of narration or signification.  The description of “blank space” in the initial 
description of the ceiling ornament links up with “the blank white spaces at the edges 
of print” (57), and Offred’s identification of herself as “a blank” draws a connection 
among all three (228).  As we have seen, images of blankness and emptiness, as well 
as the words themselves, are dominant within the text, revealing problems with 
signification and being.  And, because empty and blank spaces are also associated with 
feminine jouissance, attention should be paid to the problematic of femininity in order 
to bring about the new ways of signification and being that could fill in the blank and 
empty spaces.   
In both Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl and The Handmaid’s Tale, 
seduction is, to borrow Hartman’s phrase, one of “the ruses of power” (79), that 
masters employ to maintain their position of dominance.  In her relations with Dr. 
Flint, Jacobs makes clear the dangers of being reduced to an erotic object, whose sole 
purpose is to satisfy her master’s desire.  In her textual account of their relationship, 
Jacobs, however, resists her master by refusing to become his mistress; thus, she 
inhabits the role of the virtuous woman who is being assailed by an unscrupulous 
suitor.  In the position of virtuous woman, Jacobs is able to garner support for the 
abolitionist cause, and she takes advantage of the ambiguous power relations of 
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 seduction to further her goal of achieving legal independence by escaping from 
slavery.  In Jacobs’s narrative, seduction functions as a mode of contesting authority, 
especially those figures supporting the institution of slavery.   
Atwood treats many of the same issues that Jacobs raises in her slave narrative, 
including sexual exploitation, the rupture of kinship bonds, oppressive systems of 
control, and the perverse relations between master and slave, or to use the terms of her 
novel, Commander and handmaid.  Despite heavily drawing on the slave narrative as a 
model for her novel, Atwood radically departs from this source by portraying Offred’s 
voluntary servitude in contrast to Jacobs’s forced servitude.  The mystery of Offred’s 
servitude is solved by analyzing the scenes and uses of seduction.  Atwood’s novel 
calls for a further interrogation of seduction; by considering the seduction fantasy as 
the psychic process in which the ego is formed as the object of the Other’s desire, the 
mystery of Offred’s servitude and passivity is solved.  Although both Atwood and 
Jacobs show the dangers of being in the object position, Atwood focuses on the 
problem of envisioning feminine desire by exposing the problem of limiting women’s 
desire to being an object for the male subject and by calling attention to the restrictions 
imposed on the expression of desire by language.  The historical and the imagined 
captivity scenarios depicted by Jacobs and Atwood respectively revolve around the 
phenomenon of seduction to consider the entanglement of desire and agency, and both 
texts show that oppressive structures of authority and, at least in the case of Atwood’s 
novel, even the symbolic order must be challenged so that women’s agency and desire 
can be liberated.
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 CHAPTER FIVE 
 
The Dissolution of the Dialectic of Domination and Submission in Réage’s 
Story of O 
 
Pauline Réage’s Story of O (1954) begins and ends with the presentation of 
alternate possibilities concerning the destiny of the novel’s heroine, O, which poses 
considerable narrative challenges to the reader of her text.  The first version of the 
opening scene describes O and her lover, René, traveling in an unmarked taxi to the 
château at Roissy where O will be instructed as a love slave, and during this car ride, 
O obediently heeds René’s request that she strip off her undergarments and relinquish 
her purse in preparation for her arrival at the château.  In the second account of the car 
ride, an “unknown friend” drives O and René to Roissy, and the unknown friend both 
informs O of their destination and tells O that René “[is] going to tie her hands behind 
her back, unfasten her stockings and roll them down, remove her garter belt, her 
panties, and her brassiere, and blindfold her” (5).  Although she is acting on René’s 
orders, O nevertheless exhibits a fair amount of agency in the initial description, and 
she even enters the château alone.  Not only is O much more passive in the second 
narration, René also plays a subordinate role because he too appears to be following 
the directives of the unknown friend.  With her hands tied and eyes blindfolded, O 
closely resembles a hostage, and her vulnerability and passivity are emphasized in 
comparison to those around her.  While there is no suggestion that O would resist 
efforts to compel her to enter the château, the image of her in bondage insinuates that 
something in her is unruly and in need of restraint, and it further implies that the 
unchecked something inside of her is outside of her conscious control because, on a 
conscious level, she is clearly willing to obey these men.   
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 The bound hands and the blindfolded eyes are, in a sense, counterbalanced by 
the accessibility of her sexual organs, as the narrator puts it: “her breasts are naked and 
free, as is the rest of her body, from waist to knee” (5).  Throughout the novel, the 
extreme attention paid to O’s erogenous zones emphasizes her de-personalized status; 
the command to make available her erogenous zones for the men highlights O’s role 
as an object, even as the object a, the object cause of desire.62  More so than the first 
description, the second account highlights the tension between captivity and freedom, 
a major theme of the text, and it introduces this tension in relation to sexuality.  The 
reference to the “unknown friend” who drives the car and provides instructions to 
René and to O raises the question of who is controlling the scenario.  The “unknown 
friend” also introduces the vital third party into the dyad of the dominating/dominated 
paradigm of the couple; the third party alludes to the absent Other, the emptiness at the 
heart of human address.63  The anonymity of the friend points to the difficulty of 
locating the source of power and control in Story of O, a novel which is very much 
about the dialectic of domination and submission.  
The details of the two opening scenarios vary slightly but significantly, yet 
neither of the two offers any hint as to why O is following the commands of these 
men.  The alternate beginnings also point to the limitations of language in regard to its 
ability to capture objective and subjective experiences, and the relationships among 
language, narrative structure, sexuality, and agency are central concerns of the text.  
The destabilization of narrative authority implied by the two openings complicates any 
attempt to probe O’s intentions and motivations because such variations render it 
doubtful as to whether or not the narrative voice can provide definitive explanations 
for her behavior.  The enigmatic portrait of O as a willing captive incites the reader’s 
                                                 
62 See Hughes and Malone for a summary of this concept, pp. 29-30. 
63 See Hughes and Malone for an explanation of this term, p. 30, and see Cantin’s “Perversion and 
Hysteria” for a discussion of the absent Other, p. 158. 
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 curiosity to understand the paradoxical relationship between captivity and freedom as 
it is staged through the presentation of her body. 
In an echo of the two alternate beginnings, Réage presents the reader with two 
possible endings by inserting editorial comments that appear after the conclusion of 
the proper boundaries of the narrative.  The editorial voice speaks from a position of 
privileged knowledge about the manuscript and provides the following closing 
remarks about O’s fate:  
     In a final chapter, which has been suppressed, O returned to Roissy, 
where she was abandoned by Sir Stephen. 
    There exists a second ending to the story of O, according to which O, 
seeing that Sir Stephen was about to leave her, said she would prefer to 
die.  Sir Stephen gave her his consent.  (199)  
The insertion of the non-diegetic editorial comments is an unusual move, one which 
calls into question the integrity of the text itself because it both denies the reader 
narrative closure and suggests that the text has been manipulated before its 
publication.64  The reader is informed that something, specifically the final chapter, is 
missing from the text, and so the final scene in which O is being “possessed” by her 
masters, Sir Stephen and the Commander, can be read only as a suspension, not a 
closure, of the narrative (199).  After following O’s transformations and her 
progression in the hands of various masters, the reader is certainly invested in learning 
of her destiny, yet one is left with conjecture rather than a certain outcome concerning 
                                                 
64 The storm of controversy over the authorship of Story of O following its original publication is also 
fascinating because the uncertainty over the authorship of the novel played out in the real world as well 
as the fictional world.  See Sabine d’Estrée’s “Translator’s Note” for a discussion of the public 
speculation concerning Réage, especially pp. x-xiii.  See also Régine Deforges’s Confessions of O: 
Conversations with Pauline Réage for Réage’s own comments on this, especially p. 13.  
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 O’s fate.65  We are left to speculate why and by whom the final chapter “has been 
suppressed” (199), and we again face the quandary, which was first encountered with 
the two opening scenarios, of interpreting two endings.  The second ending is an 
amplification and more extreme version of the first, and like the second version of the 
text’s opening, O’s enslavement and passivity is stressed more heavily in the second 
ending.  Compared to the relatively minor order that she hand over her undergarments 
in the first version of the opening scene, O, according to the second version of the 
closing scene, receives permission from her master to surrender her life, which offers 
powerful commentary on the state of her subjection.  At this point, O is no longer even 
responsible for her life; while she does express a preference, she delegates the decision 
to her master.  O’s attempt to find a reliable, or an adequate, master proves 
unsuccessful because Sir Stephen apparently discards her.  Sir Stephen’s abandonment 
of her suggests that O has failed in her endeavor to be a perfect love slave for him, 
although it is not clear why he casts her off.  Is it due to his capriciousness?  Has she 
failed to obey him, or has she failed to satisfy him?  How does his abandonment of her 
relate to René’s abandonment of O; that is, what are we to make of the series of master 
who possess O?  Could her abandonment by a series of masters be a reflection of their 
inadequacy rather than of her inadequacy? 
 In addition to the variable introductions and conclusions to her novel, Réage 
also employs cagey narrative strategies that obscure the reader’s access to O’s 
motivations and desires.  Just after O arrives at the château, an omniscient narrator 
employs the first-person perspective to report on the actions but not the mental states 
of the characters, and this narrator is an anonymous presence that observes without 
actually participating in the action.  Speaking from the “I” perspective, the narrative 
                                                 
65 Of course, this strategy may also arise from a desire to set the stage for a sequel, and Réage did write 
a sequel, Return to the Château (1969).  Sabine d’ Estrée and Jean Paulhan discuss this possibility see 
pp. xii and xxvi, respectively. 
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 voice at least provides the illusion that the actions being related have the authenticity 
of firsthand testimony, and the narrative voice also underscores the importance of the 
gaze because this narrator is watching and describing O to the reader.  The narrator 
admits that he or she is uncertain about various details, particularly in regard to timing; 
for example, the narrator remarks that “they left her for half an hour, or an hour, or 
two hours, I can’t be sure, but it seemed forever” (6).  Yet, the narrator is sure of other 
events and confidently describes how O is bathed and made up by the other slaves 
according to the rituals of the château.  The first-person pronoun “I” quickly fades 
from the narrative, and the narrator becomes an anonymous presence.  The narrator’s 
anonymity adds to the problem of locating the ultimate source of control or authority 
in the narrative, and this narrative obscurity is played out thematically because there is 
a similar challenge to identify the master behind the perverse scenarios staged 
throughout the text.  Assuming the privilege of both telling the story and providing 
access to O’s thoughts and emotions, the third-person narrator also claims the right to 
speak for O, which highlights O’s problematic relationship to subjectivity and to 
language.  
After O has been inducted into the château by her masters in the Roissy library, 
she is left alone in her bedroom for the night, and the narrator recounts O’s 
ruminations on her recent experiences, exposing O’s ambivalent feelings about her 
treatment: “O tried to figure out why there was so much sweetness mingled with the 
terror in her, or why her terror seemed itself so sweet” (22).  Just as O is confused 
about her conflicting emotions and sensations, so too does the narrative commentary 
leave the reader perplexed as to why she becomes a slave.  Throughout the text, the 
narrator puts forth various speculations (often in the form of parenthetical asides) that 
offer contradictory explanations of O’s motives and feelings that, in turn, create doubt 
and uncertainty in the reader’s mind.  The first such occasion occurs shortly after the 
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 statement quoted above as O continues her reflections: “[O] realized that one of the 
things that most distressed her was the fact that she had been deprived of the use of her 
hands; not that her hands could have defended her (and did she really want to defend 
herself ?), but had they been free they would at least have made the gesture, have 
made an attempt to repel the hands which seized her …” (22-23).  O’s hands have 
been bound “as in an attitude of prayer” (22), and her defenselessness and 
vulnerability are accentuated in this description.  Instead of an autonomous subject 
acting to defend herself, it is only O’s hands that might have put up a defense, and so 
we already see her body acting in a fragmented fashion without a strong, centralized 
will guiding its actions. The phrase “as in an attitude of prayer” also calls to mind 
images of devotion; in fact, as further explication will show, O’s experience goes well 
beyond the physical level to a mystical dimension.  The parenthetical aside, which is 
phrased as a question, undermines the assertion that she is “distressed” about her 
captivity (22), and surely it is meant to resonate in the reader’s mind.  Instances of 
parenthetical asides, as well as direct questions that undercut or qualify a preceding 
declaration, abound, and such narrative ambiguities trouble the reader’s response to 
the text.  The narrative challenge posed by the alternate and multiple scenarios is 
mirrored in the thematic challenge posed by the seemingly undecidable task of 
deciphering the connection between pleasure and pain and between domination and 
submission.   
In order to find more fruitful interpretive ground, the reader must consider the 
presentation of O’s body and its various responses to pleasure and pain in order to gain 
an understanding of why she submits to the physical tortures.  Throughout the text, 
O’s body is regularly put on display, thoroughly inspected by various masters, and 
terribly abused through sexual acts and ritual beatings.  In fact, her body is more often 
than not covered with traces of beatings, and a main purpose of these welts and scars 
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 is to make the disruptive force of the erotic drive visible on the surface of her body: 
the working of jouissance leaves its mark all over her body, not just on typically 
defined erogenous zones, like the orifices.  The phenomenon of jouissance involves 
not only ecstatic pleasure but unbearable, ravishing pain, and the unsettling coupling 
of sex and violence in this text is partly due to its exploration of jouissance.  In 
Lacanian thought, phallic jouissance is distinguished from feminine jouissance; phallic 
jouissance is related to the sexuality of the physical being.  On the other hand, 
feminine jouissance, or Other jouissance, is related to language and to subjectivity, 
and it is a force that is not directly tied to biological sexual experiences, as Tracy 
McNulty elaborates, “[it] is a structural effect of the effraction of the living being by 
language itself, which produces as its by product a jouissance irreducible to the sexual 
functioning of the organism” (“Solving” 97).  Although there are numerous depictions 
of phallic jouissance throughout the text, the more intense and elusive feminine 
jouissance experienced by O will be the main subject of discussion in this paper.66   
Although O endures physical tortures that arise in sexual scenarios, hers is not 
a case of masochism as delineated by Gilles Deleuze.  The essential characteristic of 
masochism, according to Deleuze, is that the beater act on the wishes of the beaten, as 
he puts it: “Likewise the masochistic hero appears to be educated and fashioned by the 
authoritarian woman whereas basically it is he who forms her, dresses her for the part 
and prompts the harsh words she addresses to him.  It is the victim who speaks 
through the mouth of his torturer, without sparing himself” (22).67  O does not direct 
                                                 
66 My understanding of feminine jouissance has also been significantly informed by Lucie Cantin’s 
explanation of it in “Femininity: From Passion to an Ethics of the Impossible,” especially p. 134. 
67 Slavoj Žižek offers a similar account of the dynamics of masochism: “‘In his (unpublished) seminar 
on anxiety (1962-63), Lacan specifies that the true aim of the masochist is not to generate jouissance in 
the Other, but to provide its anxiety.  That is to say: although the masochist submits himself to the 
Other’s torture, although he wants to serve the Other, he himself defines the rules of his servitude; 
consequently, while he seems to offer himself as the instrument of the Other’s jouissance, he effectively 
discloses his own desire to the Other and thus gives rise to anxiety in the Other – for Lacan, the true 
object of anxiety is precisely the (over)proximity of the Other’s desire” (21-22).   
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 the scenarios of bondage and humiliation to which she submits, and her aim does not 
lie in shaping a torturer who fulfills her wishes.  As the narrative structure of the text 
indicates, the source of control is fraught with ambiguity, and O’s past relationships 
with both men and women also reveal a confusing and unstable situation of dominance 
and submission in each relationship.  While there is certainly a strange and shocking 
mix of sex and violence in Story of O, Réage’s text does not present a case of a female 
masochism along the lines of a masochistic relationship such as the one presented in 
Leopold von Sacher-Masoch’s Venus and Furs.  Rather, the displays of perverse 
sexual acts and O’s response to them provide evidence of the pain and pleasure 
involved in the overwhelming experience of jouissance.  The perverse sexual 
scenarios and the novel’s complex narrative structure are connected to the project of 
exploring the feminine position in psychoanalytic terms.   
The problem of seduction is fundamental to this text, as it has been in the other 
captivity narratives examined in this study.  The scene of O being driven to the 
château at Roissy performs the definition of seduction as being lead astray; seduction 
as a mode of female education is also operative in this text because the point of her 
stay at Roissy, and later at Samois, is to instruct her in the duties and behaviors of a 
slave.  “Happiness in Slavery,” Jean Paulhan’s introduction to Story of O, proposes 
that the novel is a love letter: “Without doubt, Story of O is the most ardent love letter 
any man has ever received” (xxxi).  Elaborating on the novel’s resemblance to a love 
letter, Paulhan writes:  
from beginning to end, the story of O is managed rather like some 
brilliant feat.  It reminds you more of a speech than a mere effusion; of 
a letter rather than a secret diary.  But to whom is the letter addressed?  
Whom is the speech trying to convince?  Whom can we ask?  I don’t 
even know who you are.  (xxiv) 
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 Paulhan’s posture of ignorance is disingenuous because the love letter was in fact 
addressed to him.  Pauline Réage is the pseudonym for Dominique Aury, author of 
Story of O and the lover of Paulhan.  Thus, Paulhan’s involvement in publishing the 
novel and writing the introduction for it reveal his coyness and perhaps his own 
attempt to seduce the reader by insisting on the enigma both of the author’s identity 
and of O’s submission to her servitude.  Michael Syrotinski asserts that the novel is 
Aury’s “act of seduction” (74), through which she is “attempting to ‘ensnare’ Paulhan 
through the account of her own fantasies of sexual enslavement” (75).  The pattern of 
seduction works on a number of levels; it may start as a personal attempt at seduction 
by Aury of Paulhan, which is followed by Paulhan’s attempt to seduce the reader in 
his introduction.  Thematically, seduction plays a prominent role in the descriptions of 
O and the other woman at Roissy who fulfill the role of seductress for the men 
associated with Roissy.  O is charged with the task of seducing other women to join 
the enslaved of Roissy; thus, we can see that seduction is a dominant concern of the 
novel. 
 The presence of the unknown friend who drives the car, the narrator who 
watches O, and the succession of masters suggest the presence of the Other who 
observes and directs the proceedings.  When O first arrives at the château, the narrator 
speculates that someone may be watching O “through a peephole camouflaged in the 
wall” (7), and this anonymous but omnipresent gaze is staged throughout the novel.  
McNulty offers a clarification of the two concepts of the Other, which helps to explain 
the function of the Other in Réage’s text: 
In the notion of the Other, we have to distinguish between the Other as 
such—that is, the field of the Other that Freud discovers by means of 
the unconscious—and the imaginary Other or Other of seduction.  The 
first is the gap or emptiness at the center of human subjectivity, the 
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 source of the jouissance that overwhelms human life.  The second is the 
Other of the subject’s own fantasy, to which myth lends credibility by 
providing the representations that give consistency to the Other within 
a particular civilization.  The two are nonetheless intimately related, 
since the imaginary Other gives a face to the Absent Other of the 
address, and thereby allows the subject to repress its absence: by 
fearing its judgments, appealing to it for help, relinquishing his fate to 
it, or making it the embodiment of justice or goodwill. (Hostess 178-
79) 
If the imaginary Other is represented in Réage’s text by the succession of O’s various 
masters, we see that they ultimately fail in the goal of repressing “the Absent Other of 
the address” because O’s experience of jouissance is the force that cannot be contained 
by any of her masters (Hostess 178).  The fantasy of the Other who supports her ego 
fails her because the “Other of seduction” proves to be illusory and transitory, 
especially as she progresses in her enslavement (Hostess 178).  
In his Encore seminar, Jacques Lacan famously theorizes “that woman is not-
whole – there is always something in her that escapes discourse” (33).  In this same 
seminar, as illustrated in his formulas of sexuation, Lacan asserts that the feminine 
position does not entirely pass through the phallic function and that, therefore, 
femininity is not fully encompassed by the symbolic order.  When Lacan proposes that 
“there is always something in her that escapes discourse” (33), he suggests that the 
feminine position is simultaneously marked by what is missing from language and by 
what is in excess of the signification permitted by language.  One who experiences 
feminine jouissance encounters much trouble in any attempt to articulate this 
experience, and Lacan’s own involuted language on the topic of the ineffability of 
feminine jouissance stylistically performs this difficulty: “‘Were there another one,’ 
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 but there is no other than phallic jouissance – except the one concerning which woman 
doesn’t breathe a word, perhaps because she doesn’t know (connait) it, the one that 
makes her not-whole” (Encore 60).  While there may appear to be a paradox with 
respect to writing or talking about something that cannot be spoken of or known, the 
experience of jouissance cannot be denied.  The lack of knowledge or the inability to 
speak about jouissance is likely due to a defect, or gap, in the symbolic order because 
it fails to provide a means for discussing an experience that is beyond or outside of the 
present symbolic order.  It is interesting that Lacan cites visual evidence as proof of 
jouissance; he famously advises skeptics to look at Bernini’s statue of Saint Teresa:  
it’s like for Saint Teresa – you need but go to Rome and see the statue 
by Bernini to immediately understand that she’s coming.  There’s no 
doubt about it.  What is she getting off on?  It is clear that the essential 
testimony of the mystics consists in saying that they experience it, but 
know nothing about it.  (Encore 76)   
In order to say something about jouissance, perhaps a point of entry into a discussion 
of it lies in visual observation of its effects, and the importance of visual perception, 
especially of O’s body, is paramount throughout the text.   
From the outset, an extraordinary amount of attention is paid to her body, from 
the bathing and cosmetic preparations, which almost acquire the status of religious 
rites, to the elaborate costumes of “pretty eighteenth century chambermaids” that she 
and the other women of Roissy wear (6).  When O is first whipped, the Roissy masters 
inform her that the markings on her body count as evidence of the extent of her 
suffering: “judging the results [of the whipping] not from her screams or tears but 
from the size and color of the welts they had raised” (12).  Her masters claim that the 
“screams or tears” may be unreliable, but the “welts” on her body are apparently a 
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 more reliable index of her suffering.68  Sir Stephen, O’s second master, similarly tells 
her “that [she] was infinitely more moving when her body was covered with marks, of 
whatever kind, if only because these marks made it impossible for her to cheat and 
immediately proclaimed, the moment they were seen, that anything went as far as she 
was concerned” (112).  According to Sir Stephen, the “marks” serve two purposes: 
they prevent infidelity, and they speak to her willingness to engage in the most 
scandalous sexual acts imaginable.  In a sense, the traces of the beatings usurp the role 
of speech, and, unlike speech which can be misleading and deceptive, O’s body cannot 
lie.  Anne-Marie, a female “master” associated with Roissy who further educates 
young women in the art of being slaves, also relies on the testimony of O’s body rather 
than her speech, as demonstrated by her query to O: “‘But tell me now, how did Sir 
Stephen prefer using you?  I need to know’” (149).  Upon inspection, it becomes clear 
that Sir Stephen prefers her “rear” (149), and once again O’s body supplants her 
speech, as Anne-Marie remarks to O: “‘there was no need for you to tell me’” (149).  
Like Anne-Marie, the reader can learn much from a close analysis of O’s body. 
In fact, while O listens to René and Sir Stephen discuss her body and how they 
intend to use it to gratify their desires, O considers her status as an object; moreover, 
she confesses that her body’s signifying functioning is pleasing and comforting to her.  
Just after Sir Stephen makes her come, O is lying on a table where he discards her, and 
O reflects on her strange relationship to speech and to her body: 
O, still lying motionless on her back, her loins still aflame, was 
listening, and she had the feeling that by some strange substitution Sir 
                                                 
68 In “Histoire d’O: The Construction of a Female Subject,” Kaja Silverman makes a similar point about 
the legibility of the beatings: “The signifiers ‘trace’ and ‘mark’ are used so frequently in relation to the 
whipping of O that they become virtually synonymous with that activity” (337).  Though I share 
Silverman’s interest in O’s body “as a writing surface” (338), I do not read O’s case as one of 
masochism, as Silverman often does: “the marks simultaneously signify O as the masochistic subject 
who not only receives but wants them” (337). 
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 Stephen was speaking for her, in her place.  As though he was 
somehow in her body and could feel the anxiety, the anguish, and the 
shame, but also the secret pride and harrowing pleasure that she was 
feeling, especially when she was alone in a crowd of strangers, of 
passers-by in the street, or when she got into a bus, when she was at the 
studio with the models and technicians, and she told herself that any 
and all of these people she was with, if they should have an accident 
and have to be laid down on the ground or if a doctor had to be called, 
would keep their secrets, even if they were unconscious and naked; but 
not she: her secret did not depend upon her silence alone.  (112-113) 
In this passage, O, perhaps involuntarily, cedes her agency to Sir Stephen as he speaks 
for her, and this merging of her will with his alienates her from her body, bringing her 
a measure of relief from the disruptive force of jouissance that eludes her control.  
“[T]he secret pride and harrowing pleasure” derive from O’s special status as a slave, 
which grants her a unique position among other people that she comes in contact with 
(112), and she is glad that she is not solely responsible for either keeping or revealing 
her secret.  Instead of fearing exposure, O calmly contemplates the possibility of her 
secret being revealed if she should be stripped naked in front of other people.  It is 
telling that O imagines her body as distinct from her mental activities, and she tacitly 
agrees with her masters that her body can speak more truthfully than her actual 
speech.69   Interestingly enough, the secret remains unspecified, unnamed.  But it is 
suggested that it is a secret which can unveil itself by means other than language.   
                                                 
69 Silverman offers a similar reading of this scene in terms of O’s alienation “in and through a discourse 
which exceeds her – one which speaks for her, in her ‘place’” (320).  Silverman’s article provides an 
excellent analysis of the female body and female subjectivity in relation to discourse.  While my 
argument also addresses these topics, as previously mentioned, my position differs from Silverman’s in 
that I do not consider O’s case to be strictly one of masochism.  See, for instance, pp. 329-330, 337, 
340, and 342, of Silverman’s article for a discussion of masochism as a motivating factor in O’s 
submission to physical and sexual abuse. 
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 In Hysteria from Freud to Lacan, Monique David-Ménard succinctly sums up 
the significance of the hysteric’s symptoms: “what is played out in the body takes the 
place of a discourse that cannot be uttered” (3).  O is like the hysteric in that her 
experience of jouissance is disclosed through her body, not through speech.  A 
fascination with secrets and the hysteric’s symptoms is a preoccupation of Freud’s 
Dora: An Analysis of a Case of Hysteria; Freud defines a “symptomatic act” in the 
following terms: 
those acts which people perform, as we say, automatically, 
unconsciously, without attending to them, or as if in a moment of 
distraction.  They are actions to which people would like to deny any 
significance, and which, if questioned about them, they would explain 
as being indifferent and accidental.  Closer observation, however, will 
show that these actions, about which consciousness knows nothing or 
wishes to know nothing, in fact gives expression to unconscious 
thoughts and impulses, and are therefore most valuable and instructive 
as being manifestations of the unconscious which have been able to 
come to the surface.  (68) 
Freud famously likens himself to a detective who uncovers the analysand’s secrets by 
attending to the clues that they invariably offer: “He that has eyes to see and ears to 
hear may convince himself that no mortal can keep a secret.  If his lips are silent, he 
chatters with his finger-tips; betrayal oozes out of him at every pore” (Dora 69).  
Freud offers the example of Dora’s playing with her reticule as a symptomatic act 
disguising while simultaneously disclosing the wish to masturbate.  Even if the 
“secret,” the unconscious wish, is not accessible through speech, Freud argues that it 
can be reached through close observation of the body and behavior, in addition to 
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 other modes of signification that evade repression like, dreams, slips of the tongue, 
and jokes.    
The downplaying of speech as a means of signification and the concomitant 
privileging of the body suggest that the reader must shift attention to the descriptions 
and reactions of O’s body to understand Réage’s project of exploring the writing of 
jouissance on O’s body.  The insistence on the limitations of language as a mode of 
signification is also a rejection of what Lacan calls the symbolic order, which is in 
large part comprised of the register of language.  Language inevitably and invariably 
alienates the subject from his or her own desires by causing them to pass through a 
discourse which is external to the subject.  Willy Apollon’s “The Letter of the Body” 
provides a clear analysis of how language structures the child’s world:  
The child, then, encounters the symbolic order as a structure of the 
discourses of others.  There are two obvious effects of this 
enmeshment, two primary cuts bearing on the satisfaction of need and 
on self-representation.  First, the symbolic order encloses the 
satisfaction of need within the Other’s desire and discourse. … Second, 
the symbolic order severs the speaking being from self-representation.  
The primary identification of the subject comes rather out of the 
capture within the signifiers of the Other’s discourse, as well as within 
the unconscious representations of parental desires.  (105)   
Réage is interested in circumventing the symbolic order to explore other modes of 
signification which do not necessarily alienate the subject by placing him or her in the 
discourse of the Other.   
In numerous scenes, O’s body is repeatedly shown to be the object of the gaze 
of other characters, and this narrative scenario invites the reader to imaginatively 
participate in this gaze as well.  Mirrors are one of the most common objects in the 
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 text; for example, when O first arrives at the château, she is placed before “a large 
mirror [in which] she could see herself, thus open, each time her gaze strayed to the 
mirror” (7).  So, O is also subject to her own “gaze,” and this scene introduces the 
theme of narcissism, which recurs throughout the text with various images of O 
staring at her own reflection.  The “open[ness]” refers to her genitalia, reinforcing her 
role as a sex slave for the men at Roissy, where all of her orifices must always be 
available and accessible to her masters.  Whenever O looks in a mirror, what she 
habitually focuses on is her sexual organs, not a unified body image, and nowhere in 
the text is there ever a description of O’s face.  In contrast to the tremendous amount 
of attention paid to her body, her face is a blank slate, which symbolizes her lack of an 
autonomous identity.  As has been previously mentioned, the narrator proposes that an 
unseen character (the Other) may be observing O: “I have no idea how long she 
remained in the red bedroom, or whether she was really alone, as she surmised, or 
whether someone was watching her through a peephole camouflaged in the wall” (7).  
The prospect of constant yet unverifiable surveillance enforces the disciplinary regime 
of Roissy, which involves physical components, including chains, collars, and corsets 
(to name a few), as well as psychological methods such as the pervasive gaze and the 
silence imposed upon the women.70  The possibility of a covert gaze again stresses 
O’s vulnerability and her powerlessness because she cannot return the gaze of the 
Other, which entraps her in the position of object.   
As we have seen, O’s body frequently undergoes exacting scrutiny in the form 
of both visual and verbal assessment, and the experience typically unsettles her, 
perhaps because it encourages her to further regard herself as an object for the Other.  
When René introduces O to Sir Stephen, the two discuss “the advantages of her body 
                                                 
70 I am obviously drawing on Foucault’s theorization of the effects of the gaze and surveillance as a 
means of enforcing discipline as discussed in his analysis of Bentham’s Panopticon; see p. 201 of 
Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison. 
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 with respect to the demands of theirs” (90), and O feels debased by their conversation 
because of the “utterly base and contemptible” vocabulary they use in reference to her 
body (90).  Sir Stephen is a brother to René, albeit by ties of affection rather than 
blood, and he replaces René as O’s master, a move that is prefigured in the second 
version of the opening scene when the unknown friend essentially usurps René’s role 
as master by directing René’s preparation of O prior to their arrival at the château.  
After Sir Stephen becomes O’s master, he likewise introduces her to other men 
associated with Roissy, and similar feelings of shame wash over her when Sir Stephen 
discusses her enslavement with these men: “O was once again astonished at the 
coarseness of his language.  But then, how did she expect to be referred to, if not as a 
whore …” (166).  Although O often professes pride in her enslavement, her reaction to 
verbal insults, such as the ones above, reveal her sensitivity to the dehumanizing 
aspects of her enslavement, which shows that she is not totally reduced to the status of 
passive and stoic object.  It is interesting that language emotionally wounds her on a 
more profound level than the physical torture that she endures, and the stressing of 
language’s power to hurt O is most likely related to Réage’s project of exposing the 
subject’s radical alienation in language.   
Negative verbal evaluation is one way in which O is debased, and her master’s 
display of her body as a commodity is another way in which she is degraded.  O is 
taught to view herself as a commodity that can be indefinitely passed from one master 
to another.  On the occasion of her first meeting with Sir Stephen, René treats O as an 
item on display for a prospective buyer, as he offers her up for examination, “by 
exposing [O] to [Sir Stephen], by opening her as one opens a horse’s mouth to prove 
that it is young enough, that Sir Stephen found her beautiful enough or, strictly 
speaking, suitable enough for him, and vouchsafed to accept her” (81).  Later, Sir 
Stephen takes O to “‘show’” her to Anne-Marie (138), and O’s body is again carefully 
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 tested and probed.  O now compares herself to merchandise, as her masters critique 
her body, “This is how they lift the fish at the market, O was thinking, by the gills, and 
how they pry open the mouths of horses.  She also recalled that the valet Pierre, during 
her first evening at Roissy had done the same to her after having fastened her in 
chains” (140).  There is certainly no dignity in this anatomical examination, and the 
mercantile metaphors emphasize her chattel status, as O is exchanged among the 
members of Roissy.  O’s body is constantly being evaluated in terms of its 
serviceability for the sexual pleasure of her masters, but there is a tension between 
being degraded by and being exalted by her debasement.  Later, O proudly displays 
the piercings and brandings that proclaim her status as Sir Stephen’s personal 
property.  By enduring various forms of debasement, O bears witness to her lover’s 
desire for her, and the torture and debasement serve as a way of channeling the force 
of jouissance within her by experiencing it within a set of proscribed rituals. 
Once the reader learns of O’s sexual history, what is most striking about her 
current condition is the dramatic reversal her affair with René marks compared to the 
dynamics of her previous liaisons.  O’s posture of subjection begins with René; before 
becoming René’s lover, O is in the governing role in her relationships with both men 
and women.  The narrator discusses O’s capitulation to René in terms of capture and 
bondage, such as “René threw himself at her like a pirate at his prisoner” (91), which 
may foreshadow the eruption of violence in their relationship.  “But her love for René 
and René’s love for her had stripped her of all her weapons, and instead of providing 
her with any new proof of her power, had stripped her of those she had previously 
possessed” (90): the references to “weapons” and a “proof of her power” speak to the 
aggressive underside of romance and love.  The narrator further describes O’s sexual 
pursuits in terms of a challenge or contest for dominance:  
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 But what she took—or mistook—to be desire was actually nothing 
more than the thirst for conquest, and neither her tough-guy exterior 
nor the fact that she had had several lovers—if you could call them 
lovers—nor her hardness, nor even her courage was of any help to her 
when she met René.  (91)   
The narrator asserts that O is not driven by “desire” in the sense of sexual attraction; 
instead, the cause of her actions is characterized as a “thirst for conquest” (91).  Yet, 
such equivocations and qualifications again suggest that narrative explanations of O’s 
actions should be regarded with suspicion because straightforward and uncomplicated 
analysis is so rarely given.  However, the prioritizing of the “thirst for conquest” does 
convey the idea that being in a position of control is more important to O than finding 
the mutually fulfilling and caring relationship usually thought of as love.   
On the romantic battlefield, O is depicted as a ruthless warrior, and she is 
explicitly coded as masculine through the image of the “tough-guy exterior” and 
implicitly coded as masculine through her association with stereotypically masculine 
traits such as “hardness” and “courage” (91).  The phrase “if you could call them 
lovers” implies that only a real lover possesses the power to provoke such radical 
dependence and devotion in one’s partner (91), and love, or some force that is 
unleashed through her relationship with René, apparently has the power to transform 
O from a “femme fatale” into a love slave (90).  Yet, an interpretation that posits that 
love is the factor which accounts for the radical destabilization of the dialectic of 
domination and submission in O’s sexual relationships is neither satisfactory nor 
adequate to explain her mystifying behavior and transformation. 
 Gender roles also play out in interesting ways in regard to the dialectic of 
domination and submission.  In addition to male lovers, O has had multiple female 
lovers in the past, and she later takes Jacqueline, a glamorous Russian fashion model 
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 and actress whom she photographs, as another lover, although she is acting on the 
orders of Sir Stephen and René during the course of this affair.  As a young woman of 
twenty, the narrator explains that O relishes acting in the male role in the game of 
chivalrous courtship, “by doffing her beret, by standing aside to let her pass, and by 
offering her a hand to help her out of a taxi” (96).  By maintaining the dominant male 
role in conventional courtship rituals, O props up a certain kind of passive femininity 
that she later embraces when she becomes a love slave.  In her interactions with 
women, O often assumes the leading role: “Probably not for the pursuit itself, however 
amusing or fascinating it might be, but for the complete sense of freedom she 
experienced in the act of hunting.  She, and she alone, set the rules and directed the 
proceedings (something she never did with men, or only in a most oblique manner)” 
(96).  In “A Case of Homosexuality in a Woman,” Freud discusses masculine and 
feminine roles in love affairs; although it is important to stress that his attribution of 
masculine and feminine roles should not be assigned to biological sex, his comments 
nevertheless elucidate O’s behavior in her affairs with women: 
What is certainly of greater importance is that in her behaviour towards 
her love-object she had throughout assumed the masculine part: that is 
to say, she displayed the humility and the sublime over-estimation of 
the sexual object so characteristic of the male lover, the renunciation of 
all narcissistic satisfaction, and the preference for being lover rather 
than the beloved.  She had thus not only chosen a feminine love-object, 
but had also developed a masculine attitude towards this object.  (131) 
“The sublime over-estimation of the object” is developed by Lacan in his theorization 
of sexual difference and his claim that, for the masculine subject, object a is “what 
comes to make up for (suppléer) the sexual relationship that does not exist” (Encore 
63).  By propping the other women up as the cause of her desire, O gains a better 
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 understanding of her own position as object a for her various lovers, who are in the 
place of the Other of the fantasy.  
In some of her prior relationships with men, we see that O is indeed capable of 
exercising tyrannous control over her lovers; for instance, she “[strips] naked” in front 
of a young man who has attempted suicide in his despair over her rejection of him 
only to cruelly inflame his desire even though she has no intention of gratifying it 
(91).  And so, the assertion that she fails to “set the rules and [direct] the proceedings” 
with men is not entirely accurate, providing yet another instance of narrative 
unreliability.  After she returns from Roissy, O’s co-workers at the fashion studio 
notice that her whole demeanor has become more reserved, and her outfits, as 
Jacqueline remarks, give the impression of being “‘[v]ery little-girl-like’” (60).  Due 
to her girlish clothing, the narrator additionally notes that “O looked like a well-
brought-up little girl”, and “she [is] taken for [Sir Stephen’s] daughter, or his niece 
…” when they are in public (164).  O’s histrionic performance of both male and 
female gender roles points to the cultural construction of these roles. 
Whereas O’s masquerade as a gentleman suitor allows her to act in a more 
assertive and aggressive manner, the role of slave requires that she feign a hyper-
femininity marked by passive and submissive behavior, which, along with her girlish 
clothing, causes her to appear younger than her actual age.  O’s youthful aspect 
bolsters her dependence on her older master, and the feminine position is mainly 
marked as one of submissive object throughout this text.  In terms of feminist politics, 
it is obviously very objectionable for the feminine position to be tied so closely to 
passivity and for feminine sexual desirability to be linked with passivity and 
vulnerability.  The secret society of Roissy with its male privilege and female 
servitude is, at least in part, an exaggerated microcosm of society at large with its 
stereotypical codes for the assertive, dominant male and the submissive, docile female.  
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 Even though it often appears that O is acting on the basis of her love for a man, this 
appearance is undercut by the fact that her affections are transferable and by the fact 
that we see women acting in similar patterns of dominance and submission in same 
sex relationships (for example, the young Natalie’s pledge of love and devotion to O; 
or Anne-Marie, the master/mistress of the women at Samois).  O is definitely desirous 
of being the object of the Other’s affections, but the positions of object and Other do 
not correspond to male and female biological sexual assignments.   
Through her sexual encounters with women, O discovers another dimension of 
her identity as object for the Other by seeing something of herself in these women.  On 
the one hand, O pursues women because such encounters allow her to be in the 
leading position, but she is also genuinely attracted to the beauty of other women.  
However, O’s fascination with their beauty is most likely a means to an end rather 
than a wish for a homosexual relationship:  
The beauty of other women, which with unfailing generosity she was 
inclined to find superior to her own, nevertheless reassured her 
concerning her own beauty, in which she saw, whenever she 
unexpectedly caught a glimpse of herself in a mirror, a kind of 
reflection of theirs.  The power she acknowledged that her girl friends 
held over her was at the same time a guarantee of her own power over 
men.  (97-98). 
O’s admiration of other women’s beauty is partly a quest to find her own image, 
which may be a form of narcissism.  When O looks in the mirror, the image she sees 
reflected is her own as well as that of other women.  Toward the end of the novel, O 
again reflects on her desire for other women in a way that reveals a narcissistic 
investment: “she was only in love with girls as such, girls in general—the way one can 
be in love with one’s own image …” (191).  O’s point of identification is with the 
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 male lover; she wants to see the beauty in other women from the same position that 
her male lover sees her beauty.  If O finds the women’s beauty moving and powerful, 
then, since her own beauty resembles theirs, she too is beautiful and desirable.  The 
apparent narcissism is undermined by the fact that O’s motivation lies not in boasting 
of her own beauty but in assuring herself that others will find her beautiful.  
After O’s first visit with Anne-Marie, she recalls a childhood memory that 
conjures up a powerful narcissistic image: 
the statue she had seen as a child in the Luxembourg Gardens: a woman 
whose waist had been similarly constricted and seemed so slim 
between her full breasts and plump behind—she was leaning over 
limpid waters, a spring which, like her, was carefully sculptured in 
marble, looking at her reflection—so slim and frail that she had been 
afraid the marble waist would snap.  (141)   
Anne-Marie instructs O to wear an extremely constricting corset, which will refashion 
O’s body to look like the statue.  As a child, O remembers sensing something fragile 
and precarious about the statue; perhaps, through this recollection and comparison, O 
glimpses a premonition of her own impending fate.  Like Narcissus, the female statue 
stares into the water at her own image, alluding to the enchanting yet fatal attraction of 
the gaze.  The myth of Narcissus teaches that self-love is self-destruction, and, while 
O does appear to be on the path of self-destruction, the myth of Narcissus does not 
exactly correspond to her situation.  It is not so much a selfish absorption but rather a 
curiosity to know something about herself that drives O.  In Freud’s Papers on 
Technique, Lacan proposes that love has a narcissistic foundation: “That’s what love 
is.  It’s one’s own ego that one loves in love, one’s own ego made real on the 
imaginary level” (142).  If it is true that one seeks a specular manifestation of “one’s 
own ego” in the world of images, then this may help to account for O’s concentration 
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 on studying the faces of other women.  Lacan’s formulation also suggests that love 
relationships arise in dyadic terms of object and Other, in which a person needs 
another person to make visible and to acknowledge and thereby participate in the 
creation of the other person’s identity.  
O’s obsession with women also arises from her fascination with jouissance, 
and through witnessing other women have orgasms, she gains an important point of 
entry into this phenomenon.  O elaborates on the basis of her attraction to women by 
discussing how emotionally electrified she feels when she makes a woman come: 
The pleasure she derived from seeing a girl pant beneath her caresses, 
seeing her eyes close and the tips of her breasts stiffen beneath her lips 
and teeth, … then sigh and moan—was more than she could bear; and 
if this pleasure was so intense, it was only because it made her 
constantly aware of the pleasure which she in turn gave when she 
tightened around whoever was holding her, whenever she sighed and 
moaned, with this difference, that she could not conceive of being 
given thus to a girl, the way this girl was given to her, but only to a 
man.  Moreover, it seemed to her that the girls she caressed belonged 
by right to the man to whom she belonged, and that she was only 
present by proxy.  (191)   
The visual nature of the pleasure is once more highlighted with the repetition of the 
word “seeing,” and in an earlier passage, O also fixates on watching the faces of 
women who are having orgasms: “For O passionately loved to see faces enveloped in 
that mist which makes them so young and smooth, a timeless youth that does not 
restore childhood but enlarges the lips, widens the eyes the way make-up does, and 
renders the iris sparkling and clear” (97).  In this same section, O is further described 
as being “overwhelmed” by “the transfigured face of a girl” (97).  Both the long and 
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 brief excerpts quoted above place much emphasis on the details of the body’s physical 
response to sexual stimulation, such as the contractions, sighs, and moans, but 
jouissance, specifically feminine jouissance, produces more than just a physical 
reaction in the body.  The reference to “a timeless youth” and “the transfigured face” 
argues for a mystical and spiritual dimension to the changes induced by jouissance.  
Just as the other women’s beauty helps her to comprehend the influence of her 
own beauty on men, so too does her ability to appreciate being the giver and receiver 
of orgasm provide her with a more intimate and nuanced understanding of it.  Once O 
becomes a slave at Roissy, male priority is reinforced because she would only put 
herself in the position of object for a man and because she understands the women as 
property, or objects, which belong to a man.  O literally performs jouissance in the 
sense of the word’s original feudal meaning of enjoying or profiting from something 
or someone that you do not own.71  O’s derives her own pleasure by watching other 
women having an orgasm, and so she enjoys through observation of that woman’s 
pleasure.  O also labors on behalf of a master (again performing the feudal definition 
of jouissance) by bringing the woman to orgasm for a master; she is “present by 
proxy” and doing the work of the master (191).  O’s relationship to her own orgasm is 
problematic, even traumatic, and this is most obvious in her one act of disobedience, 
her refusal to masturbate in front of Sir Stephen when he orders her to do so.  It is as if 
her own jouissance can also only be experienced by proxy; that is, it must be offered 
up to the Other. 
One way in which O serves René is through his prostitution of her among the 
other Roissy masters, and this is likened to the way a god treats his creatures: “Thus he 
would possess her as a god possesses his creatures, whom he lays hold of in the guise 
of a monster or a bird, of an invisible spirit or a state of ecstasy” (31).   In a manner 
                                                 
71 See McNulty for an explanation of the etymology and definition of jouissance; p.217 of The Hostess. 
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 similar to a god’s manifestation “in the guise of a monster or bird,” René declares that 
the other masters are “reflections of him” (31), and this claim divorces authority from 
any single male because it is a quality or abstract principle possessed by or embodied 
in René that O is ultimately obeying.  Behind the positioning of male masters and 
female slaves in the dialectic of domination and submission, the preponderance of 
religious imagery intermingled with scenes of sexual excess intimates that jouissance 
may be the driving force which supersedes the two terms in the dialectic.  Expounding 
on the rationale for O’s prostitution, the narrator relates that “[René] gave her only to 
reclaim her immediately, to reclaim her enriched in his eyes, like some common object 
which had been used for some divine purpose and has thus been consecrated” (31).  
Prostitution is compared to a religious ritual that transforms O into a more valuable 
and precious object, and this alchemy occurs through the jouissance that flows through 
the medium of her flesh.  René also wants to prostitute O to affirm his ownership of 
her because “one can only give what belongs to you” (31).  Jane Gallop confirms 
René’s definition of ownership in her explanation of the difference between ownership 
and jouissance: 
It is the use, the enjoyment, the jouissance, which exceeds exchange.  
This opposition of jouissance and possession can refer to a legal 
meaning of jouissance, as having the use of something.  Notice the 
example of usufruct, given in the dictionary under jouissance.  
‘Usufruct’ is the right to the jouissance but not the ownership of 
something; in other words, you can use and enjoy it, but you cannot 
exchange it.  (49-50) 
O’s body again functions as a commodity that is exchanged among men, but the 
experience of jouissance is not tied to any particular man or woman.  Ultimately, she 
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 is passed on from master to master, which implies that ownership is also a problematic 
notion in regard to her status as property.   
 Part of the reason why O assents to become a slave also derives from the 
mystical aspect of jouissance, and her devotion to her master is often expressed in 
religious discourse and imagery.  For instance, when O is in the Roissy library with 
the masters, she kneels in an attitude “as nuns are wont to do” (10), suggesting that her 
sexual degradation is a form of humility before a deity as nuns prostrate themselves in 
the presence of God.  O also conceives of her confinement at Roissy as penance and 
purification for her god—that is her master—and the extreme portrayal of herself as 
the lowly sinner and René as the lofty master contributes to the religious imagery.  In 
melodramatic terms that resemble those of unabashed erotica, the narrator describes a 
scene in which O performs fellatio on René: “O felt that her mouth was beautiful, 
since her lover condescended to thrust himself into it, since he deigned publicly to 
offer caresses to it, since, finally, he deigned to discharge in it.  She received it as a 
god is received …” (19).  Few women would speak of oral sex in such exalted terms, 
and so the use of words like “condescended” and “deigned” is a clear indicator of O’s 
extreme level of self-debasement.   
When O first sees a master at Roissy, he is “dressed in a long purple robe,” and 
she immediately notices his penis: “It was the sex that O saw first …” (7).  On the 
same night, O is told that the masters wear capes that expose their penises “for the 
sake of insolence, so that your eyes will be directed there upon it and nowhere else, so 
that you may learn that there resides your master, for whom, above all else, your lips 
are intended” (16).  This assertion dislocates authority from any specific man, which is 
borne out by the substitutability of O’s masters, and the fragmentation of the male 
body also depersonalizes the master as a specific individual.  The insistence on the 
penis as the “master” is also notable because the penis is the male organ through 
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 which phallic jouissance is experienced.  The masters may also be overwhelmed by 
jouissance despite their position of dominance in the dialectic.  The penis as the 
“master” also invokes the phallus as the master signifier in the symbolic order, 
suggesting that something greater than sexual indulgence is at stake.  The constant 
availability and accessibility of O’s orifices for her masters and their flaunting of their 
penises implies that their sexual gratification is a priority, but the anonymity and 
substitutability among the masters leave open the possibility that they may be subject 
to someone or something beyond any individual male.  O’s religious attitude certainly 
suggests that she endures the physical trials for something much greater than the sake 
of bodily pleasure, either hers or her masters.   The various masters fulfill the role of 
imaginary Other, positing a dyadic relationship between O and each master, but the 
absent Other, associated with the subject’s alienation in language and with the 
experience of jouissance, is also at stake in these scenarios, as implied in the unnamed 
but powerful presence in the various scenarios of domination and submission.  
Despite its avowed practices of sexual indulgence, Roissy shares some 
similarities to a convent because the women are cloistered there and devoted to their 
masters with a fervor that resembles those of members of religious orders.  In a 
convent, nuns engage in many rituals that involve mortification of the flesh to elevate 
the spirit, and, in the château, O endures many forms of torture to prove her 
commitment to her master.  The masters tell O that she will be whipped “less for our 
pleasure than for your enlightenment” (16), and they inform her that “this flogging and 
the chain … are intended less to make you suffer, scream, or shed tears than to make 
you feel, through this suffering, that you are not free but fettered, and to teach you that 
you are totally dedicated to something outside yourself” (17).  The body becomes an 
instrument that enables O to gain knowledge about “something outside of herself,” and 
yet this “something” is “outside of herself” only in the sense that she cannot 
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 consciously control it and that it does not exclusively originate within her body.  The 
“something” seems to be the phenomenon of jouissance, which is simultaneously an 
experience within the body and also an experience which comes from “something 
outside yourself” (17).  Jouissance threatens to override and dissolve the integrity of 
the body, and the chains anchor the body to this experience and remind O that she is 
not in control of her body.  On the face of it, O tolerates the rigors of Roissy to ensure 
René’s love for her, but, as a number of points demonstrate, she is actually trying to 
find some relief from jouissance, a far more disruptive energy than her attachment to 
René.   
The master’s goal of instilling in O a devotion “to something outside of 
[herself]” (Réage 17) is effectively accomplished because O internalizes the discipline 
she learns at Roissy, as the following scene portraying O gazing at her reflection in her 
bedroom mirror reveals: “She was no longer wearing either a collar or leather 
bracelets, and she was alone, her own sole spectator.  And yet never had she felt 
herself more totally committed to a will which was not her own, more totally a slave, 
and more content to be so” (58).  O no longer needs the accoutrement of Roissy to 
generate the conditions of her enslavement, and, more importantly, she no longer 
needs her master’s presence to compel her to obey.  Although the arrangement of this 
scene is narcissistic, its effects are not: the spectacle of her body reminds her of her 
subservience to an external “will which was not her own” (58).  While at Roissy, O 
cedes both control and use of her body to her masters, who attempt to channel the 
force of jouissance, and, by doing so, O gets a reprieve from this experience.  When 
she speaks of the enslaving effect of her love for René, O rejoices in the bonds of his 
love: “She was no longer free?  Yes! thank God, she was no longer free.  But she was 
light, a nymph on clouds, a fish in water, lost in happiness” (91).  The paradoxical 
relation between captivity and freedom results from the fact that O is free in servitude 
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 because someone else assumes (whether or not this assumption is successful is 
debatable) responsibility for the jouissance that she cannot control.  Once O forsakes 
her freedom, she can revel in her captivity, and this is similar to the mental and 
spiritual release that nuns experience through their dedication to God despite the 
physical and material restrictions of their lives.  
Perhaps what is most remarkable about the religious imagery is the discourse 
of sin and redemption that permeates the novel, and O repeatedly expresses a desire 
for redemption, which obviously raises the question of what sin she is guilty of.  O 
initially concedes that there may be “trifling acts” and “thoughts and fleeting 
temptations” in regard to her desire for others, but she insists that she has not acted on 
these feelings (92).  Yet, O’s testimony is contradicted by Sir Stephen’s assessment of 
her upon their first meeting:  
  “You are easy, O,” he said to her.  “You love René, but you’re easy.  
Does René realize that you covet and long for all the men who desire 
you, that by sending you to Roissy or surrendering you to others he is 
providing you with a string of alibis to cover your easy virtue?” (83) 
Shortly after Sir Stephen’s appraisal, O essentially admits that he is right when she 
reflects that “[René] was certain that she was guilty, and without really wanting to, 
René was punishing her for a sin he knew nothing about (since it remained completely 
internal), although Sir Stephen had immediately detected it: her wantonness” (92-93).  
O’s sin apparently lies in her attraction to other people and her desire to be 
“surrender[ed]” to them, despite what appears to be an earnest desire to remain faithful 
to René in her actions as well as her thoughts.  O interprets her harsh handling at 
Roissy, which includes violent sexual encounters and multiple floggings, as 
punishment for her “sin,” and the sexual surfeit of Roissy may be understood as an 
instance of the cure for the disease being an overdose of the cause.  However, the 
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 typical pattern of narrative uncertainty regarding O’s motivations is particularly 
evident in the two passages quoted above.  O moves from dismissing her peccadilloes 
as hardly worthy of mention to condemning herself as deserving of severe punishment.   
Once Sir Stephen puts forward the accusation that René facilitates her sinfulness by 
indulging her irrepressible promiscuousness, O begins to seriously contemplate this 
possibility herself: “What if she actually enjoyed her debasement?  In that case, the 
baser she was, the more merciful was René to consent to make O the instrument of his 
pleasure” (93).  Yet, it remains speculative as to whether or not O is actually 
prompting René to order her beatings since this possibility is framed as a question.  
Along with O, we see that Sir Stephen is a more discerning master than René, but he is 
not necessarily the ultimate authority on O’s desires.  The reader must again study her 
bodily responses to seek a more authentic or accurate explanation.  
In the simplest terms, O’s dilemma can be described as a conflict between love 
and lust, or her mind and her body.  The repeated image of O in bondage, beginning 
with her bound hands during the car ride to the château, develops the idea that 
something inside of O needs to be controlled, and while it is not explicitly stated, it is 
very likely that it is jouissance, which overruns her body.  It is clear that her body, 
especially the manifestation of her erotic drives, defeats her conscious efforts to 
control it.  On her first morning at Roissy, O moans and cries in pleasure during sex 
acts with an unknown man in the presence of René, which produces feelings of guilt 
and anxiety in her: “[O] had moaned beneath the lips of the stranger as never her lover 
had made her moan, cried out under the impact of a stranger’s member as never her 
lover had made her cry out.  She felt debased and guilty.  She could not blame [René] 
if he were to leave her” (30).  Through the medium of her body, O ostensibly admits 
that the other man is a better lover than René, but, since she loves René, she is 
ashamed to have received such pleasure from another man.  O interprets her orgasm as 
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 a sign of her infidelity, and this is why the language used to describe her orgasms 
reveals that O both resists giving in to her pleasure and conceives of it as a moment of 
defeat, a triumph of her body over her will: “wrenching from [O] a moan which she 
could no longer restrain” (40).  When René first bestows O upon Sir Stephen, the 
language used to express her feelings of shame upon climaxing at the hands of Sir 
Stephen is even stronger: “[O] was vanquished, undone, and humiliated that she had 
moaned” (77).  Instead of orgasm being a blissful release, O generally experiences it 
as proof of her weakness, and she wishes that she could overcome her body’s 
submission to her erotic drive.  
Story of O differs dramatically from the Marquis de Sade’s Philosophy in the 
Bedroom (1795) in this regard.  Whereas Sade celebrates orgasm as liberation from 
the repressive morals of dominant society and a return to the natural instincts of 
Mother Nature, Réage presents orgasm, in most contexts, as a more problematic 
experience of overwhelming jouissance, a force that divides the subject between the 
desire to indulge the erotic drives and the wish to find a limit to the erotic drive, which 
is closely aligned with the death drive.  Sade advocates for complete sexual freedom 
for women as well as men, and he views love as a serious impediment to this freedom: 
“it is above all to oppose yourselves [that is, women] to enslavement by any one 
person, because the outcome of constant love, binding you to him, would be to prevent 
you from giving yourself to someone else, a cruel selfishness which would soon 
become fatal to your pleasures” (286).  On the hand, Sade’s argument against 
monogamy partly applies to O’s situation because her love for René does prevent her 
from indulging her desire for other men and women without René’s express 
authorization.  On the other hand, O finds a certain limit to the drive by submitting to 
bondage; enslavement is liberating in the sense that it provides some relief from the 
overwhelming jouissance within her. 
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 When O is penetrated by another man at Roissy in the presence of her lover, 
she does experience physical pleasure, but her emotional reaction is one of guilt and 
fear, as quoted above, “She felt debased and guilty.  She could not blame [René] if he 
were to leave her” (30).  O interprets her guilt in a theological framework, likening 
herself to “the salt statues of Gomorrah” and proclaiming that “[t]hose who love God, 
and by Him are abandoned in the dark of night, are guilty, because they are 
abandoned” (92).  Natalie, the younger half-sister of Jacqueline, idolizes O in a similar 
manner to O’s initial extreme dedication to René, and she begs O to beat her rather 
than to cast her off: “‘If you had a dog, you’d keep him and take care of him.  And 
even if you don’t want to kiss me but would enjoy beating me, you can beat me.  But 
don’t send me away’” (179-180).  For both O and Natalie, kisses may be preferable to 
beatings, but beatings are certainly preferable to abandonment.  What’s more, Natalie, 
like O, compares herself (at least implicitly) to an animal, and by doing so, both 
women place themselves in subordinate positions to a master in the way that an animal 
is at the disposal of an owner.  Dogs are typically associated with loyalty, which most 
likely accounts for Natalie’s choice of this animal, but fidelity is a very fraught issue 
in this text, one that pits the body against the mind and one that foregrounds the 
question of fidelity to what or whom since the masters are substitutable and 
impermanent. 
The strange and unsettling interchangeability between sex and violence is also 
borne out in the similar vocabulary used to describe sex and floggings, as well as O’s 
reactions to both of these events.  For example, a master’s penis is described as a 
“sword of flesh which had so cruelly pierced O at least once” (40), and Sir Stephen’s 
first sexual act with O is also shown in very aggressive terms of an “inva[sion]”: “he 
drove into her mouth.  … O felt the suffocating gag of flesh swell and harden, its slow 
repeated hammering finally bringing her to tears” (83).  The image of the “sword of 
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 flesh” and words like “pierced” and “hammering” deliberately blur the boundary 
between torture and sex.  As noted above, Réage uses the same vocabulary of 
“moaning” when O is being whipped and when she is having an orgasm (25), and the 
use of the same utterance suggests that the two apparently different physical actions 
can induce a similar bodily response in O.  However, if jouissance is an excess of 
pleasure that spills over into pain (or vice versa), then it is not surprising to find this 
correspondence in the terminology.  Freud’s essay, “A Child is Being Beaten,” also 
presents a theoretical framework for understanding the interchangeability between sex 
and beatings.  In his analysis of female children, Freud reports that the second and 
unconscious phase of the beating fantasy arises from the child’s feelings of guilt for 
her incestuous love for a parent: “The sense of guilt can discover no punishment more 
severe than the reversal of this triumph: ‘No, he does not love you, for he is beating 
you’” (107).  Freud then goes on to explain that “[t]his being beaten is now a meeting-
place between the sense of guilt and sexual love.  It is not only the punishment for the 
forbidden genital relation, but also the regressive substitute for it …” (108).  While O 
is not guilty of an incestuous love, she does exhibit prohibited desires for other men 
and women, and her acceptance of her punishment may also be compensation (or “the 
regressive substitute”) for sex.  
When O is staying at Anne-Marie’s, Anne-Marie instructs O to whip another 
slave, Yvonne, and the narrator relates O’s pleasure in performing this task: “how 
lovely it was to hear [Yvonne’s] moans and sighs, how lovely too to witness her body 
soaked with perspiration, and what a pleasure to wrest the moans and sweat from her” 
(157).  Taken out of context, it might be assumed that Yvonne is having sex and 
coming whereas she is actually being systematically whipped by O.  At first, O is 
hesitant to inflict pain on Yvonne, but she is swiftly “overwhelmed with a terrible 
feeling of pleasure …” (157), which again illustrates the instability of the dialectic of 
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 domination and submission.  There is no innate essence in a person that relegates him 
or her to the role of master or slave; rather, one’s position in the dialectic is 
determined by the specific dynamics and circumstances of a particular relationship.  
The startling mixture of pleasure and pain is common to texts written in the libertine 
tradition, and despite the tendency to hold the two experiences apart, the body 
responds in much the same way to these two stimuli, a fact that troubles the dialectic 
of master and slave. 
In addition to the overwhelming force of the erotic drive, the depiction of 
various physiological functions demonstrates the pressure of biological functions, and 
the emphasis on O’s inability to control these functions provides a justification for the 
use of physical punishment to discipline her body.  When O is at Roissy, she is forced 
to urinate in front of the valet, Pierre, a rather unnerving incident: “All the while [O] 
remained there, [Pierre] stood contemplating her, she could see him in the mirrors, and 
see herself, and was incapable of holding back the water which escaped from her 
body” (Réage 45).  In this room with its mirror-covered walls, O is subject to multiple 
views of herself, as well as the gaze of Pierre, and so she is constructed as the object 
of both the Other’s gaze and her own.  The presence of Pierre provides the perspective 
of another viewer who witnesses O gaining knowledge of her inability to control her 
own body.  Obviously, the biological need to urinate is of a different order than the 
erotic drive, but this scene likewise emphasizes to O her failure to have command of 
her body in a manner that is certainly meant to embarrass her.   
Sir Stephen subjects O to a similar scenario when he instructs her to “[c]aress 
the tips of your breasts,” and O “[feels] them stiffen and rise” (79).  Later in this same 
scene, O perceives that Sir Stephen lightly strokes her nipples: “Sir Stephen’s right 
hand, which was holding his cigarette, grazed their tips with the end of his middle 
finger and, obediently, they stiffened further. … the way one checks to ascertain 
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 whether a machine is functioning properly” (82).  As far as biological reflexes are 
concerned, O’s body behaves “obediently,” and, on an organic level, some biological 
processes do function autonomously of conscious thought like a “machine.”  This is 
also true for Sir Stephen, who gets an erection when he gazes longingly at O: “[O] 
none the less was easily able to see that he was admiring her, and that he desired her” 
(70).  Sir Stephen may possess greater will power than O, as she observes: “O hated 
herself for her own desire, and loathed Sir Stephen for the self control he was 
displaying” (80), but he eventually succumbs to his desire when he finally ejaculates 
in her anus.  In the case of both O and Sir Stephen, the organic functioning of the body 
is pitted against eroticism, and the point of the encounters described above is to test 
the boundaries between the two. 
The modification and disciplining of O’s body is a seemingly endless project 
that progresses through many stages: the renovation of her wardrobe for the purpose of 
facilitating access to her sexual organs, the application of makeup and perfume on 
various erogenous zones of the body, the repeated whippings that leave large welts on 
her body, the gradual enlargement of her anal cavity by means of “an ebonite shaft” 
(41), the gradual contraction of her waist by successive corsets, the excruciating 
piercing of her labia, and the branding of her buttocks.  By contrasting the starting and 
finishing point of O’s makeover, beginning with the surrender of her undergarments 
and ending with her metamorphosis into a non-human creature, it becomes apparent 
that the cost of her erotic escapades is to render her into a fantasy object of the Other’s 
desire, quite possibly at the expense of her own life.  Toward the conclusion of the 
fourth and final section of the novel, “The Owl,” O is again a passenger in a car – this 
time Sir Stephen is the driver – and she now appears in an even more extreme image 
of bondage.  By this stage of O’s servitude, the transformation that began with the 
removal of her undergarments culminates in the dramatic reinvention of her body as 
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 an owl, a nocturnal bird of prey.  O’s owl costume is a mask “composed of tan and 
tawny feathers whose color blended beautifully with her tan; the cope of feathers 
almost completely concealed her shoulders, descending half way down her back and, 
in front, to the nascent curve of her breasts” (193).  Aside from the mask, O is 
completely naked, even to the extent of having her pubic hair removed to bare her 
genitalia more completely, and she is being lead on a leash to a party hosted by 
another Roissy member, known as the Commander.  The mask conceals O’s face, 
effacing her individual identity and heightening the viewer’s attention to her body.  
Natalie, Jacqueline’s younger half-sister who is in love with O, leads O about by a 
chain “used for dogs” (193), a detail which adds to the picture of O’s degradation, and 
this chain is grotesquely attached to the rings that pierce her labia.   
Appearing in the moonlight and being led on a chain by “her black little 
shadow, Natalie” (197), O causes quite a sensation upon her arrival at the party.  The 
other guests gape at and even touch O, but no one speaks to her—they are fascinated 
and stunned by her appearance.  Without a doubt, there is something eerie and even 
monstrous about O’s appearance as an owl, and this is evident in the guests’ reaction 
to her.  None of the guests dare speak to O, which particularly highlights her status as 
an aesthetic object: “the illusion was so extraordinary that no one thought of 
questioning her, which would have been the most natural thing to do, as though she 
were a real owl, deaf to human language and dumb” (197-198).  The ability to use a 
complex system of language is generally recognized as a distinguishing characteristic 
of humans, and O’s perceived inability to speak or comprehend language places her in 
the realm of the non-human.  In order to accept her presence at the party, the guests 
actually need to disavow her humanity, and this is illustrated by the crass American’s 
discovery that she is not a statue but a person:  
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 There was even one drunken American who, laughing, grabbed her, but 
when he realized that he had seized a fistful of flesh and the chain 
which pierced her, he suddenly sobered up, and O saw his face fill with 
the same expression of horror and contempt that she had seen on the 
face of the girl who had given her a depilatory; he turned and fled. 
(198)72
When confronted with the reality of her human body, “a fistful of flesh,” the 
stereotypically brash American is shocked out of his fantasy of viewing O solely as an 
erotic mannequin, and the extreme degree of her subjection produces intense emotions 
of “horror and contempt,” which precipitate his flight from her.   
In the Ethics seminar, Lacan offers a formulation of sublimation as a 
phenomenon that raises “an object … to the dignity of the Thing” (112).  O has been 
in the object position in relation to her various masters, but her dramatic 
transformation in this scene, to the extent that she no longer even seems human, 
suggests that the phenomenon of sublimation is at play.  The American’s flight from 
her also suggests that he is in the presence of the Thing because a crucial element of 
the Thing is the subject’s proximity to it.  If the Thing, or das Ding, is “something 
entfremdet, something strange to me, although it is at the heart of me,” as Lacan 
explains Freud’s theorization of das Ding in the Ethics seminar (71), then one can 
approach it only cautiously and at a certain distance before being overwhelmed by it.  
For another young couple, O is a teaching tool, simply a body without 
subjectivity, and the young girl touches O’s body at the behest of her lover: “they used 
                                                 
72 When O visits the beauty parlor for her depilatory, the beautician is horrified by the lashes on O’s 
body, and O tries to comfort the beautician by “explain[ing] to her that this wax-type depilatory, a 
method in which the wax is applied and allowed to harden, then suddenly removed, taking the hair with 
it—was no more painful than being struck with the riding crop” (194).  This is an odd juxtaposition, 
which collapses the supposedly normal world with its common grooming practice and the libertine 
world with its violent practices.  The disconcerting effect is to call into question the accepted distance 
between these two worlds. 
181 
 her in this way as a model, or the subject of a demonstration, not once did anyone ever 
speak to her directly.  Was she then of stone or wax, or rather some creature from 
another world, and did they think it pointless to speak to her?  Or didn’t they dare?” 
(198-199).  The rhetorical questions point to the ambiguity of her status, and the final 
question suggests an element of dread in her bearing.  O is clearly there for the use and 
enjoyment of the other guests at the party, and she functions on a number of levels, 
namely the instructive, aesthetic, and erotic.  The theatricality of O’s costume and 
presentation is similar to a tableau vivant, and she previously remarks on “this air of 
an Egyptian statue which this mask lent her …” (195).  The elevation of her body into 
an artwork is evidence of the crucial component of fantasy in erotic life, but such an 
elevation leads to an erasure of agency, which, if it can be said that she has a goal, it 
seems likely that her goal is just this.  And we see this erasure most dramatically 
marked by her apparent loss of speech, which is the culmination of her problematic 
relationship to language and to agency.   
While it does appear that O lacks any control or agency in the final scene, this 
appearance is somewhat deceptive because Natalie has actually been promised to O, as 
O’s reflections on this topic reveal,  
If Natalie had not been declared off-limits to her, [O] would have taken 
Natalie, and the only reason she had not violated the restriction was her 
certainty that Natalie would be given to her at Roissy in a few weeks’ 
time, and that, some time previously, Natalie would be handed over in 
her presence, by her, and thanks to her.  (190-91)   
At Roissy, O will assume the role of instructing Natalie, and she will essentially 
prostitute Natalie by “hand[ing] [her] over” to a Roissy member (190).  Since an owl 
is a bird of prey, O doubtless has the aggressive hunting instincts of such birds, and 
her hunting prowess is explicitly praised just before she tries on the various masks: 
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 “[O] was apt at hunting, a naturally trained bird of prey who would beat the game and 
always bring it back to the hunter” (192).  Despite her own submission, O possesses 
the power to lure and trap others, so long as she performs this service for her master.  
O is initially attempting to capture Jacqueline for René and Sir Stephen, but Natalie 
proves to be an easier prey and becomes a substitute for her half-sister because she is 
eager to join the ranks of the enslaved women of Roissy.  After leading O to a bench, 
Natalie sits “on the ground to the left of [O’s] feet” (197), and this positioning of their 
bodies symbolizes Natalie’s servitude to O.  The ambivalent relationship between the 
two women once again leaves open the question of who is dominant and who is 
submissive, or, at least, it indicates fluidity between the two positions. 
Sir Stephen is presumably still O’s master, but he now entrusts O to the 
Commander’s care, blurring the picture of who is in control once again.  This is 
illustrated when Sir Stephen tells O “‘you’ll be an owl for the Commander’” (193), 
explaining that this performance is staged for another master.  Just as authority over O 
shifts in the first scene from René to the unknown friend, here control over O is 
similarly transacted between two men.  O learns that Sir Stephen agrees “to lend her to 
[the Commander] the following week” (190), a prospect which must distress O, since 
she finds his presence intimidating:  
[The Commander] circled [O], studying her breasts, her thighs, her 
hindquarters, inspecting her in detail but offering no comment, and this 
careful scrutiny and the presence of this gigantic body so close to her so 
overwhelmed O that she wasn’t sure whether she wanted to run away 
or, on the contrary, have him throw her down and crush her.  (189)   
The Commander is introduced as “an enormous man, a giant of a creature with a 
cigarette between his lips, his head shaved and his vast belly swelling beneath his open 
shirt and cloth trousers …” (188), his massive bodily presence signifies his power.  
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 The “vast belly swelling beneath his open shirt and cloth trousers” sounds like an 
indirect allusion to his sexual potency.  The daunting size of the Commander and his 
menacing presence probably influence O’s instinct to flee from him.  Alternatively, O 
may actually want him to be killed by him—if he were to “throw her down and crush 
her” (189).   
The reader begins to suspect that the Commander is about to become O’s new 
master when Sir Stephen grants the Commander’s wish that O come as an owl to his 
party.  O’s transfer from René to Sir Stephen begins when René loans O to Sir 
Stephen, and this model of transacting ownership of O looks as if it is about to happen 
again.  The names of O’s masters reveal a hierarchy among them: René is known by 
his first name only, Sir Stephen has a title that speaks to his aristocratic privilege, and 
lastly, the Commander is known by a designation that literally affirms his powerful 
and domineering role.  The portrayal of increasingly potent masters raises this 
question: Who is the master behind the Commander?  That is, we might reasonably 
wonder whether or not there is a limit to the transacting of O’s ownership among 
various masters.  We might also speculate as to what would serve as proof of O’s 
submission and therefore the sign of an effective master.  Would her physical death be 
the necessary proof of her surrender of both her will and her body? 
The suspicion that death is indeed the ultimate proof of O’s submission is 
tentatively confirmed by the two editorial comments (which were previously 
discussed) inserted after the conclusion of the proper boundaries of the narrative.  The 
unstable and provisional positions of domination and submission that have 
characterized O’s relationships will finally come to a stop with her death.  Throughout 
the text, Réage represents O’s body as a writing tablet on which jouissance erupts in 
response to both pleasure and pain.  By repeatedly presenting the feminine position as 
that of an object, Réage shows the vulnerability of women to jouissance by tracing O’s 
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 futile attempts to control this force and by showing the dissolution of her subjectivity 
through the transformation of her body into a pure object.  Story of O is an exploration 
of what happens to a woman when she surrenders to the workings of jouissance, and, 
in this novel, we see that bondage and torture provide some relief from overwhelming 
jouissance because these experiences allow O to cede control of her body to someone 
else.  The emphasis on O’s body, either through visual observation and evaluation of it 
or through its ability to speak in her place, arises from skepticism about language’s 
role in expressing and describing experiences.  The destabilization of narrative 
authority is directly linked to the privileged status of O’s body in which the reader, as 
well as other characters, can observe and learn certain things about her that resist 
signification in language.  By pointing to the limits of the representational abilities of 
language, Réage’s novel exposes some of the gaps in the current symbolic order 
through her portrait of the writing of jouissance on O’s body and through her depiction 
of O as a willing captive who revels in both the pain and the bliss of her servitude.  
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 CODA 
 
Eroticism and Slavery 
 
In his introduction to Story of O, “Happiness in Slavery,” Jean Paulhan draws 
an analogy between Réage’s erotic novel and “an apologia for slavery,” an apocryphal 
document supposedly authored by an Anabaptist minister on behalf of recently 
emancipated but still oppressed blacks living in Barbados (xxii).  After the 
abolishment of slavery in the British West Indies in 1833, Great Britain instituted an 
apprenticeship program for the former slaves in Barbados that essentially perpetuated 
their state of servitude.  Although he acknowledges the harsh conditions of the 
apprenticeship program, which could certainly have served as the basis of a revolt by 
former slaves against their masters, Paulhan makes the outrageous claim that the 
former slaves asked their master “to take them back into bondage” (xxi) because 
“[they] were in love with their master, [and] they could not bear to be without him” 
(xxxvi).  Paulhan imagines that O accepts her servitude because she too cannot bear to 
be without her master; he argues that “[l]ove implies dependence” (xxxii).  Paulhan’s 
comparison between O and the former slaves of Barbados is especially inflammatory 
given the historical context of 1954.  John Culbert nicely sums up the nature of 
Paulhan’s introduction: “Published in 1954, at the height of the decolonization 
movement, Paulhan’s essay is at least as scandalous as the text it introduces” (95).  
Two examples of the decolonization movement affecting France in this period are the 
Algerian War of Independence, which began in 1954, and the 1947 uprising in 
Madagascar, which helped lead to some reforms mandated by the Overseas Territories 
Law of 1956. 
186 
 It is telling that Paulhan uses the example of a British colony rather than a 
French colony; it is as if he wants to distance France from the problems associated 
with empire by displacing the problem onto the British West Indies.  Arguably, the 
most famous slave revolution, the Haitian Revolution of 1791-1804, occurred against 
French rule in Haiti (formerly known as the French colony of Saint-Domingue).  
Réage alludes to the period of the Haitian Revolution through her descriptions of the 
gowns that resemble those of “pretty eighteenth century chambermaids” (6), which the 
enslaved women of Roissy wear.  A physical reminder of the colonies is present in the 
figure of Sir Stephen’s house servant, who is described as “an elderly mulatto servant” 
(89), and O confesses to Sir Stephen that Norah, his servant, “fright[ens] her” (137).  
Sir Stephen validates O’s fears: “‘When Anne-Marie is finished with you, I’ll give you 
genuine reasons for being afraid of Norah’” (137).  Norah is later assigned the duty of 
whipping O when Sir Stephen is unable to do so himself.  The fact that Norah is 
partially of African descent suggests a possible connection to the French colonies, and 
it seems significant that she is assigned the duty of whipping O, as if her beating of O 
is coded representation of the movement for decolonization.  
In her study of Haiti, Joan Dayan argues that there is a strong connection 
between the libertine world depicted in Sade’s works and the Black Code, or Code 
Noir.  As Dayan argues “[t]he one living model for The Hundred and Twenty Days of 
Sodom was slavery in the French Antilles, a fact ignored by all critics of Sade.  It is no 
accident that Sade’s introduction begins with ‘the reign of Louis XIV,’ who 
promulgated the Black Code for the slave owners of the French Antilles” (212).  
Dayan describes the Black Code as “sixty articles that take us into a chilling series of 
qualifications: prohibitions that permit, limitations that invite excess, and a king’s 
grandiloquence that ensures divestment” (203).  Dayan convincingly makes the case 
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 for the Black Code as a source for Sade’s fiction, showing how the reality of slavery 
shared much in common with the excesses and abuses of Sade’s fiction. 
The instruments and technologies of torture and bondage depicted in the 
libertine world of Story of O have a historical model found in the institution of slavery.  
Although O’s conditions of servitude as compared to those of a real slave like Harriet 
Jacobs are vastly different, asymmetrical power relations and physical and sexual 
abuse play a dominant role in each case of servitude.  Unlike O, Jacobs never consents 
to her servitude; Jacobs desires legal and personal freedom whereas O desires a limit 
to her experience of jouissance.  Despite the differences in their goals and motivations, 
the comparison between the two is instructive because it brings historical and 
psychoanalytic models into dialogue.  The sadistic behavior at the center of the 
institution of slavery forces the most challenging questions about the ethical treatment 
of the other at the level of the imaginary; that is, at the level of intersubjective 
relations.  Dayan asserts that “[Sade] revealed the truth at the heart of the traffic in 
slaves: not only economic gain, but the tempting and pleasurable reduction of human 
into thing” (212).  The collision of erotic and ethical matters in the captivity literature 
examined in this study suggests the need for consideration of the human psyche in 
political, as well as personal, affairs.  
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